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Abstract 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation maintains that future 
viability of air transportation may well be predicated on perception 
of safety rather than any more tangible measures.  In order to keep 
safety risks at an acceptable level it advocates a change of 
fundamental approach to the system of safety management, one 
that is more proactive.  This study examines the causes of such a 
requirement for change, and the scope for improving the efficiency 
of what Calabresi refers to as the second principal goal of accident 
law, namely accident cost reduction. First, testing the validity of the 
traditional approach to safety analysis and management, as stated 
in regulatory guidelines.   Secondly, examining the possibility that 
the efficiency of safety cost-benefit analysis can be practicably 
improved. 
 
A subsequent aim is to find an empirically based proxy measure for 
the acceptability of risk by examining the outcomes to potential 
safety related risk scenarios.  Such a measure, if validated, may 
convert many existing intangible assessments concerning safety 
management into more transparent and reliable judgements. 
 
The offshore helicopter industry has many unique characteristics, 
some of which derive from the fact that the customers, the oil & gas 
companies, are more powerful than the operators.  Others relate to 
the absence of any intermodal competition, and passengers who are 
specially trained to be properly aware of their safety.  As choice is 
severely limited, this population is also likely to reflect a much 
broader range of risk preference.  A carefully structured 
questionnaire was presented to a sample of these passengers, and 
the responses analysed in depth.  
 
The conclusions of this study are that choice is driven by the 
perceptions of safety, and that market stability is only maintained 
with the pre-condition that safety is deemed acceptable. Further, 
the failure of this pre-condition will follow a predictable pattern, 
based on a normal distribution for the population.   The 
recommendation of this study is that such reactions to perceptions 
of safety risk are given due consideration alongside traditional cost-
benefit analysis, and in so doing it is likely that more secondary and 
tertiary accident cost factors will be more fully addressed.  This will 
improve the overall efficiency of accident costs reduction, and make 
a significant contribution to the aim of proactive safety 
management. 
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Foreword 
The reasons for taking the slightly unusual step of including a 
foreword with this thesis document are twofold.  The first is to 
explain how the research question arose, and the second is to 
explain the motivation for trying to answer it. 
 
Whilst the normal process of research is to establish the need for a 
research question as a result of conducting the literature review, 
this literature review merely explores the nature of question that 
needs to be asked. The justification for this approach is that I can 
support the need for asking questions about the economics of safety 
on the basis of twenty years experience operating helicopters on 
behalf of the military, police, business aviation, and offshore oil 
support. 
 
Over this time I have endeavoured to understand the industry in 
which I work better, including earlier research work on why a public 
service such as the police should spend considerable amounts of its 
scarce and valuable resources on aviation assets.  I have also 
witnessed times when a new dawn for the helicopter is declared 
with conviction, only to disappear with as many differing opinions as 
to why.  However, it is rare that the problems of encouraging 
growth in the helicopter industry are not discussed without the 
inclusion of some reference to safety. 
 
So, the statistics for helicopter travel must clearly be terrible, 
because the economics of safety are risk neutral and objective?  
They are undoubtedly not as good as modern jet airline travel, but 
in fact UK public transport helicopter operations have a reportable 
accident rate comparable with that for public transport turboprop 
aircraft (CAP 763, 2005).  Yet, concerns within government and 
industry about helicopter safety are such that the International 
Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) was established in 2005 with the 
objective of reducing helicopter accidents by 80 percent in 10 years.  
Where is the statistical justification for this initiative, if that is the 
foundation of the economics of safety?  Safety statistics are clearly 
not as good as jet airline travel, but are they so far short that both 
government and industry should cite safety as being such a key 
performance indicator? 
 
Maybe statistics are not enough. 
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The motivation for this research was borne out of experiences 
following the fatal accident of a Sikorsky S76A+ helicopter, 16th July 
2002, G-BJVX, in the southern North Sea. 
 
I was at the time operating an AS365 helicopter off the North West 
of Scotland when the terrible news of this accident came through, 
quickly followed by instructions to move the aircraft and ourselves 
to Norwich airport.  The circumstances were such that although not 
required by the regulator, manufacturer or operator (a different 
company to ourselves); Shell had elected to spend considerable 
amounts of money chartering replacement aircraft of different types 
to the accident aircraft, as a gesture to their own personnel. 
 
Whilst operating this service for Shell, it became apparent from 
discussions with passengers that they were forming opinions about 
safety based on criteria not appreciated by us as professional 
aircrew. These experiences highlighted that many existing 
assumptions about safety did not appear to fully explain the 
situation as it was in the aftermath of that accident.  
 
The question these experiences raised was: ‘Is safety the challenge 
for the helicopter industry, or, is it our understanding of safety that 
is a challenge for the helicopter industry?’ 
 
There is of course the third possibility; that some of the challenges 
experienced in the helicopter industry are partly due to safety, 
partly due to our understanding of safety, and partly due to the 
manner in which safety is communicated. 
 
It is possible that the environment of the helicopter industry 
highlights shortcomings in our understanding of safety in some way 
that other sectors of the aviation industry do not.  Additionally, a 
better understanding of the economics of safety under these 
particular circumstances, of heightened passenger awareness and 
customer bargaining power, could well improve our knowledge of 
how safety influences choices under more general circumstances. 
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1 Introduction 
Dr. Edward P. Warner, the future inaugural president of ICAO, 
writing as Professor of Aeronautics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, in 1922, commented that: “Since it is the fact that the 
fear of accident is a strong deterrent influence from the use of 
aircraft, it is very important that the real facts in the matter should 
not only be determined in such a way as to be available to the 
technical world, but also that they should be laid before the non-
flying public in all possible completeness in order that they may 
furnish the ground for each individual to make his own decision as 
to the wisdom of flight for his own purposes.” 
 
In the intervening years there has been a dramatic improvement in 
the statistical safety of airline travel.  As recently as 1972 there 
were 3.4 fatal accidents per million flight hours for world-wide 
scheduled services (Taylor, 1988), and from the most recent 
Aviation Safety Review by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAP 763, 
2005) the ten year average for jet aircraft is less than 10% of that, 
at 0.3 fatal accidents per million flight hours.  Today of course air 
travel is commonplace, to the extent that in International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) surveys of ‘Factors Influencing Airline 
Choice, Long-Haul’, safety scores less than 15% in relative terms to 
other factors such as schedules, which can be nearly 50% for first-
class passengers (Clark, 2001). 
 
However, it is widely suggested that picture may be different for 
helicopters. In February 2006 Flight International ran a feature on 
helicopter safety, it was entitled “Playing Catch Up”, with the 
opening line: “Helicopter Safety is not good enough.”  The main 
source for this statement would appear to be recent US figures, 
where for 2004 the fatal accident rate for civil helicopters was  
equivalent to 14.8 per million flight hours.  Those US helicopters 
operating to Part 135 rules during 2004 have a better record, 
equivalent to 7.8 per million flight hours, as reported in Flight 
International.   
 
David Lawrence (1991), writing during the time he held the post of 
Director of Market Planning, United Technologies Sikorsky Aircraft 
Division, describes the challenges facing the helicopter market thus: 
“Often, the helicopter succeeds not because it is a better way, but 
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because it is the only way.  If it is to escape that embarrassment, it 
must overcome infrastructural problems, negative attitudes of 
travellers and the public,.. ..there are three critical technologies that 
must be addressed, and probably in this order: (1) dispatch 
reliability and safety, (2) economy and productivity, and (3) 
amenities : less noise and vibration, and more comfort.” 
 
Safety improvements seem to be so widely cited as the top priority 
for the helicopter industry that an international initiative to improve 
safety standards by 80% over 10 years was begun towards the end 
of 2005, called the IHST.  The case for targeting statistical 
measures of safety as the key performance indicator for sustainable 
growth in the helicopter industry would appear to be 
unquestionable.  However, safety is possibly the most significant of 
commercial factors in the UK offshore helicopter industry, a section 
of the industry that has highly developed safety management 
systems and has invested considerable resources to making 
technical improvements.  A programme of initiatives that has 
managed to reduce the fatal accident rate to below 3.4 per million 
flight hours (CAP 735), or the same as that for world scheduled 
airline operations in 1972 and less than half that of US Part 135 
operators. 
 
It raises the question, are objective measures of statistical safety 
sufficient to explain the present market conditions, and to achieve 
the stated objectives for its future growth and viability? 
 
There seems to be an equally strong case to understand what it is 
about the very nature of safety that eludes the industry.  There is 
an apparent need to determine what it is about helicopters (as a 
type of technology) that may prove incompatible with current 
definitions of safety, or to determine what it is about current safety 
objectives that fails to achieve the overall aim of strengthening 
demand for helicopter travel. 
 
If it is possible to answer all, or even some of these questions, it is 
then highly likely that the improvement of knowledge will not only 
aid the specific problem of strengthening the helicopter industry, 
but also contribute to wider knowledge about the economics of 
safety in transportation generally. 
 
Paradoxically, it is the very characteristics of offshore helicopter 
travel that make it so potentially valuable as a means to explore the 
nature of safety, and its effect on market conditions. First, there is 
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no choice for passengers but to accept helicopter travel if they wish 
to work in the offshore oil sector.  As pay and conditions are 
relatively high compared to alternative sources of employment, 
some people who are more risk averse than the average will still be 
included in the survey.  Whereas, if a similar study into these 
aspects of safety were to be conducted in any other sector of 
aviation, these same personality types would likely be excluded, as 
they may not choose to travel by air.  Another factor is that as 
helicopter travel is effectively part of the terms and conditions of 
work for this population, so there are many institutions with an 
interest in air safety, including the employer organisations and the 
unions.  This creates considerable extra pressure on helicopter 
operators to be transparent.  Similarly, there is likely to be far 
greater awareness of air safety amongst this passenger population.  
 
In all, these conditions and constraints create an environment for 
study that can justifiably be described as unique within the aviation 
industry, and, for that matter, amongst most other forms of 
transport.  Such an environment facilitates a comprehensive 
evaluation of both the behavioural and statistical measures of 
safety.  It also provides good opportunities to assess the validity of 
any proposed modification of theory and predicted outcomes, 
against observed organisational behaviour in the face of a safety 
related crisis.  Included amongst these, the accident investigation 
and aftermath of the accident involving the S-76A+ helicopter G-
BJVX. 
 
 
1.1 Research Goal 
 
Within the system of air transport, explore the relationships 
between determinants of safety and any consequential economic 
forces. 
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2 Literature Review 
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2.1 Definitions of Safety 
 
"To resolve any complex whole into elements of which it is compounded, is the meaning of analysis; 
and this we do when we replace one word which connotes a set of attributes collectively, by two or 
more which connote the same attributes singly, or in smaller groups."  
 John Stuart Mill, “A System of Logic”, 1892. 
 
The very fact that Orville Wright got airborne Thursday 17th 
December 1903 is testament to the idea that differences of opinion 
about what constitutes ‘safe’ have beneficially served the interests 
of society over history.  However, to facilitate meaningful analysis of 
how these variable definitions of safety influence individual decision-
making, and collective decision-making, it is important to try and 
map the many connotations of the word ‘safe’, and by extension, 
‘safety’.  
 
The ICAO states that: “While the elimination of accidents (and 
serious incidents) would be desirable, a hundred percent safety is 
an unachievable goal.. ..Safety is a relative notion, whereby 
inherent risks are acceptable in a “safe” system”(ICAO Safety 
Management Manual, 2006). 
 
The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK adopts the general 
principle termed ‘Tolerability of Risk’ (TOR), but equally concedes 
that this does not mean the same thing as acceptable risk (HSE, 
2001). 
 
‘Safety’ denotes competing interests between a potential injurer and 
a potential victim (Calabresi, 1970; Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978). This 
translates into several definitions of ‘safety’, delineated by both 
variations in viewpoint and context. 
 
Derived from the literature covered here, there would appear to be 
at least four distinct viewpoints, which are: 
 
• The Technical Viewpoint 
• The Legal Viewpoint 
• The Political Viewpoint 
• The Social Viewpoint 
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2.1.1 Viewpoints 
2.1.1.1 An Engineering or Technical Viewpoint 
 
The engineering approach to safety is centred on the probability of 
failure, which consequently dominates the creation of airworthiness 
requirements. 
 
Lloyd & Tye (2002) describe the process of safety assessment as 
analysing the probability of system failure, which can be divided 
into six categories (p.7): 
 
a. The effects of single and multiple material failures. 
b. The lack of adequate performance with or without material 
failures. 
c. Errors in manufacture or maintenance, some of which can be 
caused by poor design or inadequate procedures. 
d. Pilot mismanagement sometimes made possible by poor 
arrangement of controls or poor presentation of information, 
or inadequate procedures. 
e. The effects of environmental conditions not adequately 
catered for in the design (e.g. ice, lightning strikes). 
f. The behaviour of passengers, ground handlers and cabin 
crew. 
 
This approach results in a technical viewpoint, where safety is 
deemed as the balance between the probability of a harmful 
occurrence, and the nature and scale of consequences. 
 
Table 1 is a summary of international standards that form the 
technical definition of aviation safety (Lloyd & Tye,2002, p.36). The 
purpose is to show the differences in technical definition of safety 
between Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) as stipulated in the 
USA, and the European equivalents (JAR). 
 
This definition is, by extension, used to define many safety goals 
and objectives, a fact recognised by Reason (1997): “The most 
widely used indicator is the number of negative outcomes,..” 
(p.108). For example, on the question of a sustainable aviation 
industry, Upham (2003) makes reference to a report conducted on 
behalf of the Air Transport Action Group, by INFRAS (2000).  In this 
report, it is maintained that one of the necessary ‘social criteria’ 
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should be safety, as defined by: “number of accidents, deaths per 
year and per unit of transport” (p.11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Relationship Between Probability and Severity of Effects 
(source: Redrawn from Lloyd & Tye) 
 
Some of the use, or misuse, of this definition has attracted criticism. 
Weir (2000) expresses the opinion that: “The aviation industry 
persistently resists new safety measures, but when such attitudes 
look like attracting widespread criticism it commissions research...  
..For misleading uses of statistics, the airline industry is the place to 
go” (p.2-3). 
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2.1.1.2 A Legal Viewpoint 
 
From a legal viewpoint, the definition of safe, and safety centres on 
assessments of due care (Abeyratne , 1999; Shavell, 1987). 
 
The appropriate level of due care will be influenced by: the 
likelihood that harm will occur, the nature, scope and scale of harm 
that can result from an activity, the ability of potential injurers to 
alleviate risk. 
 
Although similar in some fashion with the technical viewpoint of 
safety, in that this viewpoint also makes reference to the probability 
and scale of harm, there are some important distinctions. 
 
As described by Shavell (1987), the consideration of how easy it is 
for potential injurers to alleviate risk introduces a time frame not 
evident in the technical definition of safety.  For example, if the 
advancement of knowledge or technology should create an 
alternative method of reducing risk, then this can influence the 
assessment of due care, and hence the courts’ definition of safety.  
This notion of obsolescence means that, “a firm will be held liable 
for harms resulting from a dangerous characteristic in all units of its 
product if an alternative, safer design could have been used at 
reasonable cost” (p.63). 
2.1.1.3 The Political Viewpoint 
 
Expediency plays its part in forming the political viewpoint of safety, 
in a similar way to any other arena requiring consensus and a 
degree of international harmony. 
 
Political interest in aviation has been explicit since early days, 
eloquently characterised by this statement, made by Dr Edward 
Warner at the Opening Session of the Interim Council of the 
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation, August 1945: 
“Our first purpose will be to smooth the paths for civil flying 
wherever we are able.  We shall seek to make it physically easier, 
safer, more reliable, more pleasant; but I believe it will be agreed 
also that we should maintain the constant goal that civil aviation 
should contribute to international harmony.  The civil use of aircraft 
must so develop as to bring the peoples closer together, letting 
nation speak more understandingly unto nation” (cited in 
Abeyratne, 1999, p.10). 
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However, the problems of achieving international consensus on 
market related issues, such as routes and capacity, has sometimes 
resulted in a manipulation of the definition of safety to facilitate 
other political aims and objectives circuitously. 
 
Golich (1989) has written an authoritative text, “The Political 
Economy of International Air Safety”, in which many of the 
mechanisms for using safety as a political device are described, 
commenting: “Industry personnel are concerned that safety 
regulations and engineering standards may be used to preclude 
foreign products from markets even though the agreement on 
technical barriers to trade negotiated under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade prohibits their use as 
‘obstacles to international trade’”(p.50); and further, “State elites 
recognised the potential benefits inherent in dominating the 
industry and controlling the safety regime” (p.60). 
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2.1.1.4 A Social Viewpoint 
 
Any economic system, essentially concerned with the production 
and exchange of goods, will depend for its efficiency not only on the 
availability of monetary capital, but also on what has become known 
as ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 2000).  Sen (1999), discussing social 
capital, makes reference to the ‘complementary values’ required for 
the success of capitalism, “such as the making and sustaining of 
trust, avoiding the temptations of pervasive corruption, and making 
assurance a workable substitute for punitive legal enforcement” 
(p.267). 
 
The importance of trust to a system, one characterised by 
complexity and uncertainty, is that it allows those individuals who 
may feel disadvantaged by lack of knowledge, information or power, 
and who subsequently feel vulnerable to harm, to engage in risky 
activities (Lazaric et al., 1998; Cvetkovich et al.,1999; O’Hara, 
2004; Slovic, 2000). Without a general level of trust, many 
functions or activities of modern society would be unsustainable, or 
at least be subject to significant volatility and instability. “Trust is a 
kind of cement which allows partners to commit resources to 
collaborative endeavours in contexts where there remains an 
irreducible element of uncertainty over the outcome” (Lazaric and 
Lorenz, 1998, p.209). 
 
Safety remains such an ‘irreducible element of uncertainty’, and it is 
for this reason that trust becomes a critical element in the social 
viewpoint for a definition of safety. 
 
Sjoberg (1999), commenting on the relationship between risk 
perception and trust, notes that: “There was some support in the 
data for the notion that low trust is sufficient to create a high 
demand for risk mitigation, while high trust is not sufficient to 
create the opposite, only necessary” (p.99). 
 
A definition of safety that is predicated on notions of trust is 
consequently highly dependent on perception: perceptions of risk as 
a range of probabilities, perceptions of risk as a set of dangers or 
hazards.  
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2.1.2 Context 
 
As stated earlier, the second category of variable that emerges from 
the literature as being critically important to the formation of a 
given definition of safety is context.   Context in this sense is taken 
as including elements of the cultural framework, such as rationality 
and perception. 
2.1.2.1 Rationality 
 
Earle and Cvetkovich (1999), Adams (1995), Slovic (2000) and 
Perrow (1999) all describe how people can disagree and argue 
different viewpoints entirely rationally, founded on cultural premise.  
As Douglas (1992) elaborates: “There is no way for protecting the 
claims for rational foundations of discourse.  The ground rules (that 
is the conditions for knowledge) cannot be tested and proved in the 
same way as discourse itself is tested. The step-by-step 
construction of a logical argument, correctly performed, leads to 
valid conclusions.  But though valid, the conclusions may not be 
accepted as true.. ..The question of foundations is about acceptable 
categories, not about valid logic.”(p.250-251) The implication being 
that where the parties to discussion come from ideologically and 
culturally is as influential on the final outcome as what is being said. 
 
Adams (1995) holds that there are four cultural frameworks on 
which opinions concerning safety and risk are founded: 1) 
Individualism, 2) Egalitarianism, 3) Hierarchism, and 4) Fatalism. 
Slovic (2000) contends that in addition to these four there is 
another distinct framework, called ‘technological enthusiasm’. 
 
Where: 
 
• Individualism, is associated with a philosophy promoting 
market forces, individual responsibility, and which is resistant 
to State regulation. 
• Egalitarianism, is generally associated with precautionary 
approaches to technology and risk, and supporting of State 
regulation for its protective purposes. 
• Hierarchism, is generally associated with groups or individuals 
who look for the answers to risk and uncertainty through 
institutional structure, and direction from those in authority, 
both scientific and administrative.  State regulation is 
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supported as much for its corrective purposes as for its 
protective ones. 
• Fatalism, unlike the others, is linked with a socio-economic 
stratum of society (Adams, 1995).  The fatalist views risk and 
danger as a lottery, and any attempt to engage with society 
to address them as being futile.  Adams suggests that this a 
view prevalent amongst lower socio-economic groups. 
• Technological enthusiasm, Slovic (2000) proposes this fifth 
group as distinct from the others, and represented by a view 
that answers can be found to health and social well-being in 
technology. 
 
Perrow (1999) iterates the importance of rationality on decision-
making, but classifies just three varieties: 1) Absolute rationality, 2) 
Bounded rationality, 3) Social Rationality. 
 
Where: 
• Absolute rationality, describes the decision framework where 
risk and hazard are assessed and balanced purely on objective 
criteria, probability and expected loss. 
• Bounded rationality, describes a framework that accepts that 
decisions are made using mental shortcuts, termed heuristics, 
which allow people to simplify overly complex problems into 
more manageable concepts.  However, decisions remain 
essentially concerned with probability and expected loss. 
• Social rationality, is a term describing a framework of decision 
making less concerned with the probability and size of any 
loss, but more concerned with the social consequences of 
such a loss, in terms of community and social bonding. 
 
2.1.2.2 Hazards, the Perceptions of Safety and Trust 
 
It is the nature of aviation hazards (involving new technology, 
potential for externalities or consequences, and powerful images) 
that any perception of safety is necessarily multidimensional, and 
highly susceptible to context. 
 
Investigation into these aspects of safety has traditionally been the 
preserve of psychologists, of which there is in fact a wealth of 
material available.  Of particular significance to this study have 
been the works of Slovic, 2000; Adams, 1995; Perrow, 1999. 
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Researching the nature of dangers and the perceptions of hazards in 
general, these authorities on risk all tend to identify similar key 
dimensions, which ultimately define the acceptability of a given risk.  
Whilst not all the writers reviewed here consider all eleven 
behavioural characteristics critically significant, each factor is 
considered so by at least some. 
 
Summing up the literature reviewed, the eleven behavioural 
characteristics most relevant to any overall perception of safety are: 
 
• Voluntariness 
• Familiarity 
• Immediacy & Conspicuousness 
• Framing 
• Dread 
• Control 
• Catastrophic Potential 
• Equity & Fairness 
• Knowledge 
• Availability 
• Uncertainty & Ambiguity 
 
It is worth noting at this stage that the characteristic of ‘peril’ is not 
considered separately, as it tends to be a compound description of 
others (Slovic, 2000), mainly immediacy and catastrophic potential. 
2.1.2.2.1 Voluntariness 
 
Starr (1969) has been able to establish that a significant 
determinant of the acceptability of risk is the degree of voluntary 
action involved, suggesting that voluntary risks may be acceptable 
at as much as 1000 times greater levels than involuntary ones.  
However, Slovic (2000) also found that the voluntary characteristic 
of risk tends to be highly correlated with other negatively perceived 
characteristics, and suggests that voluntariness of risk may just be 
a circumstance of these. 
 
Adams (1995), whilst accepting that measuring voluntariness is 
problematic, suggests that there are degrees of volition in taking 
risk, “depending on the relative sizes of those imposing the risk and 
those imposed upon; the greater the relative size of the person or 
agency imposing the risk, the less voluntary the risk will appear to 
those imposed upon”(p.66). 
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2.1.2.2.2 Familiarity 
 
Starr (1969;1972), as well as proposing a voluntary dimension to 
risk, found that “the acceptable level of risk is inversely related to 
the number of persons participating in an activity” (cited in Slovic, 
2000, p.26) 
 
Douglas (1985) recognises the role of familiarity, and suggests that 
ignoring everyday dangers is a species survival strategy, and 
“allows humans to keep cool in the midst of dangers” (p.30). 
 
Savage (1998) also considers familiarity a strong influence on risk 
perception, noting: “In effect, familiarity breeds contempt for the 
possibility of risk” (p.113) 
 
2.1.2.2.3 Immediacy & Conspicuousness  
 
The degree to which victims are identifiable and the degree to which 
they can be directly associated with an accident, or the 
consequences of an accident, will greatly affect perceptions of 
safety.  In other words, many events around the world (both 
natural and technological) can result in far higher numbers of 
victims than aviation accidents, but will not, somehow, generate the 
same levels of outrage from the general public.  Some of this may 
be due to the fact many victims (who will in all probability be 
anonymous) suffer the consequences of the accident many years 
after the event (e.g., Chernobyl), and are what Perrow (1999) 
describes as fourth-party victims (future generations).  This makes 
it difficult to create the same awareness amongst the public of the 
association of losses with the causal event (immediacy vs. delay). 
Whereas, an aviation accident may create many fewer victims, but 
they easily become named (with clearly identifiable family 
connections and human interest stories), and they arise in the 
moments of the accident itself. 
2.1.2.2.4 Framing 
 
Slovic (2000) makes a detailed analysis of how differences in the 
presentation of information can greatly influence decision-making, 
without there being any difference in actual informational content.  
This  ‘framing’ of information is particularly important in risk 
perception; “Subtle aspects of how problems are posed, questions 
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are phrased and responses elicited can have substantial impact on 
judgements that supposedly express people’s preferences.”(p.166)  
 
A classic example is how the dangers of medical treatment are 
presented to patients (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  The same 
probabilities (invariance) are presented in two frames: 1) a Survival 
Frame, the numbers living after treatment, and, 2) a Mortality 
Frame, the numbers dying from treatment.  There is generally a 
greater uptake of treatment when the problem is framed as one of 
survival rather than mortality. 
2.1.2.2.5 Dread 
 
The potential to anticipate death and suffering can weigh heavily on 
the psyche, and this constitutes a characteristic of certain types of 
risk termed ‘dread’. 
 
Not only does ‘dread’ affect those in immediate proximity to a given 
hazard, it is also recognised as a source of ‘harm’ to relatives and 
dependents of victims, who can experience suffering, as ‘dread’, 
vicariously. 
 
In 2001, US District Judge Charles Legge of San Francisco ruled that 
relatives of the crash victims in the Alaska Airlines, Flight 261 
accident could pursue claims against Boeing for ‘the terror suffered 
by the passengers in the final minutes’ (The San Francisco 
Chronicle, Judge refuses to delay suit over crash of Alaska Airlines 
plane, 23 June 2001) 
 
2.1.2.2.6 Control 
 
Closely associated with the factor of voluntariness (suggested by 
Starr (1969) as being particularly influential), is the degree of 
available control over the levels of risk, or risk exposure. Slovic 
(2000) found that higher thresholds of acceptable risk are generally 
correlated with activities that can be tightly controlled, or at least 
give the impression of being under control. 
 
Perrow (1999) classifies risks over which the individual performing 
the activity has some control as ‘active’, as opposed to ‘passive’.  
However, Perrow also makes the point that ‘active’ risks are rarely 
undertaken for someone else’s profit, and so this makes another 
close connection with the idea of voluntary vs. non-voluntary risks. 
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If any potential differences in knowledge about risk exposure are 
ignored or assumed to be balanced, Perrow also makes the point 
that in any given activity (e.g., transportation); potential first-party 
victims (operators) will likely accept higher thresholds of risk than 
second-party victims (passengers), who in-turn would accept higher 
thresholds than third-party victims (innocent bystanders).  
 
2.1.2.2.7 Catastrophic Potential 
 
Slovic (2000) found another important factor in assessing 
acceptable risk, closely correlated with voluntariness, that of 
castrophic potential, stating: “We conclude that society’s apparent 
aversion to involuntary risks may be mostly an illusion, caused by 
the fact that involuntary risks are often noxious in more important 
ways, such as being inequitable or potentially catastrophic” (p.148). 
 
2.1.2.2.8 Equity & Fairness  
 
Whether or not the benefits derived from a risky activity are 
considered fairly distributed amongst society, and whether the costs 
of the same activities result in externalities (costs borne by third- or 
fourth-party victims), can have a significant bearing on the levels of 
risk mitigation required, and any general acceptance of the safety 
hazards concerned (Slovic, 2000; Perrow, 1999). 
 
Douglas (1985) notes that; “It is often held that perception of risk is 
directed by issues of fairness.. ..The threshold of risk acceptability 
in the workplace is lowered when the workers consider themselves 
exploited”(p.5). 
 
2.1.2.2.9 Knowledge 
 
The writings of many academics reviewed here, from differing fields 
of interest, tend toward agreement on the subject of knowledge. 
That is that knowledge plays a pivotal role in forming perceptions 
about risk, and particularly any acceptance what is deemed ‘safe’. 
 
Awareness of a hazard is the starting point of risk perception 
(Regester & Larkin, 1997). As writers on risk management, such as 
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Davidson Frame (2003),point out; before planning a response to a 
risk it has first to be thought of as possible.  In situations that have 
potential for tragic consequences, the very fact that significant 
sections of society may either be unaware, or later may become 
aware of a known hazard, can have a significant impact on the 
accepted standards of safety. Calbresi & Bobbitt (1978) recognised 
a phenomenon where ‘tragic choices’ (e.g., decisions to ration or 
limit expenditure on safety devices) are accepted by the population 
at large for as long as the decision is not evidently a choice that 
challenges fundamental values, termed the ‘sufficiency paradox’.  
So, for example, a decision not to act on many of the Vice President 
Al Gore led, White House Commission on Aviation Safety’s 
recommendations for improving airport security in 1997 were 
generally acceptable to the public (Cobb & Primo, 2003), because 
there was no real awareness of a ‘tragic choice’ (i.e., convenience to 
the passenger and cost savings to the airlines winning over possible 
terrorist threat).  However, in a post September 11th 2001 world, 
many recommendations became a political imperative, almost 
regardless of cost; because security was clearly no longer 
‘sufficient’, awareness (knowledge) had been triggered, and the 
tragic implications of the choice were evident to all.  
 
2.1.2.2.10 Availability 
 
Once an awareness of a hazard is alerted, it is widely suggested 
that perception tends to be heavily influenced by how easily a 
particular incidence of the hazard is recalled to mind. 
 
As previously reviewed when discussing bounded rationality, 
psychologists have found that people (either as individuals or as an 
institution) tend to cope with complexity by simplifying it with rules 
of thumb, or mental shortcuts, called ‘heuristics’ (Slovic, 2000;  
Perrow, 1999;  Gowda, 1999; Sunstein, 2002). 
 
According to Slovic (2000); “..any incident that makes the 
occurrence of an event easy to imagine or to recall is likely to 
enhance its perceived frequency” (p.37). 
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2.1.2.2.11 Uncertainty & Ambiguity 
 
Adams (1995) describes a state of risk being where the odds of 
various possible future states are knowable, and uncertainty as one 
where either the possible future states themselves are unknown 
(and hence the probabilities are necessarily unknown), or the odds 
of future states are unknowable. “It is common in cases of genuine 
uncertainty for the perceptibility of hazards to be much clearer to 
non-scientists than to scientists.  Most of us, most of the time, 
navigate our way through life with remarkably simplistic ideas of the 
threats we face” (p.199). 
 
A leading theory of choice in the face of uncertainty is called 
‘prospect theory’ (Tversky and Kahneman,1986).  The theory 
describes a set of circumstances where apparently irrational 
decisions (i.e., decisions that do not maximise expected utility) 
become rational (or, at least conform to observed rules of 
behaviour). Of significant interest is the proposed idea that there is 
a tendency for people to prefer choices that offer either certainty, or 
the illusion of certainty (pseudocertainty). Slovic (2000) tested this 
idea via a questionnaire on vaccination, and found that the form of 
wording that apparently provided complete protection from one 
strain of disease, and none for another, was received more 
favourably than an alternative form of wording, presenting the 
identical scenario as an overall reduction of risk for both strains. 
 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) make similar findings, but introduce a 
concept of ‘ambiguity’, defined as ‘an intermediate state between 
ignorance and risk’, that is a function ‘of the number of distributions 
that are not ruled out by one’s knowledge of the situation’ (p.45).  
It is argued that normal behaviour is to try and avoid ambiguity, 
and that this tendency could explain why ‘new technologies are 
resisted more than one would expect on the basis of their first-order 
probabilities of accidents, failures, and so on’ (p.46). The overall 
effect of decision making under ambiguity is that low probabilities of 
loss tend to be overestimated (pessimistic view), and comparable 
win probabilities tend to be underestimated (optimistic view). 
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2.1.3 Definitions of Safety in Common Usage  
 
“The FAA has no definition of safety – no official definition, that is.  
Safety is not defined in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. It is not 
specified in the FAA regulations.  It is not explained in the agency’s 
guidelines.  So FAA officials can’t say what safety is..” Mary Schiavo, 
Inspector General, US Department of Transportation, 1990 – 1996 
(Cited in: Cobb & Primo, 2003, p.153-154) 
 
However, the ICAO does attempt to provide a working definition of 
safety in its Safety Management Manual (2006).  The ICAO accepts 
that “the concept of aviation safety may have different 
connotations, such as: 
a) Zero accidents (or serious incidents), a view widely held by 
the travelling public; 
b) Freedom from dangers or risks; i.e. those factors which cause 
or are likely to cause harm; 
c) Attitude towards unsafe acts and conditions by employees 
(reflecting a ‘safe’ corporate culture); 
d) Degree to which the inherent risks in aviation are ‘acceptable’; 
e) Process of hazard identification and risk management; and 
f) Control of accidental loss (of persons, property or damage to 
the environment)… 
.. Thus, for the purpose of this Manual safety is considered to be: 
Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property 
damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable 
level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk 
management.” (p.1-3) 
 
It should be emphasised that the active part of this definition is “an 
acceptable level”.  This is because the Manual goes on by saying 
that “The acceptable level of safety shall be established by the 
State(s) concerned” (p.1-4). This is an acknowledgment that the 
definition of safety remains highly political, and that it is a remote 
possibility that there will not be many variations of ‘acceptability’ 
across regions, and even across industry sectors within a State. 
 
Cobb and Primo (2003), rather than trying to resolve the differing 
concepts of safety into a single definition, argue that disputes arise 
over the meaning of ‘safe’ exactly because there are innate 
differences in definition, rather than just different ‘acceptable 
levels’.  It is proposed that there are at least six definitions of safety 
within the aviation business. 
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Definition 1: Safety Defined as the Statistical Probability of Dying in 
a Plane Crash 
Definition 2: Safety Defined as No One Being Killed in a Crash 
Definition 3: Safety Defined as the Absence of Unsolved Crashes 
Definition 4: Safety Defined as the In-Flight Performance of Planes 
and Airlines 
Definition 5: Safety Defined as the Ground Performance of Planes 
and Airlines 
Definition 6: Safety Defined as Invulnerability to Terrorism 
(p.154 – 161) 
Cobb and Primo point out many of the implications of these 
definitions, some of which are discussed in more detail below: 
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Definition 1: Safety Defined as the Statistical Probability of Dying in 
a Plane Crash 
 
This definition tends to emphasise that air travel is statistically safer 
than any other common mode of transport, and any accident is 
likely to be both an isolated and rare occurrence.  However, it has 
been pointed out that ‘for those who accept this safety criterion, 
there is no premium on taking immediate corrective action following 
a crash.  Clearly, planes are not unsafe’ (Cobb & Primo, 2003, 
p.156).  
 
It is also worth noting the comments made by Sunstein (2002) on 
the significance of risk. Sunstein points out that the significance test 
of a hazard is a function of not only the probability of loss, but also 
the size of population affected. By this argument, even the best 
airworthiness standards of a probability of failure no greater than 
10–9  (Lloyd & Tye, 2002) becomes ‘significant’ when a certain level 
of the world’s population become exposed. This concept is also 
reflected in the opening remarks made by Congressman Norman 
Mineta to the US National Civil Aviation Review Committee, October 
1997: “It is also clear that the anticipated growth in aviation 
coupled with the current accident rate [will mean that] the 
frequency of accidents in the future will become wholly 
unacceptable” (cited in: Weir, 1999, p.7). 
 
Definition 2: Safety Defined as No One Being Killed in a Crash 
Cobb & Primo interpret this as the absolute safety standard, or zero 
accidents, stated by the ICAO as ‘a view widely held by the 
travelling public’ (Safety Management Manual, 2006, p.1-3). 
 
Definition 3: Safety Defined as the Absence of Unsolved Crashes 
 
This definition expresses the concept that accidents can be accepted 
only provided that the causes can be explained and rationalised.  It 
is a concept closely allied to the findings that people exhibit an 
aversion to uncertainty and ambiguity, discussed earlier. 
 
One significant implication of this definition is: “This safety definition 
is demanding for those involved, allowing no failures and 
uncertainties on the part of investigators.  No matter how long the 
time period, causes must be found and the public must be given a 
satisfactory answer”(Cobb & Primo, 2003, p.158). 
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Definition 4: Safety Defined as the In-Flight Performance of Planes 
and Airlines 
 
If failures are discovered, then corrective measures need to be 
taken to ensure no further recurrence.  It is implied by this 
definition that confidence in aviation ‘safety’ can be sustained 
provided a system of hazard identification and risk management is 
incorporated, and effectively maintained. 
 
Definition 5: Safety Defined as the Ground Performance of Planes 
and Airlines 
 
This definition is used by Cobb & Primo to describe a concept that 
aviation safety can be deemed acceptable on the basis of the 
perceived quality of regulatory oversight.  The implication of this 
definition is that if the State’s regulatory authority appears 
ineffective, or even incompetent, then overall public perception can 
be seriously affected. 
 
This concept is supported by other findings on the functioning of 
institutional trust.  “The result of globalising trust through 
institutions is to increase both trust and risk simultaneously.. ..It is 
essential in such circumstances that the institutions are reliable and 
efficient, and have effective powers of investigation.. ..in the world 
of institutionalised trust, an institution certifying people as 
trustworthy had better have proper procedures, because if one of 
the people it certifies turns out to be untrustworthy, everyone else 
it certifies falls under a shadow. Uncertainty increases” (O’Hara, 
2004, p.88). 
 
 
Definition 6: Safety Defined as Invulnerability to Terrorism 
 
This definition is included in a text written post September 11th 
2001, and it is suggested that: “Now when a crash occurs, this is 
the first definition that comes to mind for many” (Cobb & Primo, 
2003, p.161). 
 
Having discovered that safety can, and does, mean differing things 
to different people, it is important to explore how these distinctions 
can impact on market conditions. 
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2.2 The Financial Implications of Safety 
 
“The air transportation industry’s future viability may well be 
predicated on its ability to sustain the public’s perceived comfort 
regarding their safety while travelling.  The management of safety is 
therefore a prerequisite for a sustainable aviation business”(ICAO, 
Safety Management Manual, 2006, p.1-4). 
 
However, safety is not now, nor has it ever been, the ultimate 
objective.  Safety is a facilitator or enabler of other desired benefits 
and outputs of air travel. As long as the perceived standard meets 
the required standard by the customer, then safety is unlikely to 
feature greatly in the demand function (Savage, 1998).  
 
The aviation industry has been enjoined with many grand 
objectives, not least those elucidated by Dr Edward Warner (later 
the first president of the ICAO Council): “The civil use of aircraft 
must so develop as to bring the peoples closer together, letting 
nation speak more understandingly unto nation” (cited in: 
Aberatyne, 1999, p.10).  Although the outputs of aviation cannot, in 
all honesty, be said to be entirely beneficial, particularly as 
awareness of environmental hazards gain in prominence, it 
undoubtedly has a significant part to play in the global economy 
(Upham et al., 2003). 
 
The mechanisms by which aviation delivers the various economic 
and social benefits can be reduced to categories defined by a 
lowering of transaction costs, enhancing the scale and scope of 
freedom of movement, and the efficiency of communication. Human 
capital is thereby enhanced, and the capability of an economy to 
grow and develop is generally improved. 
 
“We have good reasons to buy and sell, to exchange, and to seek 
lives that can flourish on the basis of transactions. To deny that 
freedom in general would be in itself a major failing of a society.. 
..The ubiquitous role of transactions in modern living is often 
overlooked precisely because we take them for granted”(Sen, 1999, 
p.112). 
 
These attributes are the purpose for which the activity of aviation is 
undertaken, and will ultimately determine its success. It is therefore 
against the benefits derived from these attributes that safety will be 
assessed.   
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A consideration when assessing the overall utility (or, gain) from 
undertaking a risky activity is that the benefits (freedom of 
movement, efficiency of communication, lower transaction costs) 
are not subject to the same scale factor as the costs (loss of life, 
damage to property, environmental hazards, etc.).  Thus, any 
overall assessment is subject to not only what is produced (air 
travel), but also how much is produced, and the nature of 
consumption (i.e., how many people and how often) (Calabresi, 
1970; Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978; Shavell, 1987). 
 
The judgement translates into whether the presence of extra safety 
enhances the quantity or distribution of benefits, and whether the 
absence of safety would similarly detract or add to the costs. 
 
Sunstein (2002) argues that it is only economically efficient to 
manage ‘significant risks’, where the degree of significance is 
determined by the probability of occurrence multiplied by the size of 
population affected. 
 
If the aviation market were considered ‘perfect’ (as defined in an 
economic context), the financial implications of safety could be 
assessed merely by observance of any shifts in demand and supply.  
However, the aviation market is considered ‘imperfect’, and subject 
to the failings of: 1) producing externalities (including the potential 
for ‘tragic’ consequences), 2) asymmetric information, 3) latent 
conditions, and 4) insufficient resources to fully cover liabilities 
(Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978; Needham, 1982; Shavell, 1987).  
 
Savage (1998) suggests that these conditions can lead to two 
situations of myopic behaviour, both of which rely on imperfect 
information.  In the one case, an unscrupulous company might rely 
on customers’ assumption that safety is being maintained at the 
required (and previously held) standard to maintain prices, but 
actually cut costs. This utilises imperfect information to make short 
run gains by reducing expenditure on safety inputs, in the 
knowledge that should an accident expose these shortcuts the 
liabilities will in all likelihood result in bankruptcy. The second case 
also results from imperfect information, where a company itself 
does not fully understand the risks and liabilities of conducting 
operations, and makes insufficient resources available for safety 
inputs. 
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For these reasons, the aviation market is a State regulated industry, 
and, as a consequence, both market and regulatory financial 
impacts have to be considered. 
 
“The aviation workplace is filled with potentially unsafe conditions 
which will not all be eliminated; yet, operations must continue” 
(ICAO, Safety Management Manual, 2006, p.4-22). 
2.2.1 The Financial Implications of a Lack of Safety 
 
The ICAO recognises that: “For most companies, safety can best be 
measured by the absence of accidental losses.  Companies may 
realize they have a safety problem following a major accident or 
loss, in part because it will impact on the profit/loss statement. 
However, a company may operate for years with many potentially 
unsafe conditions without adverse consequence.  Without effective 
safety management to identify and correct these unsafe conditions, 
the company may assume that it is meeting its safety objectives, as 
evidenced by the ‘absence of losses’.  In reality, it has been lucky” 
(ICAO, Safety Management Manual, 2006, p.4-22). 
 
This is a similar expression of factors influencing the finance - safety 
relationship as those leading to Savage’s (1998) theory of ‘myopia’, 
discussed earlier, where the present costs of preventative measures 
are not properly assessed against the potential future liabilities of 
accidents. 
 
The ICAO considers there to be two types of cost following a lapse 
of safety (accident or serious incident), including economic losses 
(such as a loss of business): direct and indirect. Whereas, 
Calabresi’s (1970) seminal work on the costs of accidents describes 
three categories of cost: 1) primary costs (accident costs), 2) 
secondary costs (loss spreading & compensation), and 3) tertiary 
costs (administrative).     
 
Shavell (1987) further argues that as economic losses are 
intrinsically linked to the particularities of the specific incident (e.g., 
the economic circumstances of either injurer or victim), they should 
not necessarily be included as a cost of the accident. Such 
considerations have the potential to distort and confuse the general 
conclusions following an accident, and could undermine efforts to 
find the most efficient accident cost reduction strategy.   
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Comparisons of the two classification systems are presented in table 
2. 
 
 
Cost Item ICAO Calabresi/ Shavell 
Hull Damage Direct Primary 
Medical Treatment Direct Primary 
Property Damage Direct Primary 
Loss of Business Indirect Economic Loss 
Damage to Reputation Indirect Economic Loss 
Loss of Use of Equipment Indirect Primary 
Loss of Staff Productivity Indirect Primary 
Investigation and Clean-up Indirect Tertiary 
Insurance Deductibles Indirect Secondary 
Legal Action Indirect Tertiary 
Compensation & Damage Claims  Indirect Secondary & Tertiary 
Fines & Citations Indirect Primary & Tertiary 
 
Table 2. Accident Cost Categorisation 
 
2.2.2 The Potential for Financial Situations to Impact on 
Safety 
 
Juxtaposing the impact of accidents (and serious incidents) on the 
financial health of a business is the possibility that the financial 
health of a business may have an impact on safety. 
 
The ICAO (2006) maintains that there are some business situations 
that justify extra vigilance from State aviation administrations, and 
that these include: 
 
• Start-up or rapidly expanding companies, 
• Corporate mergers; 
• Companies facing bankruptcy or other financial difficulties; 
• Companies facing serious labour-management difficulties. 
 
It is not only the ICAO that supposes some interaction between 
business decisions, financial health and levels of safety. 
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The Australian House of Representatives (1995) came to the 
conclusion that: “..the substantial body of theory taken in 
conjunction with the available anecdotal evidence and the result of 
some empirical studies suggest that it is likely that in general, 
safety deteriorates to some extent under financial pressure” (p.55). 
 
The U.S. Congress in its investigation “Safe Skies for Tomorrow”, 
expressed concern by stating: “..new emphasis could be placed on 
systematic and regular monitoring of financial conditions and 
management changes at airlines,..” (p.6). 
 
More recently, the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
Transportation (2005) has re-stated similar concerns by stating: “In 
response to monetary losses and to compete with low-cost air 
carriers, network air carriers are making unprecedented changes to 
restructure their operations.. ..These changes have resulted in a 
significantly different air carrier industry, which requires a dynamic 
oversight process to ensure safety is maintained” (FAA, Report No. 
AV-2005-062,p.viii). 
 
2.2.3 Existing Evidence for the Financial Implications of 
Safety 
 
The evidence of major accidents resulting in severe financial crisis 
for the operator concerned (and, occasionally, by association the 
other operators sharing the same State of Registration) is strong, 
but it has been less conclusively established that any reverse 
relationship is necessarily true. 
 
On the scale of global crisis, Deppa, et al. (1993) report how 
following the Lockerbie bomb Pan Am’s bookings fell sharply, and 
that in fact ‘all American carriers were affected in their international 
sales’.  By December 4, 1991, three years after the crash, the 
airline ceased to exist. 
 
Mitchell,M. & Maloney (1989) discovered a qualitative nature to 
market reactions following an aircraft accident.  This study revealed 
a tendency for a loss of brand value, and related loss of demand, for 
only those crashes whose causes are deemed to be within the 
immediate control of the airline concerned. 
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Rose (1992) finds that revenue losses can be great following a 
significant accident, but as any drop tends to be short term, the 
declines in equity values are not so considerable. 
 
However, the crash of ValuJet flight 592 in 1996 certainly 
precipitated the eventual failure of the airline, but the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation also notes that 
ValuJet had been overwhelmed by its rate of growth (Cobb & Primo, 
2003).  So, this is one case that possibly provides evidence for both 
types of safety-finance relationship. 
 
Overall, the evidence for financial pressures severely affecting 
safety is more mixed, and has less general support. 
 
Oster, et al. (1992) comment, “..most research has found little or 
no support for the argument that lower profitability is associated 
with poorer safety performance.  This paucity of evidence may be 
linked, at least partially, with the limited power of statistical tests 
that is associated with small samples due to infrequent accidents.  
Safety outputs other than accidents are largely unobservable and 
difficult to measure, so most studies have tried to examine the 
relationship between safety inputs and such safety outcomes as 
accidents and fatalities” (p.122). 
 
Although there are opposing arguments, in a more recent report 
Hansen, et al. (2005) suggest that: “Economic pressures may have 
also contributed to a series of crashes related to inadequate de-
icing that sparked public attention and an agency [FAA] response” 
(p.39). 
 
In a 1979 study Barnett, et al. found that: ‘Generally speaking, 
airlines that are large have demonstrably better records than those 
that are small’ (p.1046); but, in a later study, Barnett and Higgins 
(1989) found little correlation between the size of an individual 
airline (and therefore its financial resources) and safety 
performance. This later study did find some further evidence to 
support the earlier finding that the socio-economic status of the 
parent State (i.e., State of Registration) has more of a correlation 
with safety performance.  
 
Rose (1990) did discover some correlation between operator size 
and safety performance, when it is also associated with profitability.  
Rose argues where earlier findings are that no such correlation 
exists, by Golbe (1986) amongst others, it is due to ‘infrequency of 
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accidents combined with their small sample sizes limits the power of 
their statistical tests’p.945. Results of the Rose study suggested 
that ‘lower profitability is correlated with higher accident and 
incident rates, particularly for smaller carriers’p.944, where ‘small’ 
was defined as less than 75,000 average annual departures and 
medium as over 75,000 but less than 225,000 departures.  
 
Talley and Bossert (1990), studying profit and operating ratios, 
determined that worsening financial conditions did prompt a 
reduction of expenditure on maintenance.  However, no evidence 
was found that this had a significantly detrimental effect on accident 
rates. 
 
Dionne, et al. (1997) combine many of the above results, and refine 
the conclusions.  On operating margin, it may be a question of 
whether there are more resources available to spend on 
maintenance, or whether operating margins have been improved 
because of a reduction in maintenance expenditure.  The more 
reliable measure, it is suggested, is the level of maintenance 
expenditure per departure.  It is also suggested, contrary to the 
findings made by Talley and Bossert (1990), that ‘carriers do affect 
their level of accidents by modifying their level of maintenance 
expenditures’. Dionne, et al. also discovered that levels of debt have 
a relationship with a company’s safety effort, but for small airlines 
only. “More debt, for a given level of equity, increases the efficiency 
of the safety effort by permitting more investments in aircraft, for 
example.. ..We see that those airlines with large debt and negative 
equity have more accidents which is consistent with the 
interpretation that the moral hazard effect dominates the 
investment effect for airlines that are near-bankruptcy” (p.394-
395).    
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2.3 Accident Cost Reduction and Market Sustainability 
 
“If passengers ever believe that their lives are endangered by 
getting on an airliner, the industry itself would be what crashed and 
burned” (Nader & Smith, 1994, p.xvii-xviii). 
 
As discussed earlier, aviation is an activity that represents risky 
choices, risky choices that can also have tragic consequences for 
society, for organisations, and for individuals (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 
1978). 
 
A socially optimal solution is found when the value gained from air 
travel less the cost of taking due care produces market conditions 
that promote the most efficient balance in demand and supply.  Too 
much demand, resulting from an insufficient allocation of accident 
costs to the aviation industry, may in turn result in levels of activity 
(numbers of passenger miles flown) that exceed optimum for public 
interest.  Equally, an overly precautionary approach, produced from 
excessive levels of care (induced via fear of potential liabilities or 
from the State electing to pass all the costs of accidents onto 
industry), may either reduce demand or restrict the supply of air 
services below the optimum for public interest. 
 
The problem arises as to how to arrive at appropriate measures of 
‘due care’, and appropriate means of apportioning the costs as 
either incentives for improvements or deterrence against sub-
standards, both ex ante and ex post accidents (Shavell, 1987). 
 
Calabresi (1970) commences his seminal work on the analysis of 
‘The Costs of Accidents’ with this statement:  
 
“Some myths will make our analysis difficult if not cleared up.  The 
first is that our society wants to avoid accidents at all costs; the 
second is that there is an inexorable economic law that dictates the 
‘right’ way to allocate accidents losses; the third is that when critics 
and courts talk about distributing the risk of accidents they have a 
specific goal or subgoal in mind; and the fourth is that it is 
axiomatic that the costs of an accident be borne only by the victim 
or by the party who may in some sense be said to have injured 
him” (p.17). 
 
From a public interest point of view, it would be advantageous if 
cost-benefit analysis could be structured so as to consider the 
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consequences of: ‘trickle-down’ effects of technological development 
from the manufacture of aircraft (such as an enhanced, highly 
educated, skills-based workforce); risk substitution (e.g., making air 
travel so costly, people choose to travel by road, which may in 
some senses be riskier)(Sunstein, 2002); investment and industry 
clusters (businesses favour locations which have good airport 
connections); social benefits arising from tourism and foreign travel 
(Caves, 2003).  Alternatively, an assessment of costs would be 
more complete if it incorporates factors for: externalities (such as, 
environmental damage and detrimental social effects from noise 
pollution); long-term psychological effects of accidents on victims, 
families of victims, and wider communities; opportunity costs of 
alternative means of transport  (e.g., rail vs. air travel); social costs 
of encouraging socio-economic clusters around major airport hubs 
(e.g., North-South geographical divides); other political 
considerations (such as the interests of minority groups, justice and 
equity). 
 
In reality, any analysis tends to be bounded: “Attempts to weigh 
precisely the social costs and benefits associated with different 
responses to a tragic choice result more often in the valuation of 
only what we can measure than in the measurement of all that we 
value.  Costs which are difficult to measure,.. .., will often be left 
out of the accounting altogether, though the resulting narrowness of 
the premises will poison the conclusion” (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, 
p.204). 
 
In principle, safety measures in transport will be implemented 
unless the Cost of Preventing a Fatality (CPF) is ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ (Edwards v National Coal Board, 1949) to the 
Value of Preventing a Fatality (VPF).  An apparently objective 
criterion that is in fact subject to a high degree of variability based 
on judgemental factors, supposedly to account for behavioural 
factors. For instance, the VPF for a main line railway accident is 2.8 
times greater than that for a road accident in the UK (Evans, 2005). 
 
This approach is generally explained as a function of variations in 
the ‘willingness-to-pay’ to avoid risk, depending on the type of 
hazard envisaged and the available choices to society.  There is a 
view that such variations actually contribute to the efficiency of this 
type of cost-benefit analysis, as: “..social decisions should, so far as 
possible, reflect the interests, preferences and attitudes to risk of 
those who are likely to be affected by the decisions and (b) that in 
the case of safety, these interests, preferences and attitudes are 
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most effectively summarised in terms of the amounts that 
individuals would be willing to pay or would require in compensation 
for (typically small) changes in the probability of death or injury 
during the forthcoming period.” (Jones-Lee, Hammerton & Philips, 
1985, p.49) 
 
An alternative view is that utilising variable VPF amounts (or 
similarly, Value Of Statistical Life, VOSL (Jones-Lee, et al)) based on 
a ‘willingness-to-pay’ approach can result in inconsistencies in 
policy, and accentuates the difficulties of formulating efficient 
accident costs reduction policy. A situation highlighted by Evans 
(2005): “It is clear from the preceding discussion that society could 
prevent more fatalities at the same cost by devoting relatively more 
resources to road safety and less to rail safety.  It remains a puzzle 
that society chooses not to do so, and is apparently content with 
the present allocation of resources.” (p.8) 
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2.3.1 Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Costs of 
Accidents 
 
Calabresi (1970) found that analysis of accident cost reduction 
strategies is greatly improved if a clear set of goals (justice and cost 
reduction) and associated subgoals (e.g., reducing administrative 
costs) are first identified.  Calabresi also emphasizes and clarifies 
differences between the methods (essentially technical) for 
achieving goals or sub goals (e.g., spreading of costs), and the 
systems (essentially political) for allocating the costs of accidents 
(e.g., the fault system, social insurance, or enterprise liability). 
 
Underpinning the whole of this framework of analysis is the concept 
of classifying costs into three groups: 1) primary, 2) secondary, and 
3) tertiary.  
2.3.1.1 Primary Costs of Accidents 
 
The most obvious, and directly related group of costs; by definition 
an accident is an unplanned, unintended event that results in harm, 
and therefore losses (costs).  These costs range from damage to 
equipment, damage to property and/or infrastructure, and may 
culminate in injuries to people.  Equipment needs to be repaired or 
replaced; damaged property needs to be secured, repaired or 
rebuilt; infrastructure needs to be stabilised and reinstated; injuries 
to victims require medical attention.  
2.3.1.2 Secondary Costs of Accidents 
 
Secondary costs are the ‘societal costs’ (Calabresi, 1970) arising 
from accidents.  These costs include the various compensations to 
victims, and/or the families of victims. 
2.3.1.3 Tertiary Costs of Accidents 
 
Coping with accidents involves organising the resources of multiple 
parties and organisations, and the arbitration of competing 
interests. This gives rise to a set of costs concerned with 
administrating the system, and, in the case of aviation accidents, 
includes such items as accident investigation, safety regulation, and 
legal proceedings. 
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Another aspect of Calabresi’s accident cost categorisation system is 
that it becomes clear that an initiative solely targeted at one 
category will not necessarily be sympathetic with another, and so 
the overall effect may be to actually increase overall accident costs. 
2.3.2 Directionality 
 
Before reviewing methods of cost reduction, it is important to note 
that reducing any one group of costs will not always result in an 
overall reduction in the costs of accidents.  In some circumstances 
targeting the primary costs (for example) will result in an increase 
in secondary costs. If, for example, excluding all aircraft that 
weren’t multi-jet powered reduced the frequency of accidents, this 
would result in costs to society (e.g., severely restricting ‘feeder’ 
type airlines).  Similarly, if all accidents were perfectly compensated 
(secondary cost reduction), there would be reduced incentives to 
avoid accidents (primary costs). 
 
“It should be noted in advance that these subgoals 
[primary/secondary/tertiary cost reduction] are not fully consistent 
with each other.. ..We cannot have more than a certain amount of 
reduction in one category without forgoing some reduction in the 
other, just as we cannot reduce all accident costs beyond a certain 
point without incurring costs in achieving the reduction that are 
greater than the reduction is worth.  Our aim must be to find the 
best combination of primary, secondary, and tertiary cost reduction 
taking into account what must be given up to achieve that 
reduction” (Calabresi, 1970, p.29) 
 
  
  
  2-35                     
              
  
2.3.3 Methods of Accident Cost Reduction 
2.3.3.1 Primary Cost Reduction 
 
The methods of reducing the primary costs of accidents are 
concerned with reducing the frequency and/or severity of accidents, 
by either discouraging more accident-prone activities or 
encouraging safer alternatives (substituting one risky activity for a 
less risky one, or finding safer ways to engage in a risky activity). 
 
Calabresi (1970) considers two mechanisms by which such cost 
reduction methods can influence primary costs of accidents. The 
first is termed ‘general deterrence’, and describes methods that use 
the market to influence decisions to improve safety standards, or 
alter supply and demand characteristics (tax systems, subsidies, 
competition rules, etc.). The second, termed ‘specific deterrence’, 
describes those methods that use limits and controls on behaviour 
and activity (political instruments, regulation and the legal system). 
 
The advantages of market mechanisms (general deterrence) are 
that they tend to be flexible; any errors introduced can be balanced 
relatively easily (e.g., shifting costs onto more appropriate parties); 
the markets react quickly to environmental changes; and general 
deterrence methods require less sophisticated information gathering 
to be effective.  The main disadvantage is that they tend to be 
unable to adequately adjust for and/or exclude many non-
monetizable items valued by society (quality of life, justice and 
equity, etc.). 
 
The advantage of specific deterrence methods is that they can allow 
for non-monetizable values considered fundamental to society.  
However, the disadvantages are significant. To be effective, specific 
deterrence requires extensive information gathering (effectiveness 
of regulation is greatly determined by the accuracy which categories 
and sub-categories of actions are identified, collated, measured and 
monitored); specific deterrence methods tend to be slow to react to 
environmental changes; errors introduced by specific deterrence 
methodology tends to be less easily balanced or corrected by the 
rest of the system. 
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2.3.3.2 Secondary Cost Reduction 
 
“The law cannot avoid placing costs on someone.  It can for 
example decide (1) to leave them on the injured party, (2) to shift 
them to another party to the accident, (3) to divide them among 
the parties involved, or (4) to remove them from the involved 
parties and place them on the taxpayers” (Calabresi, 1970, p.52).  
 
Again, Calabresi (1970) considers two general mechanisms for 
secondary cost reduction: 1) the ‘loss spreading’ method, and 2) 
the ‘deep pocket’ method. 
 
The argument for loss spreading is founded on the concept that 
‘accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly 
among people and over time’ (p.39). 
 
“We need merely recognise that social dislocations, like economic 
ones, will occur more frequently if one person bears a heavy loss 
than if many people bear light ones to find adequate support for the 
spreading of losses” (p.40). 
 
The alternative to loss spreading, the ‘deep pocket’ method, seeks 
also to minimise the social dislocations arising from secondary 
losses.  However, this method achieves the aim by placing losses on 
those categories of people (organisations) less likely to suffer 
significant detriment as a consequence.  
 
2.3.3.3 Tertiary Cost Reduction 
 
As discussed, tertiary costs are those costs arising from 
administrating the processes of valuation, analysis, decision-
making, consensus building and/or arbitration. 
 
Having effective ways and means to minimise complexity, reduce 
uncertainty and remove ambiguity can reduce costs of this type.  
 
Many of these functions are similar to those attributed to the 
building of trust and confidence. 
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2.3.3.3.1 Trust & Confidence 
 
“Not investigating, not entering into legal relations; these are all 
signs of trust.  The truster clearly benefits from trust.  Investigating 
people and initiating legal procedures are expensive and time-
consuming, and indeed can undermine trust; sometimes uncertainty 
combined with trust is better than certain knowledge” (O’Hara, 
2004, p.15). 
 
Bradbury, et al. (1999) describe the social role of trust, and include: 
a) reducing complexity, b) fostering collaboration, c) enhancing the 
legitimacy of organisations to act on the behalf of society. 
 
“..trust is more fundamental to conflict resolution than is risk 
communication” (Slovic, 2000, p. 319) 
 
Confidence is sometimes seen as a distinguishable attribute, in that 
it describes an expectation that desired aims can be achieved. It is 
an assessment of technical capability (competence) rather than the 
integrity of intentions (Metlay, 1999; Bradbury, et al. 1999). 
 
Cobb & Primo (2003) reviewing the crash investigation into USAir 
Flight 427, make the following observations: “The crash of flight 
427 in September 1994 resulted not only in the death of more than 
a hundred people but also in a loss of credibility for parties 
associated with the investigation.  Once the plane went down, many 
assumed that the cause would be determined quickly.. ..First, the 
status of the NTSB, as the agency whose mission is to investigate 
air disasters and inform the public about them, was challenged and 
weakened.  After exhaustive, expensive testing and the passage of 
five years, all that was produced were conclusions based on 
circumstantial evidence”(p.77). 
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2.3.3.3.2 The Fault System 
 
Another major contributor to tertiary costs of accidents is the 
arbitration of competing interests (injurers, victims and the public), 
and administering the system of accident law. 
 
Calabresi (1970) is critical of the fault system as a method of 
achieving efficiency, and the maximum accident cost reductions.  
These inefficiencies arise because the ‘fault system’ can only 
consider the role and interests of the parties involved in the legal 
proceeding, and the costs can only be attributed accordingly. It 
cannot, for example, adjudge that some costs would be best borne 
by society as a whole. 
Additionally, a legal proceeding is concerned with the peculiarities of 
an accident or case, whereas the public interest is more served by 
considering the recurring events or characteristics. Last, but not 
least: “..fault leaves some victims destitute, overcompensates 
others, and does both with such enormous delays that it creates yet 
another source of secondary costs based on the delay itself” 
(p.278). 
 
The crash of Alaska Airlines flight 261 in January 2000 resulted in 
88 cases, and some four years of legal proceedings. In addition, the 
final settlements were very variable, ‘anywhere from a couple of 
million dollars up to $20 million’ (Associated Press). 
 
Shavell (1987) in making an economic analysis of accident law, 
seeks less to examine the relative merits of the ‘fault system’ as a 
means of achieving the goal of maximising a reduction in the costs 
of accidents, and more on how different liability rules can influence 
behaviour.  The characteristics that influence the choice of liability 
rule include:  
 
i) Whether the likelihood of an accident occurring is 
influenced by the behaviour of both the potential injurer 
and the potential victim (bilateral accidents), or solely by 
the injurer (unilateral accidents). 
ii) Whether or not the appropriate levels of due care be easily 
defined, and whether, once defined, key actions are 
evidently present or lacking (e.g., any evidence of keeping 
‘a good lookout’ is generally restricted to the credibility of a 
particular witness). 
iii) The level of likely harm, and the probability of harm. 
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iv) Market power, and the level of knowledge a potential 
victim (customer) is able to reasonably gain about a 
potential injurer’s behaviour and levels of care. 
 
The key liability rules to be chosen from are: 
 
A) Strict Liability, where the injurer pays costs regardless 
of the levels of care exercised. 
B) Negligence Rule, where liabilities are only incurred when 
the injurer has been shown to demonstrate less than 
‘due care’. 
 
Shavell (1987) examines in detail the likely consequences on total 
accident costs, and the levels of care promoted by these rules 
(along with associated variations, such as; strict liability with the 
defence of contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and 
negligence rule with the defence of contributory negligence). 
 
It is the unilateral nature of aviation accidents, and the likely scale 
of harm, that favours applying strict liability rules.  “The more 
important it is for injurers to take care, the greater the relative 
appeal of strict liability..”(p.16). 
 
On the effects of administration costs, Shavell notes: “Not only does 
the presence of administrative costs mean that the socially 
appropriate versus the privately motivated use of the liability 
system becomes an issue, it also introduces a new consideration 
into the determination of optimal levels of care: accidents are 
socially more expensive if they involve administrative costs in 
addition to victims’ direct losses, so optimal levels of care should be 
higher on account of administrative costs..”(p.269).  
2.3.3.3.3 Safety Investigations 
 
Another major source of tertiary accident costs are the conducting 
of investigations, either as a means of supporting the fault system 
or other regulatory alternatives, as utilised within air transport. 
 
“A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which 
includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of 
conclusions, including the determination of causes and, when 
appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.”  Annex 13 to 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
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2.4 The Role of Accident Investigation 
 
“Establishing a cause after a loss-of-life incident reassures the 
public that order exists in the world.  Absent a definite cause, an 
individual’s sense of order is weakened.  Randomness is feared 
because it does not allow a problem to be ‘solved’”(Cobb & Primo, 
2003, p.60). 
 
The role of accident investigation agencies has evolved from before 
dawn of aviation, to ensure that lessons are properly learned and 
the public interest safeguarded in the aftermath of accidents.  It 
was quickly learnt that in the absence of reliable information, a 
frightened public would assume accidents are uncontrollable and 
mysterious, and that travel was therefore something to be dreaded. 
 
Mass transportation represents a vital part of any State’s economic 
infrastructure, and any weakness in the system necessarily attracts 
political attention. 
 
In the face of a rising number of railroad collisions in the latter part 
of the 19th century, and to counter a trend that carriers 
investigating their own accidents only resulted in ‘hushing up the 
results’, some US states started establishing bodies such as a 
‘Board of Railroad Commissioners’ to solve the problem (Aldrich, 
2006).  Many of these bodies were modelled on the British Board of 
Trade, already charged with investigating accidents and making 
recommendations. Even at a time in the US when Federal 
involvement and regulations in general were little favoured, it was 
considered by many that ‘publicity was the best remedy for railroad 
dangers’ (Aldrich, 2006, p.72). 
 
In a similar fashion, from commercial aviation’s earliest days it was 
realised that: “They {those actively involved in civil aviation} realize 
that the incompetent pilot and the un-airworthy plane are a menace 
to the competent pilot in an airworthy craft. Not only are they 
desirous of avoiding this menace to their personal safety but they 
also realize that every accident in aviation tends to retard its 
popularity, alienates public support for municipal airport projects 
and increases the cost of insurance to the legitimate operator.” 
(Woolley, 1929, p.323) 
  
James G. Woolley, was writing in 1929 about the future commercial 
success of air transport, and at the time was Vice-President, 
Western Air Express. He also noted that: “Through the 
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establishment of these air navigation facilities and the use of safe 
aircraft, piloted by skilled personnel under proper regulation, public 
confidence in air travel will finally be won, and the airplane will be 
accepted as a dependable carrier, just as the railroad, the 
steamship and the automobile are accepted today.” (p.342) 
 
It is interesting to note that the first federal US legislation 
concerned with aviation, the Air Commerce Act of 1926, was framed 
in two parts.  One part was concerned with duties charged to the 
Secretary of Commerce dealing with the promotion of commercial 
aviation, and the other concerned regulatory powers.  Registration 
of aircraft, licensing of pilots and inspections of facilities were all 
covered in the second part, but ‘investigation and publication of 
causes of accidents in civil air navigation’ (Woolley, 1929, p.330) 
was in the first.  This suggests that from the first, providing re-
assurance to the flying public, and creating a foundation of trust 
and confidence was recognised as an economic imperative for the 
government (or, its agents). 
 
Although the situation in Europe was not quite the same, the 
purpose of investigation was essentially the same. Whereas in the 
US Federal Government preferred policies aimed at encouraging 
commercial development of aviation, here it was almost 
immediately considered a strategic, national asset and, 
furthermore, something appropriate for government control.  In 
Britain, the Air Navigation Act 1920 incorporated powers for the 
Secretary of State for Air Power to make regulations for the 
investigation of civil air accidents, which resulted in the Air 
Navigation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1922. 
 
Establishing a working framework of institutions that can in the one 
instance encourage growth and economic prosperity for the aviation 
industry, and in the other maintain the public’s confidence that the 
public interest is being safeguarded, has been a process of trial and 
error. At the beginning of commercial aviation in the US, these 
duties of encouraging its commercial development and for ensuring 
safety standards resided in the one agency. This may have 
contributed to some of the factors that resulted in the airmail 
scandals of 1933 and 1934.  A federal Aviation Commission was 
quickly established to investigate the circumstances of these 
situations, and make ‘recommendations of a broad policy covering 
all phases of aviation and the relation of the United States thereto’ 
(Airmail Act of 1934. Cited in; Burkhardt, 1967, p. 12).  One of its 
findings was that many commercial operations, in order to win 
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contracts, were being operated at a loss, and that this contributed 
to aviation’s poor safety record at the time (Burkhardt, 1967). 
 
Although there have been various changes to the framework over 
the intervening years, the role of investigation as distinct from 
regulation remained evident. This is in part due to the need to 
investigate the role of the regulator, and regulations as contributing 
factors to accidents. In fact, even when the US created the FAA in 
its present form in 1958, accident investigation remained within the 
remit of the Civil Aeronautics Board (which also had responsibility 
for economic regulations of air carriers) (Burkhardt, 1967). The 
NTSB itself was not formed until 1967, and it did not gain full 
independence from the Department of Transportation until 1975. 
 
The economic importance of an effective accident investigation 
system remains of great significance: “The TWA flight 800 
investigation cost Boeing, the FBI, and the NTSB at least $87 
million.. ..The impetus for greater airline safety was quashed by the 
inability of the NTSB to determine the precise cause.  This allowed 
the FAA to enact weak standards with reference to cost-benefit 
analysis.. ..Causal uncertainty allows those who wish to contain an 
issue to keep regulations from being implemented.” (Cobb & Primo, 
2003, p.118 – 119) 
 
The economic impact of accident investigation can also have 
international consequences. Golich (1989) notes: “..changes in 
Europe’s approach to safety regulation were triggered by 
dissatisfaction with the US handling of the 1974 and 1979 DC10 
disasters.” (p.68) 
 
It remains the case that it is solely the role of accident investigation 
to recommend changes that will enhance future safety.  It is for the 
regulatory authority to assess the need for any proposed changes 
and to determine the most appropriate methods of implementation.  
An inevitable part of any such assessment process will be the costs.  
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2.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
“As for those who assess everything by financial benefits and advantages, 
refusing to allow these to be outweighed by the honourable, often in their 
thinking they compare the honourable with what they conceive as useful.” Cicero 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in itself does not justify the decisions of 
industry and government, but it is generally accepted as being a 
necessary part of the decision making process for all.  “Exploratory 
calculations, of course, do not prove anything.  A proof about the 
future is in any case impossible, and it has been sagely remarked 
that all predictions are unreliable, particularly those about the 
future.  What is required is judgement, and exploratory calculations 
can at least help to inform our judgement.” (Schumacher, E.F. 
,1973, p.15) 
 
Thus, when bad decisions are made, it is not often a problem with 
the analysis tool in itself, but more often the use of the results. 
There have been some infamous cost driven decisions made by the 
aviation industry.  Most notably as outlined in a memo from F.D. 
Applegate (Director of Product Engineering, Convair), concerning 
problems identified in the DC-10, 27th June 1972: “My only criticism 
of Douglas in this regard is that once this inherent weakness was 
demonstrated (failure of the cargo door) by the July 1970 test 
failure, they did not take immediate steps to correct it.  It seems to 
me inevitable that, in the twenty years ahead of us, DC10 cargo 
doors will come open and I would expect this to usually result in the 
loss of the airplane.  This fundamental failure mode has been 
discussed in the past and is being discussed again in the bowels of 
both the Douglas and Convair organizations.  It appears however 
that Douglas is waiting and hoping for government direction or 
regulations in the hope of passing costs on to us or their customers. 
If you can judge from Douglas’s position during ongoing 
contract change negotiations they may feel that any liability 
incurred in the meantime for loss of life, property and equipment 
may be legally passed on to us. 
It is recommended that overtures be made at the highest 
management level to persuade Douglas to immediately make a 
decision to incorporate changes in the DC10 which will correct the 
fundamental cabin floor catastrophic failure mode.  Correction will 
take a good bit of time, hopefully there is time before the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or the FAA ground the airplane 
which would have disastrous effects upon sales and production both 
near and long term.  This corrective action becomes more expensive 
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than the cost of damages resulting from the loss of one planeload of 
people.” (Golich, 1989, p. 117-118) 
 
Before two years were out, on the 3rd March 1974, a Turkish Airline 
DC10 crashed with the loss of all onboard over the French 
countryside, due to the catastrophic failure mode identified in this 
memo. 
2.5.1 The Requirements for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The issue about whether or not government regulatory agencies 
should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of their actions is no longer 
about principle. That argument was largely resolved by the end of 
the 1980’s in favour of its proponents.  However, there is still some 
debate to be had about how cost-benefit should be done (Sunstein, 
2002; Needham, 1983). 
 
The ICAO recognises that analysis of some safety recommendations 
will depend on credible cost-benefit analysis, and further states: 
“Sometimes, cost-benefit analysis may suggest that accepting risk 
is preferable to the time, effort and cost necessary to implement 
corrective action.” (ICAO, Safety Management Manual, Ch.9 p.3) 
 
Along with other UK government agencies, the UK CAA is required 
to make decisions that conform to government policy, one of which 
is to conduct a Regulatory Impact Assessment before mandating 
any changes to safety requirements. “New regulations should only 
be introduced when other alternatives have first been considered 
and rejected, and where the benefits justify the costs.” (Tony Blair, 
British Prime Minister, Better Policy Making: A Guide to Regulatory 
Impact Assessment, p.1) 
 
In the U.S., there is Executive Order 12866 (September 30, 1993), 
which requires that: “Federal agencies should assess all costs and 
benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the 
alternative of not regulating,..” (Hoffer, et al., 1998, Appendix A) 
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2.5.2 Guidelines for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Whilst both U.S. and U.K. regulatory guidelines consider the broader 
issue of economic analysis, incorporating both Cost-Effectiveness 
and Cost-Benefit analysis, only the latter is considered here.  That is 
because in the case of the Cost-Effectiveness technique, the 
objectives have already been established as worth achieving, and 
the only issue remaining is how best to do it.  In the case of Cost-
Benefit, the objectives need also to be justified.  This is more often 
the situation when evaluating safety recommendations. 
Hoffer, et al. (1998) outlines the framework of analysis as: 
 
1. Define the Objective 
2. Specify Assumptions 
3. Identify Alternatives 
4. Estimate Benefits and Costs 
5. Describe Intangibles 
6. Compare Benefits and Costs and Rank Alternatives 
7. Evaluate Variability of Benefit-Cost Estimates 
8. Evaluate Distributional Impacts 
9. Make Recommendations 
(p.2-3) 
 
Where the safety objective is listed as a single category, and 
assumptions are limited to items such as the cost of fatalities and 
injuries (rather than any underlying issues of value, or philosophical 
approach).  
 
A section of this FAA guideline dealing with estimating the benefits 
of safety is given below: 
 
“Safety may be defined in terms of the risk of death, personal 
injury, and property damage which results from air transportation 
accidents.  A major responsibility of FAA is to reduce the incidence 
of such outcomes.  FAA carries out this function through its capital 
investment, operations, and regulatory functions.  The evaluation of 
the benefits of such activities requires determination of the extent 
to which deaths, injuries, and property damage resulting from 
preventable accidents will be reduced, and that these reductions be 
valued in dollars.  This subsection presents methodology for 
determining deaths, injuries, and damages prevented by risk 
reduction.  Once known, these can be valued in dollars by applying 
standardized DOT and FAA economic values.” (Hoffer, et al., 1998, 
p.3-5) 
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‘Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A 
Guide’, states that valuations for preventing injuries and death are 
done on the basis of a Willingness to Pay (WTP) approach.  The 
2001 valuation of avoiding a fatality is $3 million, and for avoiding a 
serious injury $580,700. 
 
The guide also gives a value for the cost of a major accident 
investigation, at $8.5 million.  However, a ‘major accident’ in this 
sense is one involving a heavy airliner, and an offshore helicopter 
accident would more probably be classed as ‘Air Carrier’, which is 
costed at $449,000. 
 
In the U.K., guidance is contained within ‘Better Policy Making: A 
Guide to Regulatory Impact Assessment’, published by the Cabinet 
Office, and ‘The Green Book’, published by HM Treasury.  However, 
these books are much more general policy guidelines, that cover 
every aspect of government business. 
 
It is worth noting that there are a number of value statements in 
these guidelines, including: 
 
• “The cost-benefit analysis should reflect the values and needs 
of society”. (Cabinet Office, p.71) 
• “Do not forget any indirect benefits – changes in behaviour 
that can have additional effects.” (Cabinet Office, p.71) 
• “the sooner the benefits and the further into the future the 
costs, the better.” (Cabinet Office, p.73) 
• “The UK, along with other developed countries, is committed 
to using the precautionary principle.” (Cabinet Office, p.79) 
 
On the subject of intangible values, The Green Book 
recommendation is: 
 
“5.76 Costs and benefits that have not been valued should also be 
appraised; they should not be ignored simply because they cannot 
easily be valued.  All costs and benefits must therefore be clearly 
described in an appraisal, and should be quantified where this is 
possible and meaningful.” (p.34) 
 
In common with the U.S., the UK uses a WTP principle to ‘value a 
prevented fatality’, at round £1.145 million (in 2000 prices), and 
£128,650 for serious injury.  These figures are considerably less 
than the ones used in the U.S.  
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In a recent CAA paper, ‘A Benefit Analysis for Cabin Water Spray 
Systems and Enhanced Fuselage Burnthrough Protection’, it is 
stated that: “All benefits derived are based on the number of lives 
saved for the world fleet of western-built aircraft type certified for 
more than 30 seats and are relative to the period 1967 to 
1996.”(p.1) 
2.5.3 Challenges for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
“The “second generation” debates raise difficult questions about 
how (not whether) to engage in CBA – how to value life and health, 
how to deal with the interests of future generations, how to 
generate rules of thumb to simplify complex inquiries, how to 
ensure that agencies do what they are supposed to, how and when 
to diverge from the conclusion recommended by CBA, how to 
determine the roles of agencies and courts in contested cases.” 
(Sunstein, 2002, p.xi). 
 
Sunstein (2002) identifies three key potential problems with CBA: 
“poor priority setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the 
unfortunate side effects of regulation” (p.6). 
 
Comparing this point with the process of analysis defined by Hoffer, 
et al. (1998) in the FAA guide, the considerations that will most 
affect these issues are: 
 
• Defining Objectives 
• Making Assumptions 
• Describing Intangibles  
 
2.5.3.1 Objectives 
 
Calebresi (1970) argues that the goal of safety, as defined by 
organisations such as ICAO (2006), is too broad an objective on 
which to perform any meaningful analysis. 
 
To achieve meaningful analysis, Calabresi argues that the accident 
costs should be categorised according to three sets of objectives, 
objectives that are not wholly compatible. 
 
As discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, to eliminate totally 
the primary costs of accidents in aviation will not necessarily 
improve the overall goal of reducing total accident costs, as higher 
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secondary costs (social costs) may be incurred as a result. For 
example, to achieve this reduction in the primary cost of accidents, 
one mode of transport becomes relatively expensive, and activity 
shifts to an alternate mode that has higher risks (say, road 
transport). 
 
Similarly, a system of compensation that eliminates all secondary 
costs may create its own hazards, by reducing incentives to avoid 
accidents in the first place (primary costs). 
 
So, Calabresi argues that to pursue any one objective to the 
exclusion of others will eventually produce a negative total impact.  
It is therefore important to sub-categorise objectives as far as 
reasonably possible, as it is the overall balance of measures that 
achieves efficiency in cost reduction, not any particular one.  
2.5.3.2 Conditions Affecting the Efficiency of Cost-
Benefit Analysis 
 
“The advantage of studying models is that they allow predictive and 
normative questions to be answered in an unambiguous way.  
Practicality, however, requires that models be kept simple; although 
there is no conceptual bar to introducing in them all manner of 
complications, admitting even a few tends to make models difficult 
to solve or interpret.  Thus, the understanding of reality gained 
from models must be inexact, and rough judgements about the fit 
of models must be made.” (Shavell, 1987, p.3) 
 
Taking into consideration all the issues discussed, there would 
appear to be four critical factors which will most affect the overall 
efficiency of safety cost-benefit analysis, and any resulting accident 
costs reduction: 
 
• The nature of choice and risk preference. 
• The appropriateness of any value placed on preventing injury 
or death via the ‘Willingness-to-Pay’ (to avoid risk) (WTP) 
method.  
• The assessments of significant risk. 
• The influence of intangible factors. 
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2.5.3.2.1 The Nature of Choice and Risk Preference 
 
Economic theory largely supposes that the aggregate description of 
any market situation is equivalent to individual decision makers 
making choices solely on the basis of expected outcomes, and that 
these cannot be significantly influenced by the process of making 
the choices (Hogarth & Reder, 1986). 
 
Psychologists argue that the way in which an argument is framed 
can have a significant impact on the eventual choices made by both 
individuals and, in an aggregate effect, the market (Slovic, 2000; 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D., 1986). 
 
2.5.3.2.1.1 The Rational Choice Paradigm 
 
Hogarth & Reder (1986) describe an economist’s view of rationality 
as when decision makers behave in a manner that conforms to what 
is termed the ‘rational choice’ paradigm. “This paradigm, expounded 
in many textbooks and treatises, supposes that the individual 
decision maker has a utility function whose arguments are defined 
as alternative uses of the resources with which he or she is 
endowed.  The quantities of these resources are interpreted as 
constraints on the possible choices available to the decision maker, 
so that rational behaviour consists of determining the set of 
resource quantities to be devoted to each of the possible uses as 
the solution to a constrained maximization problem.. ..recent 
applications of the paradigm have included descriptions of 
phenomena such as variations in the  numbers of crimes 
committed, births, marriages, law suits and so on as outcomes of 
changes in the costs (i.e., in the resource constraints) of such 
actions to the decision makers.” (pp.2-3) 
 
In a generalised case this desired outcome, termed ‘utility’ (U) can 
be defined as a function of differing amounts of goods (x). 
 
 U=f(x)       (i) 
 
The shape of the resulting utility curve will help determine many 
issues, including the point at which maximum total utility is 
achieved.  A point where and any further increases in good (x) fails 
to increase overall utility (or, well-being) and may in fact reduce it, 
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as alternative uses of resources would result in larger gains.  This 
point is taken as where Marginal Utility (MU) is zero. 
 
  MU= dU/dx =0      (ii) 
 
Of equal relevance to this study is the concept that given the same 
constraints and choices, different people may have different forms 
of the equation (i).  The shape of this curve will be largely 
determined by the risk preference exhibited by a given individual. 
 
It is important to note that the terms ‘risk neutral’ and ‘risk averse’ 
have a very specific set of meanings in economic terms. “A fair 
gamble is one which on average will make exactly zero monetary 
profit… ..Economists classify individuals as risk-averse, risk-neutral, 
or risk-loving.  The crucial question is whether or not the individual 
would accept a fair gamble.  A risk-neutral person pays no attention 
to the degree of dispersion of possible outcomes, betting if and only 
if the odds on a monetary profit are favourable.. ..A risk-averse 
person will refuse a fair gamble.  This does not mean he or she will 
never bet.  If the odds are sufficiently favourable the probable profit 
will overcome the inherent dislike of risk.” (Begg, et al, 1994, pp. 
237-238).   However, for the purposes of the study, it is suffice to 
note the description given by Shavell (1987): 
 
“8.1.1 Assumption of risk aversion. In contrast to risk-neutral 
parties, risk-averse parties care not only about the expected value 
of losses, but also about the possible magnitude of losses.  Thus, for 
instance, risk-averse parties will find a situation involving a 5 
percent chance of losing 20,000 worse than a situation involving a 
10 percent chance of losing 10,000.. ..even though each of the 
situations involves the same expected loss of 1,000. (Risk-neutral 
parties would not find any one of the situations worse than any 
other.) Risk-averse parties, in other words, dislike uncertainty about 
the size of losses per se.” (p.186) 
 
This means that when dealing with an issue such as safety, it is not 
only important to consider actual utility, but also expected utility. 
 
Expected Utility (EU) 
 
= 
 
Utility of Possible Consequence x Probability of Possible 
Consequence 
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If an individual exhibits risk-averse behaviour, then the shape of the 
resulting utility function will be concave in relation to wealth (or 
resources, health, etc.), chart 1. 
 
 
 
Chart 1  (re-drawn from Shavell, 1987) 
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As can be seen from chart 1 (re-drawn from Shavell, 1987, p.188), 
some consequences of this type of utility function are: 
 
• An individual is likely to view the expected disutility of loss 
involving the same reduction in wealth as more important 
than an equivalently risk averse organisation with greater 
resources. 
• The cumulative outcome of a group of individuals faced 
with an expected loss may not be equivalent to that of an 
organisation acting as agent facing a similar loss. 
 
In the case of providing safety, chart 1 is clearly a simplification and 
is just used to illustrate the shape of a typical risk-averse utility 
curve.  However, it is natural to assume that an individual with only 
one life available to lose is likely to be more risk-averse than any 
government acting on their behalf, even if members of that 
government are also risk-averse. 
 
One method used to compensate for such limitations is to set a 
value of statistical life, or value of preventing a fatality, by empirical 
means (Jones-Lee, et al, 1985). 
2.5.3.2.2 The Appropriateness of Any Value Placed on   
Preventing Injury or Death Via the ‘Willingness-
to-Pay’ (to avoid risk) (WTP) Method 
 
“It is morally indefensible to work out the money value of life – 
especially when it is different according to where you come from.  
Doing so makes an international agreement impossible.  Yet without 
trying to count the real cost, it will be very hard to reach a real 
bargain.” (Boyle, 2001, p. 211) 
 
With reference to the section on ‘rational choice’, it is worth 
recalling that economists view rationality as finding a ‘solution to a 
constrained maximization problem’. However, the anthropologist 
Mary Douglas (1985) points out that: “The question of acceptability 
of risk involves freedom as well as justice” (p.10).  In essence, any 
value placed on life is going to reflect social and economic 
opportunities of the group or community being studied.  
 
This means that whether a cost-benefit analysis is performed 
utilising ‘willingness-to-pay’ (WTP) or ‘willingness-to-accept’ (WTA) 
  
  
  2-53                     
              
  
values for risk can have a very significant influence on any 
subsequent recommendations (Slovic, 2000; Adams, 1995).  This is 
because WTP values will generally be significantly less than the 
equivalent WTA values.  One consequence of using WTP values (as 
recommended in both U.S. and UK guidelines) is that there is a cost 
difference, borne by the potential victim of any accident, which will 
be left uncompensated (Calabresi, 1970; Shavell, 1987).  This may 
constitute a social cost, or secondary accident cost (Calabresi, 
1970), which potentially undermines the overall efficiency of the 
recommendation. 
 
Another difficulty of utilising such values is that they are generally 
based on empirical studies (Jones-Lee, et al, 1985) that summarise 
the results of questionnaires comparing opinions about differing 
risks of injuries and death, at a given time.  As indicated by the 
work of psychologists (Slovic, 2000; Starr, 1969) these views are 
likely to change with improving technology and increasing 
familiarity, and so it is difficult to imagine that even inflation 
adjusted values of such figures remain fully valid for long. 
 
However, the main consequence of WTP values remains that it 
introduces cultural and geopolitical aspects to the analysis; 
demonstrated by the difference between the FAA value of a 
prevented fatality and the UK value.  “Cost-benefit analysis also 
relies heavily upon current market prices for evaluating costs and 
benefits.  Yet these reflect current economic arrangements that 
many might question and wish to change.  For example, people with 
low earning power can receive lower prices on their lives.” 
(Perrow,1999, p.310) 
 
2.5.3.2.3 Assessments of Significant Risk 
 
Current international airworthiness standards set specific 
probabilities for acceptable risk, according to the severity of 
expected outcome following a failure of the component or system 
concerned (Lloyd & Tye, 1982). 
 
However, Sunstein (2002) makes the point that a significant risk is 
defined by two terms.  Whilst one is the probability of occurrence, 
the other is the exposure of risk.  In other words, even an 
extremely low probability of risk can still become unacceptable if 
enough people are exposed to it in such a way as to make the total 
number of injuries, or deaths, alarming. A point iterated by a senior 
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Boeing official in 1993: “We have to halve the accident rate by the 
year 2000 just to stay where we are.  Otherwise, we could face a 
major commercial jetliner accident somewhere in the world every 
couple of weeks”. Paul. D. Russell, chief of product safety, Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group, April 26, 1993 (Nader & Smith, 1994, 
p.xiii). 
 
It is also worth noting that low probabilities of loss tend to be 
overestimated  (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).  A consequence of this is 
that individuals may form a view that their expected disutility of 
injury or loss bears little resemblance to the disutility expected by a 
regulatory authority, who is in possession of more accurate data; 
even if perceptions about the consequences to any loss are the 
same.  
 
The other difficulty alluded to in this Boeing official’s comment is 
that improving safety has greatly increased the marginal costs of 
safety inputs.  A point re-iterated in the ICAO Safety Management 
Manual, 2006: 
 
“1.6.3 Historically, aviation safety focused on compliance with 
increasingly complex regulatory requirements.  This approach 
worked well up until the late 1970s when the accident rate levelled 
off.  Accidents continued to occur in spite of all the rules and 
regulations. 
 
1.6.4 This approach to safety reacted to undesirable events by 
prescribing measures to prevent recurrence.  Rather than defining 
best practices or desired standards, such an approach aimed at 
ensuring minimum standards were met. 
 
1.6.5 With an overall fatal accident rate in the vicinity of 10-6 (i.e. 
one fatal accident per one million flights), further safety 
improvements were becoming increasingly difficult to achieve using 
this approach.” 
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2.5.3.2.4 Intangibles 
 
All three groups of organisations (ICAO, FAA, & UK Government) 
make clear in their respective guidelines to conducting cost-benefit 
studies, some qualitative considerations are problematic when 
trying to create any meaningful monetary valuation, or other proxy 
measure. 
 
“10. In the absence of an existing reliable and accurate monetary 
valuation of an impact, a decision must be made whether to 
commission a study, and if so, how much resource to devote to the 
exercise.  Key considerations that may govern a decision to 
commission research are: 
 
• Tractability of the valuation problem: whether research is 
likely to yield a robust valuation; 
• Range of application of the results of a study to future 
appraisals; 
• How material the accuracy of the valuation is to the decision 
at hand.  This may be gauged through sensitivity analysis 
around a range of plausible estimates; and, 
• Scale of impact of the decision at hand.  If the decision relates 
to a multi-billion pound programme or to regulation that will 
impose costs of similar scale upon industry, it is clearly worth 
devoting much more resource to ensuring that the valuations 
of the non-market benefits (and costs) are accurate than 
would be appropriate for a smaller scheme.”  (Green Book, 
Annex 2, p.58) 
 
This decision, therefore, relates to two earlier stages of the cost-
benefit analysis.  First, whether the underlying objectives recognise 
the potential importance of some intangibles; for example, should 
the objective of the analysis be to assess the number of prevented 
fatalities and injuries, a study where some difference in quality of 
life is researched is unlikely to be justifiable, by these guidelines.  
Secondly, the nature of the assumptions will greatly determine 
whether the ‘scale of impact’ criteria for commissioning any study 
are met. 
 
Summarising the literature reviewed for this study, how intangibles 
make an impact fall into two broad categories: 
 
• Social Values 
• Unintended Consequences 
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“Tragic choices come about in this way.  Though scarcity can often 
be avoided for some goods by making them available without cost 
to everyone, it cannot be evaded for all goods.  In the distribution 
of scarce goods society has to decide which methods of allotment to 
use, and of course each of these methods – market, political 
allocations, lotteries, and so forth – may be modified, or combined 
with another.  The distribution of some goods entails great suffering 
and death.  When attention is riveted on such distributions they 
arouse emotions of compassion, outrage, and terror.  It is then that 
conflicts are laid bare between on the one hand, those values by 
which society determined the beneficiaries of the distributions, and 
(with nature) the perimeters of scarcity, and on the other hand, 
those humanistic moral values which prize life and well-being.. In 
such conflicts, at such junctures, societies confront the tragic 
choice.  They must attempt to make allocations in ways that 
preserve the moral foundations of social collaboration.” (Calabresi & 
Bobbitt, 1978, p.18) 
 
Calabresi and Bobbitt developed a theory that describes the process 
of making tragic choices as an evaluation in two stages.  The first, 
called a ‘first-order determination’, is a decision about how much of 
a scarce resource should be provided.  The second, termed a 
‘second-order determination’, is concerned with how that resource 
is distributed to society.  “Many tragic, second-order choices are, of 
course, violently unstable.  To be stable, at a minimum, somehow 
second-order decisions themselves must be able to be perceived as 
not-life-negating.” (p.142) 
 
The other major group of intangibles are those that result from 
unintended consequences.  “The importance of unintended 
consequences has been emphasized in different ways by Adam 
Smith, Carl Menger and Frederich Hayek, among others.  If most of 
the important things that happen are not intended (and not brought 
about through purposive action), then reasoned attempts at 
pursuing what we want might appear to be rather pointless”. (Sen, 
1999, p.250) 
 
The aviation industry certainly exhibits the effects of this 
phenomenon. The inefficiency and poor customer service levels of 
state regulated airlines were two of the key drivers for market 
deregulation from the late 1970’s onwards (Upham, 2003).  
However, it is extremely unlikely that the growth of low-cost 
airlines, and many of the industry changes, let alone the social 
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changes, brought about as a consequence were anticipated at the 
time. 
 
2.5.4 Reactions to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
One theory proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) is that 
institutions have a tendency to attach ready-made solutions to 
problems, and that any analysis by way of justification is made to fit 
the chosen answer to the issue.  This theory they called: ‘A garbage 
can model of organizational choice.’ 
 
Possibly the most cautious assessment of cost-benefit analysis was 
expounded by Needham (1983): “Two elements of any “problem of 
regulation” – a model of regulation and a value system used to 
evaluate regulation – automatically determine the conclusions 
reached regarding regulation’s effects, benefits, and costs.  Not 
surprisingly, there is considerable competition between individuals 
and interest groups for the right to define these two elements and 
the nature of specific problems of regulation.  This right conveys the 
ability to formulate a problem of regulation in such a manner that 
the conclusions correspond to those desired by the problem 
formulator: the right to define a problem automatically conveys the 
ability to influence the prescribed solution to the problem”. (p.7). 
 
Mary Douglas (1985) also similarly noted that: “Cost-benefit 
analysis would give very different results if applied within different 
ethical systems.  An ingenius attempt to work out ethical 
foundations of cost-benefit analysis defines four ethical systems.. 
..utilitarian .. ..egalitarian. ..elitist.. ..libertarian.” (p.15) 
 
However, Boyle (2001) states : “There is nothing wrong with cost-
benefit analysis, as long as you remember what a benefit and a cost 
means.” (p.203).  Although, he also noted that: “It’s strange how 
the figure of $1 million comes up when people don’t actually know 
what something is worth..” (p.212). 
 
Some more specific criticisms of cost-benefit analysis, as used 
within the environment of air transport, have been made: 
 
“The manner in which cost/benefit analysis has been used to stifle 
safety is a travesty.  It is wrong to deny the flying public safer 
transport because of some arbitrary equation, especially one that is 
so imprecise.  The bean counters in the FAA aren’t psychics.  They 
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cannot know how many lives actually will be saved by a proposed 
rule.” (Nader & Smith, 1994, p.37) 
 
A point reflected by these comments regarding the still ongoing 
discussions concerning safety recommendations for fuel tanks: “In 
August 2001 a report provided to the FAA noted that all methods to 
render fuel non-flammable were too costly and did not satisfy cost-
benefit analysis.. ..In response to the FAA report, Jim Hurd, one of 
the task force members who had lost a son on the TWA flight, said, 
“The report basically says it’s acceptable to have a fuel tank 
explosion every four years.. ..It was my duty to be the conscience 
for the group.  When they say it’s acceptable to have another fuel 
tank explosion, I say, ‘Is it really acceptable?’”” (Cobb & Primo, 
2003, p.117) 
 
One highly experienced air accident investigator even suggests that 
cost-benefit analysis has sometimes been used as a political tool to 
excuse inaction: “We do research to say we are doing research.  
The idea is not to do anything, say you are doing research and wait 
until the fuss has died down.. ..they then apply cost-benefit analysis 
and say it is too expensive.” (Eddie Trimble. Cited in: Weir, 2000, 
p.234 – 235) 
 
The author of many seminal works on accident prevention, 
Professor Reason notes any cost-benefit analysis of safety 
recommendations is faced with a very particular problem:  
“Decision-makers must decide how to allocate their resources.  If 
they give money to production, they can look to their productivity 
figures for immediate feedback.  But the pursuit of safety gives 
negative feedback: you are winning when you hear nothing.  It is 
not a compelling reason for investing in safety.” (James Reason. 
Cited in: Prince, 1990, p. 120) 
2.5.5 An Alternative Technique 
 
Despite some negative reactions to cost-benefit analysis, it remains 
the case that competing schemes and alternative uses of resources 
have to be assessed in some way. When it comes to improving 
safety, as part of these assessments it is argued that some value 
has to be placed on preventing a fatality. “To put into place 
procedures and equipment that will save lives, a value must be 
placed on these lives in order to know how to allocate funds 
amongst contesting improvements.” (Cobb & Primo, p.35) 
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There are however some alternatives, or at least variations, on this 
type of analysis.  One is discussed briefly here. 
 
Most regulations are enacted because of some customary approach 
to solving a market failure, of one type or another.  In the case of 
safety, it has often been pointed out that passengers do not have 
enough specialist knowledge to enable the market to operate 
efficiently.  However, Savage (1998) proposes that some 
advantages of the market mechanism could be utilised by 
disseminating information on safety inputs. If, rather than making 
assessments of how effective a safety input is likely to be, a 
statement of the levels of safety inputs provided by each operator 
were made available to the general public, then demand for safety 
would be better reflected in the price mechanism. “Examples might 
be the average experience of the staff, the age and condition of 
equipment, and the level of safety-related expenditures.  
Information of this type will be especially useful in ameliorating the 
market failure due to myopia.”(p.134) 
 
“Socially-optimal behavior will only occur if fully-informed customers 
make rational choices consistent with their desires and economic 
incentives.” (p.202) 
 
2.6 Inferences From the Literature 
 
It is a matter of record that many effective safety measures have 
been enabled in the past as a result of what the ICAO (2006) terms 
the ‘traditional’ method of safety management, with its associated 
cost-benefit analysis on the basis of the WTP principle.  However, a 
logical inference from the weight of evidence presented in the 
literature is that there now exist reasonable grounds for exploring 
alternative measures of acceptable risk to augment the existing 
guidelines. 
 
The key issues are: 
 
a) Safety has improved to the level whereby there are 
diminishing marginal returns on new inputs and increasing 
marginal costs. 
 
b) The traditional basis of analysis is essentially reactive, and 
therefore more suited to accidents where primary costs are of 
dominant concern. 
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c) WTP values are based on empirical studies, and these may 
not be frequent enough to remain appropriate in light of 
rapidly changing technology and social conditions. 
 
d) It is possible that as the nature of safety management 
changes to a more proactive approach (ICAO, 2006), it is 
secondary and tertiary accident prevention measures that will 
dominate.  Such safety inputs (e.g. enhancing certainty 
through improved accident investigative aids and technology) 
are not well suited to justification on the grounds of WTP 
principles alone, and decision making becomes reliant on 
regulatory authorities exercising judgement. 
 
e) The nature of risk preference can have a significant bearing 
on the acceptability of risk, and that the sum of individuals’ 
disutility is not the same as the disutility for society faced with 
equivalent risk. 
 
f) It may be possible to describe and validate an individual utility 
function, incorporating variables for risk perception and 
preference (Savage, 1998), but such a description for a group 
or society would likely be too complex to be reliable. 
 
g) The range of choices available to an individual faced with an 
issue of safety is limited, and so even though the utility 
function itself may be complex the outcome is relatively 
simple.  By making an empirical study of these outcomes, or 
likely outcomes, it may be possible to generate a practicable 
proxy measure for the acceptability of risk. 
 
Given these inferences, the logical next step is to consider the 
following possible descriptions of the world: 
 
1. There is no marked aggregate risk aversion evident amongst 
individuals, and all individuals are in possession of near 
perfect information. Choice in the aviation market is 
conventionally rational, and all decisions relating to safety 
issues will continue to prove efficient if made on a traditional 
basis. 
 
 
2. Choice in the aviation market is affected by behavioural 
characteristics, and therefore perceptions of safety.  However, 
these perceptions are intangible, and any improvement in the 
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overall efficiency of safety policy is only possible through 
judgemental decisions.  
 
3. Choice in the aviation market is affected by behavioural 
characteristics, and therefore perceptions of safety.  It is 
possible to measure these perceptions and use the 
information to form a behavioural economic model of choice, 
associated with a quantifiable system of analysis that can 
improve the overall efficiency of safety policy.  
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3 Methodology 
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3.1 Hypotheses 
 
3.1.1 Traditional View of Accident Costs Reduction  
 
The present regulatory guidelines for safety analysis are most 
efficient when the main concern is preventing primary accident 
costs.   For this policy to result in an efficient overall accident costs 
reduction the aggregate response from individuals should not 
exhibit any marked risk aversion, and they should be essentially 
well informed about the probabilities of an accident.  The first test is 
therefore to discover whether or not this is in actuality a valid 
premiss. 
 
3.1.2 Behavioural View of Accident Costs Reduction  
 
If individuals exhibit a consistent tendency toward risk averse 
responses to safety risk and are not well informed, then a logical 
inference is that safety analysis augmented by behavioural 
principles are more likely to reflect the real aggregate responses to 
safety risks.  The second test is to explore the validity of this 
alternate economic view. 
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3.2 Research Objectives 
 
1. In order that the present statistical method of safety analysis 
proves most efficient, it is a necessary assumption that 
aggregate responses to safety issues average out as being 
similar to that of a risk neutral and objective observer. The 
first objective is to test the likely range of validity of this 
assumption.  
 
2. The ICAO has proposed that market stability ‘may well be 
predicated’ on the perceptions of safety. The second objective 
is to explore the range and relevance of perception attributes 
in determining attitudes amongst passengers towards air 
transport. 
 
3. If the assumption stated at Objective 1.) fails, cost-benefit 
analysis may prove more useful if conducted on a different 
basis.  The third objective is to investigate the possibility of 
measuring the cost-benefit of safety inputs and 
recommendations against shifts in demand. 
 
4. Should strong evidence emerge that the attributes of 
perception are instrumental in forming attitudes and 
subsequent decision-making, maintaining trust and confidence 
in the system is by implication a necessary competence.  The 
fourth objective is to investigate the nature and role of 
paternalism in achieving effective governance of aviation and 
air transport. 
 
5. The evidence may suggest that a behavioural economic model 
for the economics of safety more accurately reflects the 
observed behaviour of the system. If this should prove the 
case, the fifth objective is to induce the logical consequences 
of such a description, and seek evidence that supports these 
expected outcomes from observed experience. 
 
6. The final objective is to propose methods by which any new 
information discovered can enhance the decision-making 
process and efficiency of safety management, as exercised by 
legislative and executive bodies. 
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3.3 Methodology 
 
When selecting the most appropriate methodology, that both 
achieves all the research objectives and also answers the underlying 
questions posed by the two hypotheses, it is necessary to consider 
the study as being in parts.  Some parts lend themselves to a 
positivistic methodology and others to a phenomenological 
approach.  Each part will answer different research questions, but 
the meaning of the whole would be incomplete without them all. 
 
Consequently, a case study methodology appeared applicable (Yin, 
1994): i) the research aims were both to explore and understand 
the phenomena of safety, ii) the research questions were not pre-
fixed, neither were the limits of study fully defined, iii) and, there 
were opportunities to use multiple methods of data collection and 
research during the study. The UK offshore helicopter industry had 
already been selected for study, because not only levels of 
statistical safety but also perceived safety had been observed 
(anecdotally from years of experience in the operation) to be of 
accentuated importance to the commercial viability of the industry 
sector. This ‘unit of analysis’ (Hussey & Hussey, 1997) is thus one 
where all the potential definitions of safety would most likely be 
evident 
 
It was the intention to develop the case study methodology along 
the lines of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  As a result, 
it was decided to design the case study as a four stage process.   
First, to confirm the findings of earlier studies that suggest there is 
little or no correlation between safety performance and financial 
performance.  Secondly, to collect data about behavioural aspects of 
perceptions, induce which of the possible factors of safety actually 
influence decision-making, and how important they are. Thirdly, 
deduce the likely consequences of the resulting ‘definitions of 
safety’. Finally, examine recorded circumstances (accidents and 
their aftermath) for evidence of these theoretical consequences.  
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3.3.1 Replicating Earlier Research Findings 
 
The first stage was to try and replicate the results of earlier studies 
that had attempted to establish links between safety standards and 
financial performance for operating companies.  Although there is 
no question about the validity of these earlier studies, it was 
deemed important to reproduce it. The reasons for doing this are 
twofold.  It is possible that the particular circumstances of the 
offshore helicopter market, notably the power of oil companies 
being so relatively strong, could produce a situation where a 
conventional economic model of rational choice genuinely operates. 
This would indicate that the answer to any failing in the present use 
of cost-benefit analysis lay more in the asymmetry of information, 
rather than any significant flaw in underlying assumptions about the 
market behaving in a risk neutral and objective manner.  The 
second reason was that many researchers (ref. 2.2) held that the 
lack of accident data contributed to the lack of conclusive results.  
These same researchers believed that the wider data available from 
general occurrence data could not be used because of the variability 
in reporting standards amongst operators.  This is another factor 
that could be greatly reduced in the case of offshore helicopter 
operations, because of the standardised nature of operations and 
the greater pressure on transparency, produced by the power of the 
customers. 
 
The aim of this part of the study would be to take the basic 
approach adopted by earlier researchers (ref. 2.2), and just change 
the details of the method.  It is possible that using all occurrence 
data (dismissed by earlier researchers as being unreliable, Barnett 
et al., 1979) and sub-categorised to finer detail, it could result in 
data with improved validity. Conceivably, such a procedure would 
produce evidence that is more conclusive, against which these 
earlier hypotheses could be tested.  This approach was considered 
sufficiently viable to warrant testing.  A comprehensive study of all 
UK helicopter Mandatory Occurrence Reports between Jan 1995 and 
Feb 2004 was conducted, amounting to over 3400 individual 
reports, and then compared with corresponding financial records 
submitted by the operating companies.  However, the results were 
still largely inconclusive on the matter of a link between safety 
performance and financial performance. 
 
The meaningful result is that the conclusions are similar to earlier 
research, and the study serves merely to confirm that the market 
conditions of offshore helicopter operations are consistent with 
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other modes of air transport in this aspect.   For this reason, a full 
description of this part of the study is attached at Appendix A, 
rather than the main document.  
 
Having confirmed that findings from earlier research could be 
replicated, it was a strong indication that an alternative approach 
was needed if the two hypotheses proposed were to be tested. 
 
3.3.2 Interviews, Focus Groups and Surveys 
 
It was established during the literature review that any definition of 
safety is subjective, heavily influenced by interests and perception. 
The only methodology available for investigating the power of 
perceptions of safety is a phenomenological one.  There does 
remain a decision about whether to use focus groups, some form of 
behavioural experimentation or surveys.  In reality, this decision 
was less about the best quality of data available and more about the 
best quality available given the resources. 
 
Collecting data about the perceptions of safety was divided into four 
phases, with an end objective to establish which of the factors 
discussed in the literature review were evident, and how important 
they each are (or, are likely to be). 
 
It was realised that a survey method was going to be most cost-
effective as the main part of study, but that some extra resource 
devoted to a small-scale focus group type study at a preliminary 
stage would deliver dividends. This first phase was a preliminary 
investigation, consisting of interviews and group discussions with a 
small cross-section of stakeholders in the offshore oil industry (low 
skilled workers, high skilled workers, an oil installation manager, 
aircraft engineers and pilots). The purpose of this stage would be 
to: 
 
• Remove or reduce any bias imposed on the structure of the 
survey resulting from the background of the researcher. 
• Establish how the theoretical characteristics of perception, 
identified in the literature, become manifest in the context of 
offshore helicopter travel. 
• Investigate the possibility that some extra factors might 
become evident that had not been revealed during the 
literature review. 
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• Establish the factors of safety most likely to reveal any 
groupings and differences between stakeholders. 
• Establish the most effective way to conduct any subsequent 
survey.  
 
Taking the time and effort to conduct this phase of the research 
made a significant contribution to the overall study.  The 
discussions and interviews did indeed reveal many instances where 
opinions were not as expected, and revealed new information that 
was worth investigating.  This process also made it possible to 
determine the levels of enthusiasm for the different types of survey 
technique.  For example, it was made clear by participants that any 
internet based survey would likely fail, as access to the internet is 
limited on offshore platforms, and respondents almost certainly 
wouldn’t complete a survey from home. Each discussion and 
interview is presented in tabulated form at Appendix B, and against 
each topic there is an entry in the final column to indicate the 
nature of underlying issue(s).  This information was then used as 
the principal guide in the design of a questionnaire. 
 
Although there were many interesting issues raised by the 
preliminary investigation work, much of it justifying further 
research, this survey would be concentrating on how perceptions of 
safety are built, and possibly more important, eroded – and to what 
effect. The task was to come up with a questionnaire design that 
would be both comprehensive and yet still manageable. 
 
It had to be borne in mind that the potential respondents in this 
survey get continual demands for survey material, for a wide range 
of reasons (though, anecdotally, rarely if ever about helicopter 
operations). The other major concern about a questionnaire-based 
survey is that the commercial environment of offshore oil production 
is extremely complex, with multiple interests ranging from 
transnational oil companies, through to union and government 
organisations. Therefore, at every stage it was extremely important 
to gather a broad consensus of approval, which tended to be time 
consuming.  However, discussions with Shell Aircraft Ltd resulted in 
gaining the support of this very key stakeholder.  It was realised 
that any of the many differing interest groups had the capability to 
bring the whole research to a halt, but the endorsement of such a 
key organisation made that less likely. 
 
The second phase was questionnaire design. Having made the 
decision to endeavour for broad participation in a limited survey, 
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rather than small-scale participation in an exhaustively detailed 
survey, question selection was critical.  As previously discussed, the 
group discussion phase was highly valuable, and facilitated the 
questionnaire design as follows: 
 
• It helped to express the theoretical material covered in the 
literature in terms familiar to potential respondents. 
• It helped identify which factors of perception could be 
investigated with reasonably simple approaches, and which 
might require more complex, multiple questions with slight 
variations. 
• It helped reduce ambiguity. 
• It helped maximise the available value from the limited 
number of questions. 
 
A tabulated analysis of the output from the questionnaire is included 
at Appendix C, indicating which questions covered which areas of 
material from the literature review.   
 
The first draft for the questionnaire was formulated in September 
2004, and given to a small sample of potential respondents as a 
trial run in November 2004. Some of the results of these trials were 
merely technical, in that they highlighted some need for 
amendment (generally a need to reword questions so as to avoid 
potential ambiguity, or to remove ‘jargon’), but others were of a 
more fundamental significance. The early indications were that the 
results of the full survey would demonstrate some ways in which 
the viewpoints or ‘mental model’ adopted by various categories of 
stakeholder differ in critical ways. These were likely to be very 
important if supported by the main survey. This raised a further 
problem. To remain on schedule, a relatively small survey would be 
necessary (given the available resources, technical difficulties of 
accessing a large range of stakeholders from an equally diverse 
range of organisations, and locations).  However, it was evident that 
in order to fully test the findings of this trial phase of study, it would 
be critical that the sample should be as representative as possible.  
As the results of the trial study were potentially so significant for 
the ultimate validity of the research, the questionnaire had to be 
distributed as widely as practicable. This meant that the survey had 
to go to every base of operations, so that all the possible variables 
were covered, these included: 
 
• The Northern North Sea is generally infrequent, long sector 
travel in large cabin helicopters. 
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• The Southern North Sea is characterised by generally more 
frequent travel, but in smaller aircraft and for short sectors. 
• The Northern North Sea is deeper water and generally oil 
fields, the Southern North Sea is much shallower and 
generally gas fields, and so the size and structure of 
platforms is different. 
 
As part of the continuing process of maintaining broad industry 
support, the amended questionnaire was then distributed amongst 
some of the key stakeholders with this power to effectively thwart 
any practical research. After many weeks of communication, some 
degree of consensus was achieved around January 2005, and the 
questionnaire, attached at Appendix C, was the final version given 
to passengers and helicopter personnel operating in all the major 
helicopter terminals. 
 
The technical difficulties of managing this ambitious survey with the 
limited resources available to the study did make it the most time 
consuming phase of study.  However, it remained absolutely vital 
that the sample was representative of the population.  Eventually, 
this approved survey ran in the terminals serving the southern 
North Sea over the summer and autumn of 2005 (Norwich, Great 
Yarmouth, Humberside, Blackpool), and in the major northern North 
Sea hub of Aberdeen over the winter of 2005/6. 
 
The many negotiations required during the whole survey process 
was a significant source of delay in this study, and, as a result, the 
final data collection from the questionnaire was only completed in 
March 2006. 
 
The questionnaire survey resulted in 309 completed returns, which 
equates to approximately 0.6% of the total offshore population, and 
represents over 20,000 points of data.  
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis and Validation 
 
The next stage of research was to analyse this data returned as part 
of the survey, and arrive at some conclusions about the relative 
importance of the various factors that go to form perception.  A full 
report on this part of conducting the survey is given in Chapter 4. 
 
There is some novelty in arriving at knowledge that places a relative 
scale of importance on attributes of perception, but it is insufficient 
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to meet all the objectives.  A further objective is to make an 
alternative set of economic assumptions to those of a ‘risk neutral 
and objective’ rational choice.  To achieve this, the data needs to be 
combined in some manner so as to arrive at a measure that 
represents the overall perception of safety.  Such a measure is 
needed to provide a meaningful mechanism for any behavioural 
economic model of safety. 
 
Finally, it is important that any expected outcomes to changes in 
the perceived safety risk are tested and validated against recorded 
events. 
 
For many offshore helicopter accidents this is really only possible by 
examining archived press coverage, for reports of organisational 
behaviour in the aftermath.  However, with the extensive co-
operation of Shell Aircraft Ltd and AAIB, it was possible to make a 
detailed analysis of the S76 G-BJVX accident aftermath. 
 
This deeper analysis of the results presented in Chapter 4 is given in 
Chapter 5. 
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4 The Perceptions of Safety Survey: 
Results & Analysis 
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4.1 Perceptions of Safety 
 
4.1.1 Data Analysis 
 
The questionnaire (Appendix C) had been designed to take no more 
than 15 minutes to complete. Wherever possible, the questions 
were designed with a ‘tick-box’ format and an ordinal scale to aid 
analysis. 
 
The questionnaire delivered 6 variables about the demographic of a 
particular respondent (1 of which is induced by which helicopter 
base the return came from). On a fully completed questionnaire, the 
32 further questions (including part questions) would result another 
61 variables.  There were also 3 separate opportunities for 
respondents to give additional comments (to add to the validity of 
the data, and to provide further opportunities to gather unexpected 
data). 
 
Some questions ask for similar data, but only in areas where it was 
evident (from the preliminary survey) that there could be a 
tendency to give a subjective response, and asking subtly different 
forms of question might balance out.  That is, ‘subjective’ in the 
sense of being different to what might be the revealed preference in 
a different methodology of study. 
 
The plan was that the questionnaire would test all the factors 
identified during the literature review, and some additional ones 
discovered during the preliminary survey process.  Tables attached 
at Appendix C, along with the questionnaire itself, give a scheme for 
the survey, where question numbers are associated with the 
corresponding factors that could be induced (dependant not only on 
the question, but also on the answer).
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4.1.1.1 Software 
 
Data from the questionnaire survey was input to SPSS 12.0.1 for 
windows (available at Cranfield University under an academic 
licence), and was also used for the majority of subsequent analysis. 
 
Some additional analysis was performed with the help of two 
programs ‘resample.xls’ and ‘resamplenrh.xls’ (Wood, 2003), 
downloaded from the Palgrave Macmillan website 
(www.palgrave.com). 
 
4.1.1.2 Demographics 
 
The demographics of the survey sample are presented below, along 
with associated statistics for the population of offshore oil workforce 
(provided by Shell U.K. Exploration and Production). 
 
As previously stated, the sample totalled 309 completed returns, of 
which 247 were other than helicopter operator employees. The total 
workforce equates to about 43,000, and so the sample is 
approximately 0.6% of the population.  
 
The percentage of female respondents in the survey was 4%, which 
compares with the 3.5% in the workforce as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Age Groups 
Offshore Workforce 
Under 30
18%
 30 to 45
47%
 Over 45
35%
Survey Sample
Under 
30 
14%
Over 45 
39%
30 to 45 
47%
n=308 
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Figure 2: Employer Organisation
Exploration & 
Production
53%
Support 
Services
24%
Government 
Institutions
1%
Helicopter 
Operator
20%
Other
2%
 
Figure 3: Helicopter Terminal
Humberside
19%
North Denes
13%
Blackpool
8%
Aberdeen
52%
Norwich
8%
 n=302 
n=308 
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The CAA collects data on flying hours and the sectors flown by 
offshore helicopter operators, some of which was provided for use 
with this study.  The aggregate data for 2002 indicates that the 
heavy classes of helicopter (AS332 & S61) (concentrated in 
Aberdeen) did around 74,000 sectors, and the medium fleet (AS365 
& S76) (concentrated in the southern sector of the North Sea) 
approximately 86,000. However (anecdotally) the typical sectors 
flown in the southern sector are ‘in-field’ (between offshore 
platforms), and therefore it would not be unreasonable to say that 
the number of sectors to-and-from onshore helicopter terminals in 
the southern sector are considerable less than the total shown. The 
proportions illustrated by Figure 3 are consequently not a source of 
concern for the reliability of the sample. Similarly, the majority of 
offshore workers use the helicopter to go to-and-from their place of 
work on a two-week cycle, which is consistent with the returns from 
the survey shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Frequency of Flights
More than 
once per 
week
15%
Weekly or 
fortnightly
52%
6 to 12 times 
per yr
20%
Less than 6 
times per yr
13%
 
An objective of the survey was to collect sample data that would 
permit some estimation about the population as a whole.  This 
requires that the sample be as random and representative as 
possible. From the results illustrated, there are no major indications 
of significant bias, and so the assumption is that the sample has the 
n=308 
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facility for valid and reliable estimation about the population as a 
whole. 
4.1.2 The Risk Preference 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the standard practice for 
regulatory authorities is to use cost-benefit studies based on the 
expected number of ‘lives saved’ (or injuries avoided).  These are 
most likely to achieve optimal results in a world that is generally 
risk-neutral.  If this is an accurate assumption, then ignoring 
complex behavioural factors is justified, efficient and reasonable. If 
not – it is potentially a serious limitation. 
 
The perceptions survey asked 5 questions that contribute to 
establishing the validity of this assumption. 
 
The most direct question sought respondents’ general attitude 
toward levels of risk in their daily lives: a) risk is unavoidable, but 
life is generally safe (a risk-neutral type response), b) risk is 
avoidable, and there are still too many dangers in life (a more risk-
averse response). The results are illustrated in Figure 5.  There is 
considerably less than a 5% chance that these numbers could be 
achieved by a random response, and (based on this response only) 
it is possible to be 95% confident that the proportion of the 
population showing any tendency toward the risk-neutral attitude 
lies between 56% and 67%. 
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Figure 5: Risk Attitude
Unavoidable
62%
Avoidable
38%
 
This result on its own would seem to suggest that a generally 'risk-
neutral’ assumption is not going to produce a completely optimal 
result, because 40% of the population are unlikely to consider it 
justified.  However, it is also possible that any ‘risk-neutral’ based 
decision will be acceptable enough to a large enough percentage of 
the population to work at some level. 
 
There is also the possibility that this result only operates under 
normal conditions, and that even that section of the population not 
exhibiting a generally ‘risk-averse’ attitude will alter their ‘demand 
function’ (Savage, 1998) whenever a significant hazard is 
perceived.  Such a phenomenon is suggested by Calabresi & 
Bobbitt’s (1978) ‘sufficiency paradox’ theory, and similarly by 
Savage (1998), with a parameter termed a ‘perception of 
preventive efforts undertaken’. 
n=306 
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Figure 6: Aircraft Grounding
Automatic 
Aircraft 
Grounding
42%
Grounding 
rarely 
warranted
4%
Not-
grounding to 
be justified 
rather than 
vice-versa
54%
 
Figure 6 illustrates the results to a question about the level of 
precautionary approach respondents would prefer accident 
investigators to have following an accident.  At present, it is 
considered a decision to ground all other aircraft of similar types 
should be the exception rather than the rule, which is the ‘rational’ 
response.  In the circumstances of an aircraft accident, it would 
appear from these results that not only is a ‘risk-neutral’ attitude by 
respondents unlikely, it is more likely that the attitude is markedly 
‘risk-averse’. About 42 %, a similar proportion of those individuals 
who felt that there were too many risks in life (figure 5), considered 
that an absolute precautionary approach should be taken (i.e., 
ground all aircraft of similar type at the start of investigation). 
Another 54% considered that the aircraft should only continue to fly 
if there were good justification not to ground it.  This makes a total 
of 96% of the sample (and, by extension, an assumed clear 
majority of the population) who would either already be ‘risk-
averse’, or would alter their near ‘risk-neutral’ attitude toward ‘risk-
averse’ following an accident. 
n=306 
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This result appears to support theory stated in the literature review, 
and further suggests that the validity of an assumption that 
aggregate responses can be considered ‘risk-neutral’ is confined to 
a limited set of conditions. 
 
4.1.2.1 Absolute Safety 
 
Where the results to the question illustrated in Figure 5 concerned 
an individual respondent’s risk attitude, it was also important to 
establish the risk attitude respondents expected regulatory 
authorities to hold.  The question posed was whether respondents 
expected safety regulators to: a) never compromise on safety in 
their actions (a risk-averse attitude or precautionary principle), b) 
make some allowance for cost in their actions (less precautionary), 
c) have an equal obligation to safeguard the financial viability of the 
industry.  The results are illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 Figure 7: Compromising Safety Regulations for 
Financial Considerations
Equal 
Obligation for 
Industry 
Viability
7%
Never 
Compromise
72%
Some 
Compromise
21%
 
 n=309 
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Allied to this question, is a similar question to establish the attitude 
expected of companies.  Response a) companies need to 
demonstrate an absolute safety standard, b) companies should only 
be expected to maintain an industry standard of safety (relative 
safety), or c) market forces are enough to ensure safety (laissez- 
faire). 
 
Figure 8: Companies' Prioritization of Safety
Absolute 
Priority
79%
Relative Parity
13%
Market Forces
8%
The two charts, Figures 7 & 8, illustrate quite similar results. A 
significant majority (approximately 3 quarters) seem to expect 
absolute standards of safety from those with responsibility for the 
safety of third parties. 
 
Whilst these are stated (or subjective) preferences by respondents, 
and any revealed preferences may prove less absolute; in 
conjunction, the results of all of the questions in this section do 
seem to present strong enough evidence to suggest that there is in 
n=299 
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fact an overall preference for a ‘risk-averse’ response to safety 
risks.  If cost-benefit studies based on existing guidelines are to 
prove reliable and efficient (from a social-maximisation or public 
interest point of view) this aggregate risk-averse preference needs 
to be factored. 
 
4.1.3 The Objectivity Assumption 
 
The second assumption, essential if cost-benefit analyses based on 
the guidelines of lives saved or injuries avoided are to prove optimal 
or efficient, is that the customer has the capacity to behave 
‘objectively’.  That is to say that the customer (or, passenger) has 
enough information to accurately assess their risk exposure and has 
the ability to put that assessment into context. 
4.1.3.1 Statistical Safety 
 
The survey asked two questions directly related to statistics. The 
first of these requested that respondents make a guess about the 
number of fatal accidents that have occurred in offshore helicopter 
operations around the world in the last ten years.  In the second, 
respondents were asked to guess the percentage of these that were 
in the North Sea operations area. 
 
From data provided by the International Association of Oil & Gas 
Producers (OGP), a reasonable ‘objective’ estimate to the first 
question is anything between 50 and 70; and to the second 
question, the figure is around 0.6%, but an estimate of 1% would 
be consistent with the ‘objective assumption’. 
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Figure 9: Number of Worldwide Fatal Accidents in a Ten Year Period
 
 
The picture in Figure 9 does not appear consistent with a group of 
individuals who are in a position to behave ‘objectively’.  From the 
data provided by the survey, the number of respondents who 
actually gave a reasonably ‘objective’ estimate numbered just 25.  
Even if the extreme outlying answers (over 300) are excluded, the 
number of respondents who would have been expected to arrive at 
the ‘reasonably objective estimate’ by chance is anything between 
13 and 28 (for the number in the sample). 
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Figure 10: Estimates of the North Sea Accident Record as a Percentage 
of Global Offshore Accidents
 
 
As well as further evidence for the lack of objectivity displayed by 
respondents in the first question (Fig.9); the results illustrated in 
Figure 10 lends support to the findings of other researchers who 
report that people will generally overestimate the probability of low 
probability events.  Taking into consideration that the 1% estimate 
is actually about 60% too high, approximately 80% of survey 
respondents significantly overestimated the proportion of accidents 
on the North Sea. 
 
The number of respondents who gave a reasonably objective 
estimate to both questions (and who could therefore be expected to 
conform with the assumption) numbered just 6, or 2% of the 
sample.  When it is also taken into consideration that 3 of those 
respondents worked for the one of the helicopter operators, it is 
most unlikely that the population as a whole has the capacity to 
behave objectively. 
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4.1.4 Demand Attributes 
 
There is existing evidence to suggest that the demand function will 
include a factor driven by the perception of safety (Calabresi & 
Bobbitt, 1978; Savage, 1998), and that this may well prove to be a 
step function (i.e., it’s not acceptable, it’s acceptable, it exceeds 
requirements or generates a surplus).  Additionally, this factor will 
have an element created in part by the ‘safety inputs’ (Savage, 
1998) undertaken by operators and/or manufacturers. Thus, 
potential customers will form judgements concerning the levels of 
‘due care’ being taken.  It is possible that this is the critical 
relationship in the overall economics of safety. 
 
Anecdotally many stakeholder groups have their view about how 
passengers rate different aircraft attributes as determinants of 
safety.  Manufacturers have an opinion that differs in some regards 
to that of the helicopter operator, which in turn differs from that of 
the oil company purchasing the service. All of which probably differ 
from the individual passenger travelling to and from work offshore. 
Some suggestions of these differences were available before the 
survey work started. The maintenance of interior fittings had long 
become a low priority for maintenance organisations (as it has very 
little consequence for the airworthiness of an aircraft).  However, 
during the investigation conducted by Shell Aircraft International 
following the S76 crash in July 2002, it became apparent that some 
passengers formed an impression of the overall levels of care (or 
‘safety input’) by how the aircraft looked inside.  
 
The preliminary work for the survey presented further evidence 
about other anecdotal assumptions concerning passengers’ attitude 
toward flying in offshore helicopters, and they too might not be 
valid.  In particular, it is a common belief amongst the helicopter 
operators that the extensive pre-flight briefing given to offshore 
workers negatively colours their perception about the relative safety 
of helicopter operations.  Even though the preliminary survey was a 
very small sample of potential respondents, there was strong 
evidence to suspect that this assumption could well be the inverse 
of the true state of passenger belief. 
 
Given that more of these assumptions were likely to prove 
incorrect, a set of questions was included to discern and map some 
hierarchy of desirable attributes for an aircraft. In this way it might 
prove possible to make an informed guess as to what cues the 
respondents might actually be looking for to construct their opinion 
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about the relative safety of that aircraft.  For example, if a high 
relative score is given to ‘size’ or ‘location of exits’, it would be 
reasonable to look for other indicators of ‘dread’ (this would be 
consistent with the anecdotal assumption that passengers are left 
with a heightened sense of peril, or scared, following offshore safety 
training and the pre-flight briefing procedure).  Alternatively, if 
passengers give a higher score to ‘maintenance of the interior’, it 
could be an indication that confidence in the helicopter operator 
plays a stronger part of the overall perception of safety. 
 
Before giving weight to respondents’ preference for any particular 
aircraft attribute (question no. 11a, Appendix C), it was important 
to confirm anecdotal experience that the type of aircraft used by the 
helicopter operator is noticed, and is important to offshore 
passengers. 
 
87% of respondents confirmed that they notice what type of aircraft 
they are flying in.  Of those that stated that they did not, there is no 
clear common factor to group them. There is some suggestion that 
they are more likely to be younger, and to fly less often than the 
average, but it is not conclusive from the evidence in the survey. 
 
The scores illustrated in Figure 11 were first calculated by assigning 
an ordinal score to each attribute according to where it was put in 
priority of 1 to 9, summing them and then dividing by the maximum 
possible score. 
 
For Example: 
 
 205 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 1st = 205x9 = 1845 
 24  respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 2nd = 24 x 8 = 192 
 18 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 3rd  = 18 x 7 =  126 
 13 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 4th  = 13 x 6 =  78 
 7  respondents placed ‘Safety Record’  5th  = 7 x 5   =  35 
 4 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 6th    = 4 x 4  =   16 
 6 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 7th   =  6 x 3  =   18 
 1 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 8th   =  1 x 2  =   2 
 7 respondents placed ‘Safety Record’ 9th   =  7 x 1  =   7 
 
 The total score for ‘Safety Record’  =  2319 
 
 The maximum score ‘Safety Record’ could have achieved 
 
  = The number of valid responses x 9 = 285 x 9 = 2565 
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If an index of 100 represents the maximum possible score, 
the actual score represents: 
 
2319  ÷ 2565 = 90.4 points 
 
To arrive at the range of scores expected from a survey of the 
population (95% confidence intervals), the scores for the sample 
were then subjected to resampling. 
 
When looking at the data from just the pilots who participated in the 
survey, it is interesting to note that there is little overall difference, 
other than ‘noise’ gains slightly more prominence at an index of 
around 70. 
  
Before attempting to draw conclusions from this data it is useful to 
look at some other results from related questions. 
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Figure 11: Hierarchy of Aircraft Attributes 
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4.1.5 Relative Safety 
 
The survey asked that respondents express an opinion about the 
relative safety of offshore helicopter operations, compared to a 
benchmark of airline operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Helicopter Safety Standards as Compared to Airlines 
The results would suggest that passengers generally have a good 
opinion about the standards of safety in offshore helicopter 
operations. In some regards, marginally better than professional 
pilots working for the helicopter operators (although the pilot 
sample is considerably smaller).  Apart from adding further 
evidence undermining the assumption that consistently providing 
passengers with greater amounts of information (safety training and 
pre-flight briefing) has a negative impact on perception; the results 
support the notion that passengers have a view of relative safety.  
Additionally, if there are any particular doubts about offshore 
safety, the relativity of it compared to a standard of airlines is not 
likely to be the source. 
 
Two further relative comparisons were considered worth a question 
in the survey.  The first, to check whether the safety of offshore 
helicopter operations is seen as an improving situation (Fig. 13); 
the second, to see whether there are any relative differences 
perceived due to the physical operating environment (Fig.14).  
Passengers' Opinion
Better 
Standards
41%
The Same
52%
Not as 
High
7%
 Pilots' Opinion
Better 
Standards
22%
The Same
62%
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16%
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Figure 13: The Relative Safety of Offshore Operations Now 
Compared to Previously
Safer
62%
No Change
36%
Less Safe
2%
 
 
Figure 14: The Relative Safety of Over Water Operations 
Compared to Over Land
Less Safe
27%
No Difference to 
Safety
59%More Safe
14%
 
n=307 
n=302 
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The only difference between the responses of pilots compared to 
passengers is that a slightly higher percentage of pilots (21%) 
considered that over-water operations are safer than those over-
land. However, it is particularly interesting to note both sets of 
respondents rationales for giving this answer originate from an 
opinion that Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is a significant 
hazard, and that this is reduced by conducting over-water 
operations (revealed through additional comments, listed at 
Appendix D). 
 
The fact that pilots give this answer is interesting, but not as 
surprising a result as the fact that many offshore passengers have 
such an extensive knowledge of the issue. 
 
There are further indications amongst the comments contributed by 
respondents that the offshore workforce is a well-informed and 
sophisticated (from an aviation perspective) population. In 
providing comments, respondents were taking extra time and effort 
to complete the survey, and it is interesting to note that some 66% 
of the sample chose to do so. There were at least 35 comments 
(Appendix D) that lend support to the supposition that this body of 
passengers are well able to assess the relativity of offshore safety, if 
not in a strictly objective way at least on the basis of experience. 
For example: 
 
• “I once flew in the Gulf of Mexico in a Huey. That was less 
safe” 
• “Flying in Gulf of Mexico, not as much preparation training” 
• “Everything nowadays is aimed at safety, so they should be 
safer now than they have ever been realistically” 
• “Over the years improvements made i.e., 2 pilots, improved 
lifejackets” 
• “In the 1980s, I was aware of a number of crashes involving 
offshore travel, now they are almost unheard of in the North 
Sea” 
• (reference over-water operations) “No granite clouds. 
Therefore less flight into terrain incidents. Only recovery after 
an incident is more awkward” 
• (reference over-water operations) “It seems less hazardous to 
ditch in water but it presents its own hazards” 
• (reference over-water operations) “Autorotation over land is 
safer, helicopters overturn on water” 
• “In the early days passengers were not weighed, freight 
offshore was guessed & put on the flight” 
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• “Safety of aircraft is same over land or water but risks 
increase over water in event of ditching” 
• “My perception is less safe (over-water): although in reality I 
suspect there’s probably no difference after surviving the 
impact whether you drown or survive the fire” 
• “In the late 70’s and early 80’s the performance and 
equipment was sometimes marginal” 
• “I’ve never felt unsafe flying, but recognise that there has 
been continual improvement with training, safety equipment & 
procedures which has increased safety” 
 
4.1.6 Paternalism 
 
The offshore helicopter industry differs from many other types of 
aviation, and other sectors of the industry, in the number and type 
of restrictions and controls imposed on operating companies. The 
industry is subject to not only safety regulations imposed by 
government, but also many additional safety requirements imposed 
by the oil company that is contracting the service.  These policies 
necessarily represent some element of paternalism by the 
organisations concerned.  Some of it may well be viewed as self-
interest, as it probably forms part of an overall package of 
measures to manage potential vicarious liabilities (particularly in the 
case of the oil companies).  Regardless, safety regulations are used, 
and prevent or restrict the choices available to operating 
companies, who may act differently if the goal is maximising self-
interest. 
 
As safety regulation is such an important issue, it seemed logical to 
use some of the survey questions to establish: a) the extent to 
which safety regulation is perceived as being important, b) the type 
and scope of paternalism desired. 
 
It has already been established from the results illustrated in Fig. 7 
that 72% of the respondents stated that they thought that safety 
regulators should never compromise safety for financial 
considerations.  However, that drops to 56% amongst the pilots, 
Fig. 15. 
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Figure 15: Should Safety Regulators Compromise 
Safety for Financial Considerations (Pilots)
Never
56%
Some
30%
Equal 
Obligation
14%
 
The extent to which passengers’ and operator interests (in this case 
represented by Pilots’ Opinions) may differ, and in certain 
circumstances compete, can reveal insights to much of the rationale 
sustaining arguments for a level of paternalism in the management 
of potentially ‘tragic choices’ (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978). 
 
The issue is not just a straight forward question of whether there 
should or should not be safety regulation, but also one of 
alternative mechanisms, and levels of State involvement; therefore, 
using some 10 of the 32 survey questions (at least, in part) to fully 
explore this fundamental issue is justifiable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=37 
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Figure 16: How Relevant the Standards of Safety Regulation are to 
Everyday Travel 
 
 
It would appear that the paradigm of safety regulation as an 
instrumental part of the air transport system (and the wider 
transport infrastructure) is a generally accepted principle (fig.16). 
 
However, it may be that safety regulation is merely accepted as a 
current state of affairs, rather than actually being valued as an 
effective means of achieving the objective of a safe transport 
system.  This idea was explored by offering respondents two likely 
alternatives: a) the forces of competition in the market, b) the 
transparency and pressures offered by a modern media driven world 
(Fig.17). 
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Figure 17: Safety Regulation vs. Alternative Mechanisms (Media & 
The Market) 
Although there would appear to be some marginal support for these 
alternative mechanisms, there remains a significant proportion of 
both operators and passengers who support the continued use of 
State safety regulation.  
 
Despite the fact there is continued support from all parties for 
safety regulation, it is possible that some clearer differences would 
become apparent on the issue of how restrictive or stringent the 
regulation system should be (Fig.18).  
 
For the sample as a whole, the proportion of respondents 
suggesting ‘self-regulation’ is reasonably consistent with the results 
in Fig.17 for ‘market forces’. There is a slight variance in the case of 
the pilots, but that may just be due to some respondents expressing 
concern with the earlier reference to ‘tight regulation’. 
 
From the results illustrated in Fig.18, there would appear to be 
marginally more support for a system of ‘tight regulation’ amongst 
the sample as a whole, but it is interesting to note that ‘light 
regulation’ receives considerable support.  Amongst the pilots, it 
would appear to be an even split of opinions. 
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Figure 18: Levels of Regulation Likely to Maximise Efficiency 
 
 
Of the whole survey, only one respondent gave consistently laissez-
faire responses to all regulation questions. The respondent flies 
about ‘once per year’, aged ‘30-45’, works in ‘Exploration & 
Production’, and has some responsibilities for helicopter 
management. 
 
The issues of paternalism can be sub-divided into two general 
competences: 1) trust, 2) confidence. The results covered so far in 
this section are generally concerned with the former, but there is 
also the equally important issue of ‘confidence’.  As supported by 
theory discussed in the literature review, confidence is a 
competence driven by capability, both a technical capability 
(specialist knowledge) and a resource capability (funding and 
personnel). 
 
The respondents were asked three questions concerned with 
capability. First, respondents were asked to identify which 
organisation is best placed recognise effective safety (Fig.19). In 
other words, respondents were asked which organisation they 
thought would have the most personnel with the required specialist 
knowledge. 
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Figure 19: The Organisation(s) Best Placed to Recognise Effective 
Safety Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the resources devoted by various major transnational oil 
companies (in particular, Shell Aircraft International) to developing 
specialist knowledge in this field, it is interesting to note the results 
suggested by Fig.19.  The overwhelming opinion is that the 
helicopter industry represents the group of organisations from which 
effective safety measures (improvements) are most likely to 
originate.  
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Figure 20: The Organisation(s) Best Placed to Ensure New Safety 
Measures are Adopted 
 
However, when asked whether the same organisations should be 
trusted to implement new safety measures (Fig.20) (either as a 
result of conflicting interest or lack of resources), opinions are 
considerably more divided.  Additionally, it is interesting to note 
that the operators (pilots’ opinions, Fig.20) show less support for 
the capability of their own industry to implement new safety 
measures than the sample as a whole. 
 
When the pilots were asked to give their opinion as to which 
organisation has done the most to drive safety innovation in 
offshore helicopter operations, the results were very similar (Fig. 
21). Except that the relative positions of ‘oil companies’ and 
‘government’ are reversed. 
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Figure 21: The Organisations Most Credited with Driving Safety 
Innovation (Pilots’ Opinions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overall credit given to each group of organisations is illustrated 
in Fig.22, worked out for each group as follows: 
 
    No. of 1st placings x 4 
 + No. of 2nd placings x 3 
 + No. of 3rd placings x 2 
 + No. of 4th placings x 1 
 
 Divided by the maximum score = no. of valid responses x 4  
 
 = Weighted Score (index 100) 
 
It is the fact that the opinion appears so evenly split about the 
effectiveness of government, oil companies, and the helicopter 
industry as drivers of safety improvement that is most noteworthy.  
Anecdotally, the oil companies have been providing the majority of 
the initiative and funding to drive safety improvements in this 
sector for some time.  It was expected that at least the pilots’ 
opinions would reflect that generally accepted position. 
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Figure 22: The Total Weighted Scores for Organisations Credited 
with Driving Safety 
 
Despite these three groups (government, oil companies, & 
helicopter operators) receiving recognition for their role in 
promoting safety improvements; it is still very much the case that 
the helicopter operators are ultimately held responsible for the 
safety of helicopter operations (Fig.23). 
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Figure 23: The Organisation(s) with Most Responsibility for Ensuring 
Safe Helicopter Operations 
 
There were additional comments (Appendix D) that support the 
quantitative data. It illustrates the importance of paternalism in the 
management of safe offshore helicopter operations: 
 
• “Operators should be 100% sure that their aircraft are safe to 
fly anywhere” 
• “At the first sign of a problem pilots return to base and sort it 
out” 
• “As long as all relevant precautions are taken and appropriate 
training provided, I feel safe” 
• (Feeling Operations are now safer) “It’s not necessarily a 
feeling, more a realisation that risks are better managed now 
and the industry is more highly regulated (at least in the 
North Sea area)” 
• (Feeling Operations are now safer) “More control and 
guidelines now as pre 1980’s, i.e., Pilots’ flying hours, wind 
and sea states, weight restrictions, better maintenance, more 
emphasis on safety” 
• “I have full faith in pilots” 
• (Ref. Safety equipment)“The companies must continue to 
develop new and innovative ideas for this market” 
• “Have always been glad to fly in choppers with two engines.  
Regulation has ensured that risks have reduced” 
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• “Whilst I believe that safety has increased, in terms of 
awareness of risks associated with helicopter flight and 
protection provided in the event of a crash; I always feel safe.  
However, that may be due to placing my well-being into the 
hands of others when I have confidence in their professional 
skills” 
 
 
Respondents were also asked how they rated the relative standards 
of regulation in the North Sea operating area, compared with a 
range of others around the world.  Using the same method as for 
Fig.22, the respondents rated the UK and Norwegian regulatory 
systems as being the most rigorous (Fig.24).  
 
 
Figure 24:  Comparing the Rigour of National Regulatory Standards, 
as Viewed by Respondents 
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4.1.7 Factors Affected by the Perceptions of Safety 
 
It has already been well established that safety is a complex 
description of a multiple of factors. As an extension to some of 
these theories, it is a reasonable supposition that some factors can 
be generally classified as members of a group forming inputs to the 
equation, and similarly others as outputs. 
 
Accordingly, the factors studied in the process of this survey fall into 
a group of 6 Inputs (Availability Heuristics, Knowledge, 
Power/Control, Expectations, Trust & Confidence), and 3 Outputs 
(The senses of Peril, Dread & Uncertainty). 
4.1.7.1 Peril 
 
The data illustrated in fig.11 shows a dominant preference for 
aircraft that have a good ‘safety record’. This finding is 
substantiated by the result that 91% of respondents considered 
that: ‘The accident record of any particular aircraft type is very 
important information, and should be generally available to the 
public at large’. The most closely related factor to this preference is 
the sense of ‘peril’, or more precisely a ‘freedom from peril’.  
 
A ‘peril’ related question asked whether respondents thought the 
safety training comprehensive, and whether (in their opinion) it was 
likely to improve their chances of survival. The question is 
important because much of the safety training concentrates on the 
emergency actions required when an aircraft ditches at sea, and the 
survival procedures required whilst awaiting rescue (Fig.25). 
 
A small percentage of respondents amongst the pilots and 
passengers would appear to experience a strong sense of being in 
peril under these circumstances (3% in each case). Of the 
remainder, equal percentages of passengers and pilots consider the 
training comprehensive, but a higher proportion of passengers 
believe that their chances of survival are still likely to be low (63%).  
This is likely to translate into some feelings of peril whilst travelling 
for this majority.
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Figure 25: The Quality of Safety Training, and the Chances of Survival 
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As with other areas of investigation in this survey, there were a 
number of voluntary comments (Appendix D) submitted that add a 
qualitative dimension to the data already gathered.  For example: 
 
• “Chances of survival in water crash virtually zero, but not 
much better over land” 
• “Landing in an emergency on land is much easier than 
ditching to water at freezing temp.” 
• “Crashes are generally non-survivable whether over land or 
sea. Controlled ditching at sea is less safe due to likely sea 
states” 
• “Helicopters can land anywhere, but are top heavy so flip in 
water” 
• “With engine situated above pax (abbreviation for 
passengers), upon impact (either land or water) it will drop on 
top of them regardless” 
• “I believe if I crash I would be lucky to escape, but, if I 
survived, to then have to escape in water and wait on rescue 
– I don’t think I have a chance” 
• “Most people think when a chopper goes down no one will 
survive anyway!” 
• “The important part is keeping the aircraft in the air!” 
• “Helicopters are making several stops on different 
installations, resulting in more take-offs and landings, known 
to be the highest risk during flight” 
• “High reliability of the aircraft has a greater importance than 
survival equipment” 
• “Falling from height into water or land doesn’t matter, you’re 
still going to die” 
 
4.1.7.2 Dread 
 
There no specific questions within the survey from which any 
quantitative assessments about feelings of ‘dread’ can categorically 
be made, although some questions may suggest it.  In particular, it 
is probable that the 81% of respondents who answered that having 
the personal survival equipment supplied is more important than 
any discomfort wearing it may cause, did so in part due to feelings 
of unease brought on by the thought of having to evacuate the 
cabin whilst underwater. 
 
The most significant evidence produced by this survey about the 
presence of ‘dread’ are the qualitative comments supplied by 66% 
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of the sample (Appendix D).  There are at least 37 comments that 
have an evident element of ‘dread’ in them.  For example: 
 
• “Mechanical faults cause stress.  Bad weather conditions 
makes you worry a bit” 
• “There is a secondary accident hazard in drowning if you were 
to survive the crash” 
• “Risk of capsize, especially in bad weather, remoteness of 
rescue” 
• “Capsize risk, ability to escape” 
• “Flying in Chinook helicopters, 44 passengers with only 4 
emergency exits, if the Chinook landed on the sea & turned 
over, there was no chance of escape” 
• “Injured passengers may not escape from aircraft before 
drowning.  Although impact may be greater on land, injured 
should survive” 
• “Willing to use any item which increases survivability” 
• (Ref. Hazards) “Water temp, ease of rescue, disorientation & 
panic” 
• (Ref. Feeling unsafe)“Being in a helicopter with a large person 
next to you taking up half your seat and blocking the exit that 
they will not fit through” 
• “You can’t drown on land” 
• “There is some good survival equipment out there (suits) the 
oil companies should spend some money and buy it” 
• “Due to poor ergonomics and expanding waist sizes, in the 
event of submersion I feel in some seats there is little chance 
of escape or use of equipment, due to lack of 
space/movement” 
• “Please make escape exits bigger” 
 
4.1.7.3 Uncertainty 
 
It’s a well established phenomenon that in a free choice people 
exhibit a natural inclination to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity.  In 
economic terms, this will generally translate into a willingness to 
pay a premium to avoid or mitigate any uncertainty (insurance, 
etc.), or the juxtapositional situation of demanding some form of 
compensation to accept any uncertainty (hazard pay, etc.). 
 
In aviation, it is often said that people prefer ‘tried and tested’ 
technology, and solutions to problems.  Cobb & Primo (2003) listed 
one of six definitions of safety as “the absence of unsolved crashes”.  
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They stressed that: “This safety definition is demanding for those 
involved, allowing for no failures or uncertainties on the part of 
investigators.  No matter how long the time period, causes must be 
found and the public must be given a satisfactory answer”(p.158).  
Two key questions in the survey explore the extent to which such a 
preference to avoid any uncertainty is observable, and measurable. 
 
Reference the data illustrated in Fig.6, it has been established that 
96% of respondents advocate varying degrees of precautionary 
approach following any accident.  Only 4% of respondents 
considered a decision to ground an aircraft following an accident as 
‘rarely justified’. 
 
The proportion of respondents that stated they would prefer to have 
every detail following an accident (54%) also supports the evidence 
that uncertainty could significantly influence the overall perception 
of safety (Fig.26).    
 
Just the one respondent stated that they wanted to know ‘who to 
blame’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: The Amount of Information That Should be Provided  
Following an Accident 
Every Detail is  
Required 
54% 
Just Want the Main 
Points 
44% 
Just Want to Know  
Who is to Blame 
0% 
No Details Wanted 
2% 
Don't Know What  
Information is  
Required 
0% 
n=299 
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4.1.8 Factors Affecting the Perceptions of Safety 
 
As previously stated, the working assumption is that some factors 
studied in this survey form a group that are consequential of any 
perceptions of safety (Peril, Dread, Uncertainty), and others 
causative. Of those causative factors, some are so closely related to 
others that it is reasonable to consider them in conjunction, possibly 
as a sub-category of the other. 
 
Using the material covered during the literature review as the basis 
of selection, there are six input factors selected for particular study 
as part of this survey: Knowledge, Availability Heuristic, Power (or 
Control), Trust, Confidence, and Expectation.  However, availability 
heuristic is closely related to the broader category of knowledge, 
and the requirement for trust is inversely related to power (control).  
Metlay (1999) notes “..there may be an important relationship 
between trust and power.  When power is distributed evenly, trust 
is not essential, particularly when exchanges take place over short 
time horizons and involve clear feedback measures.. ..However 
when power is distributed unevenly, the trust relationship is more 
essential for the more dependent and less influential party” (p.114).  
Similarly, it is useful to consider trust in conjunction with 
confidence, as, although separate, there is a wealth of past material 
to suggest these two factors are inherently linked (Metlay, 1999; 
Lazaric & Lorenz, 1998). 
 
Therefore, the following sections of the analysis are organised 
accordingly. 
4.1.8.1 Knowledge 
 
For the purposes of this survey, the tests of knowledge are the 
levels of awareness exhibited about the dangers and hazards 
presented by offshore helicopter travel, and the deficiencies and 
limitations in the present systems to manage them. 
 
It has already been established that any knowledge used by 
respondents to form perceptions of safety are unlikely to be 
objectively based (Fig.9 & Fig.10).  However, that result is not the 
same as saying the survey respondents have an unsophisticated 
knowledge of the hazards faced, or the safety management system. 
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The result that 98% of respondents would expect, or demand to 
know at least the main points of any aircraft accident investigation 
report (Fig.26) is also supported by the comments added by some 
respondents (Appendix D), which exhibit a high degree of technical 
awareness.  For example, some selected comments from 
passengers (i.e., not pilots or helicopter engineers): 
 
• “I have always been glad to fly in choppers with two engines.  
Regulation has ensured that risks have reduced” 
• “The vibration monitoring equipment is a major factor in 
preventing critical failures along with the constant 
improvement in material specifications” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Additions of HUMS to aircraft, advances 
in condition monitoring & lessons learned from many years of 
operation” 
• “Helicopters are making several stops on different 
installations, resulting in more take-offs & landings, known to 
be the highest risk during flight” 
• “Because of the stinginess of oil companies & government 
apathy, the flotation devices are still fitted in the wrong place, 
allowing aircraft to turn turtle in the slightest seas.  These 
devices should be fitted where the weight is, i.e., engine & 
gearbox” 
 
In total, there were 58 comments from the passengers amongst the 
sample that exhibit some higher levels of knowledge about technical 
or operational helicopter matters. That equates to just over 20% of 
the respondents who voluntarily added such a comment to their 
questionnaire return.  
 
When asked about how much information helicopter operators 
should have to publish about less severe safety matters (non-
accident data), the results were as illustrated in Fig’s. 27a & b.  
Where ‘third party oversight’, in this context, is an unspecified but 
trusted institution(s) operating in the passengers’ interests. 
 
This is a subject about which there could logically be some variance 
of opinions between passengers and helicopter operators. So, for 
comparison, Fig.27b shows the results from the pilots’ survey 
returns only. 
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Figure 27b: The Amount of Information About Safety 
Related Matters That Should be Published by 
Helicopter Operators (Pilots)
There Should 
be No Forced 
Disclosure
8%
All Safety 
Details Should 
be Published
35%
Third Party 
Oversight is 
Sufficient
57%
 
Figure 27a: The Amount of Information About Safety 
Related Matters That Should be Published by 
Helicopter Operators
Third Party 
Oversight is 
Sufficient
29%
There Should 
be No Forced 
Disclosure
4%
All Safety 
Details Should 
be Published
67%
n=306 
n=37 
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It is reasonable to conclude that the respondents in this survey 
have an interest in the subject matter of helicopter safety, and have 
the capability to understand many of the issues.  From the data 
illustrated in Fig.27a, a significant majority consider it important to 
have information available on which to form their own opinions 
(67% stating that all details should be published).  Of the helicopter 
operators (represented in this sample by the pilots), there is an 
apparent reluctance for such an extensive level of transparency 
(57% stating that third party oversight is sufficient). 
 
Analysis of the influence knowledge has on perceptions of safety 
cannot be complete without considering the role of heuristics, and, 
in particular, the availability heuristic (Slovic, 2000). 
4.1.8.2 Availability 
 
The survey had two questions primarily directed at trying to 
generate information about the influence of the availability heuristic.  
The first question (fig.28) asked respondents to assess whether 
helicopter operations were now safer than before, followed by a 
supplementary question which asked them to state whether they 
recalled the time they felt less safe (if they had stated that 
operations were now ‘safer’).  
Figure 28: The Relative Safety of Helicopter 
Operations Today
Less Safe than 
the Past
2%
No Change
36%
Safer than 
Before
62%
 
n=307 
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Of those respondents that stated that operations are now safer 
(62%), 38% were able to recall a time when they felt less safe. 
  
As the most recent accident, it was assumed that the most likely 
evidence concerning the influence of the availability heuristic (or 
bias) on passengers’ perceptions would originate from the accident 
to a Sikorsky S-76 helicopter, G-BJVX, off the Norfolk coast, 16th 
July 2002. 
 
Of the 27 comments given (Appendix D) that have elements of an 
availability heuristic, there were indeed 6 specific references to the 
S-76 accident as an influence.  Interestingly, these comments 
indicate that the availability heuristic is not necessarily going to 
negatively impact the perception of safety; occasionally it appears 
to have a positive impact.  The six comments are given below: 
 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Following Shell’s S-76 
crash off Leman in 2002.  The industry continues to learn 
from accidents and investigations which continuously 
improves safety” 
• “I was onboard the Santefe Monarch in 2002 when the S-76 
went down, so for a while I thought about safety much more” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Helicopter crash, S-76, no 
real reason found why” 
• “But felt safer just after ‘downed’ chopper about 2yrs ago, as 
I knew everyone would be more focused on 
maintenance/safety” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Because of 76 accident” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Prior to lightning strike on 
blade incident which was a factor in the incident at Norwich” 
 
However, unexpectedly, there were also 7 comments with equally 
significant references to an accident nearly twenty years ago, that 
of the Chinook helicopter, G-BWFC, 6th November 1986 (45 
fatalities). 
 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “After any incident, but 
mainly after the Chinook incident off Shetland, which I was 
close to at the time and knew a number of persons involved” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “The time they flew 
Chinooks” 
• “Flying is now safer.  There are still helicopter incidents, near 
misses, technical faults, and fatal crashes still occur.  But, in 
the past, helicopters have been used which were 
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uncomfortable, noisy & generally hated by the workforce.  I 
refer to Chinooks, and although numerous complaints were 
made, it took a fatal crash to take them out of service.  
Generally concerns are now acted on” 
• “I did not feel safe flying in the Chinooks”  
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “When flying in Chinook 
helicopters” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Used to fly Chinooks, was 
on Cormorant Alpha crew when chopper went down”(AS332 
accident, 14 March 1992, 11 fatalities) 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe in the past) “Flying Chinook helicopters, 
44 passengers with only 4 emergency exits.  If the Chinook 
landed on the sea & turned over, there was ‘no’ chance of 
escape” 
 
The strength of feeling about the Chinook suggests that the 
longevity of any availability heuristic is, in some part, dependent on 
the dramatic nature of the disaster concerned.  Between 1986 and 
2005, there were 5 other fatal accidents involving offshore 
helicopter operations (excluding S-76, G-BJVX), and yet there is 
just the one reference to any of these. 
 
Of the remaining 10 comments that have distinct elements of 
availability heuristic, 4 have a positive effect.  These comments 
describe how the respondents’ cannot readily remember any 
helicopter incidents, and how they therefore feel safer.    
 
Other comments refer to specific occasions when respondents were 
onboard particular aircraft and, because of some change to the 
normal situation, subsequently felt less safe. For example: 
 
• “After landing onshore, aircraft jammed one undercarriage 
wheel in drain cover on apron.  Pilot attempted to use lift from 
rotor to free the jammed wheel without disembarking 
passengers first.  Aircraft tilted heavily to one side” 
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4.1.8.3 Power 
 
The relationships between the acceptable levels of risk and the 
associated levels of power or control is both well documented and 
generally accepted.  The purpose of this survey was thus not to try 
to describe such relationships, but rather to make some estimate of 
the respondents’ perceived levels of control over the risks they face 
in helicopter travel. 
 
The survey included a two part question, asking respondents to 
state how important it is to be able to express an opinion about 
helicopter safety issues to responsible authorities, and whom it was 
considered most important receives that feedback (Fig.29 & Fig. 
30). 
 
Logically, there is little need (or, at least, not a strong need) to 
express an opinion if someone is in a position to control risk factors 
for themselves, or, alternatively, if the risks are not significant 
enough to be concerned over. Therefore, 66% of passengers in the 
sample stating it ‘very important’ to be able to express their 
opinions to a responsible authority about helicopter safety matters 
Figure 29: The Importance of Being Able to Express an 
Opinion About Helicopter Safety (Data from Passengers)
Very Important
66%
Important
29%
Unimportant
5%
n=303 
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would seem to suggest that they do not have a great sense of 
control or power over their safety. 
 
Figure 30: The Organisation it is Most Important to be 
Able to Express an Opinion to (Data From Passengers)
The Government
25%
Oil Companies
20%
Unions
4%
Operating 
Companies
51%
The main point of asking the supplementary question of whom it is 
most important to direct this feedback via (Fig.30) is to compare 
the result with the earlier data of who is most responsible for safety 
(Fig.23).  One possible conclusion is that although 73% of 
respondents hold the helicopter operators responsible for safety, a 
significant number consider it important to have an intermediary or 
agent to represent their interests (oil companies, government, and 
unions totalling 49% in Fig.30, as opposed to 27% in fig.23). 
 
The pilots gave slightly different responses: 81% stating it is ‘very 
important’ to be able to express an opinion, and 70% stating that 
feedback should be directed to the helicopter operators.  However, 
it is difficult to make a direct comparison with the passengers, as 
the purpose for giving feedback is likely to be different.  From 
anecdotal experience, in the case of the pilots it is less likely to be 
connected with any notion of control over risks, and more to do with 
general terms of employment. 
 
n=292 
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There was some additional material provided within the comments 
(Appendix D) that support the estimate of perceived power (control) 
as low. For example, there were a number of comments that 
express concern that other passengers on the aircraft (over whom 
the respondent submitting the comment has no control) will hamper 
emergency evacuation: 
 
• “For a man over six ft. two wearing all the equipment, I don’t 
believe he could escape, and no way could he assume the 
crash position (all helicopters need 3" more leg room)” 
• (Ref. Hazards of evacuation) “panic” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe) “Control on overly large/obese 
passengers” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe) “Being in a helicopter with a large 
person next to you taking up half of your seat and blocking 
the exit that they will not fit through” 
• “I am concerned, however, that some survival equipment 
(airpocket) may hinder my exit in an emergency” 
• “18 people would be hard to exit in a crash” (Note: 18 
passengers is a full load on a AS332 Super Puma helicopter) 
• “You seem to have to wear more and more clothing & 
equipment every year, making escape from helicopter more 
difficult” 
• “Please make escape exits bigger” 
 
4.1.8.4 Trust & Confidence 
 
Given the scope of material covered by the survey, it would be a 
challenging prospect to distinguish the complementary qualities of 
trust and confidence, however distinct the meanings of the two 
words might be.  A decision had to be made at a relatively early 
stage in preparation for the survey as to whether any confusion of 
the two would alter the overall result of the study. The length of the 
survey needed to be constrained by the practicality of achieving an 
average completion time of 10 to 15 mins, because this was 
deemed to be the maximum time passengers would have spare, or 
be generally willing to give, whilst waiting in the helicopter terminal.  
Therefore, these nuances, however interesting, had to be placed in 
lower priority to other objectives.  
 
In a complex world, individuals rely on institutions to simplify 
transactions that are either too infrequent to justify building up the 
necessary specialist knowledge, or so multifaceted that it would 
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exceed their available resources. For these institutions to fulfil this 
agency role, they must display both the qualities of trustworthiness 
and competence (confidence).  In the environment of offshore 
helicopter operations, this becomes most critical when a failure of 
safety management is highlighted by an accident. Hence, there are 
two questions in the survey constructed to establish the relative 
importance of various institutions within the framework of the 
system under these circumstances. 
 
The survey asked respondents to state who they would most trust 
for information about an accident, followed by who they would most 
trust for assurance that it was safe to fly again (fig.31). 
 
For Example, the weighted scores for the ‘Oil Companies’: 
 
Placing Trust for Information 
About the Circumstances 
of the Accident 
Trust for Information 
About the Safety of Flying 
Again 
1st 14 x 4 18 x 4 
2nd 58 x 3 53 x 3 
3rd 112 x 2 115 x 2 
4th 20 x 1 19 x 1 
Total 474 480 
Maximum 204 x 4 205 x 4 
Score 58.1 58.5 
 
 
This relates to the notion that Cobb & Primo (2003) had in making 
one of the six definitions of safety the ‘absence of unsolved 
crashes’. As it can be seen, in the opinion of respondents to this 
survey, it is the key role for government to ensure that accidents 
are solved, and to sanction the resumption of flying operations.   
 
It is also interesting to note that a small number of respondents 
(7%) stated that they would trust the media most for information 
on which to frame their opinions.  Given the size of this sample, it 
has not been possible to accurately profile these respondents.  At 
first, it looked as if this phenomenon would be typified by a younger 
age group (under 30), but as the survey progressed that was later 
proven an unreliable indicator (on its own).  Although not a large 
enough response to have a significant affect on this survey, 
understanding the drivers for this response could have some 
interesting implications, especially on the much larger scale of 
airline travel.  
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Figure 31: Trust & Confidence Held by Organisations in the Event of an Accident
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As made clear above, it was not feasible to measure the qualities of 
trust and confidence independently. However, that did not eliminate 
the possibility that some distinctions would be evident in the 
comments volunteered by respondents to the survey. 
 
There were comments that suggest that the quality of aircrew 
training, and the confidence it engenders, is an important factor for 
some passengers: 
 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “I have full faith in pilots” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “I always feel safe.  However, that may 
be due to placing my well-being into the hands of others 
when I have confidence in their professional skills” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Everyone in the business is older now” 
(meaning more experienced in this context) 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Standards of offshore heli-crew 
competency & standard of operating company’s maintenance 
& operations” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “We as helideck crew and as helicopter 
passengers feel confident in the helicopter operators, as this 
is the safest way to get from offshore to onshore each trip” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Services are far more professional than 
70’s and helicopters newer” 
 
There also some comments that highlighted the importance of trust: 
 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “At the first sign of a problem pilots return 
to base and sort it out” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe) “Because of the stinginess of oil 
companies & government apathy the flotation devices are still 
fitted in the wrong place,..” 
• “But felt safer just after ‘downed’ chopper about 2 yrs ago, as 
I knew everyone would be more focused on 
maintenance/safety” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “I do feel they always err on the side of 
safety” 
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4.1.8.5 Expectation 
 
Expectation is another factor that is challenging to assess 
quantifiably.  However, from the data gathered in relation to other 
topics, it is possible to conclude that there are high levels of 
expectation amongst the survey sample concerning both helicopter 
operators and the regulatory authority behaviour. 
 
Looking at the data illustrated in Fig.8 and Fig.23, with 79% of 
respondents stating that companies are expected to make safety an 
absolute priority and 73% stating that helicopter operators are most 
responsible for safe operations, it suggests an expectation that the 
helicopter operators will be held accountable for their activities. 
 
From Fig.7 and Fig.24, a conclusion can be made that respondents 
expect the UK regulatory authority to maintain the highest possible 
standards of regulation; with 72% stating that regulators should 
never compromise on safety when making decisions, and the UK 
being rated as having the highest standards of regulation amongst 
the major offshore helicopter operating regions (equal with 
Norway).  
 
Corroborative data for these conclusions is also evident amongst the 
comments supplied (Appendix D): 
 
• “No person should have to put their life unnecessarily at risk 
in order to carry out their job.  Risks should be eliminated or, 
if that is not feasible, controlled and closely monitored” 
• “Safety should be paramount whether over land or sea” 
• “Everything nowadays is aimed at safety, so they should be 
safer now than they ever been realistically” 
• “The same measures should be taken to ensure safety, 
whether over land or water – the highest measures” 
• (Ref. Feeling less safe) “Overseas” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Stricter regulations” 
• “Whether flying over land or not, safety should not be 
compromised” 
 
There are also comments that suggest that it is an expectation that 
safety improves with newer technology, and experience: 
 
• “I would like to think helicopter travel is getting safer every 
year” 
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•  (Ref. Feeling safer) “Additions of HUMS to aircraft, advances 
in condition monitoring & lessons learned from many years of 
operation” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Mainly because of the continuing safety 
researches” 
• “Improvements in technology allow improvements to safety 
programs” 
• (Ref. Feeling safer) “Better technology” 
• “Generally feel that as time progresses and accidents happen, 
the findings contribute to increasing safety” 
• “One would expect safety elements to improve with 
technological advances and the increasingly more vigilant 
safety culture generally” 
 
 
 
4.2 Use of Data 
 
The survey resulted in this set of data that answers all the questions 
about discrete elements of perception that go to form an opinion, 
and subsequently guide decision making.  However, in order to 
predict the aggregate response to a safety risk it has to be 
recognised that an individual forms their opinion from a complex 
interaction of these elements.  To achieve this state of knowledge, 
the next chapter deals with a more complex analysis of the survey 
data. 
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5 The Aggregate Response to Safety Risks & 
Accident Costs 
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5.1 The Work Decision Scenario 
 
Passengers using offshore helicopter travel will have a demand 
function that is differentiated from that for other types of 
passengers: the reason for travel is entirely business, it is essential 
for employment (in the UK offshore oil industry), and there is no 
intermodal competition (i.e., it is not possible to elect to travel by 
boat, for example).  This equates to a defined set of decision 
outcomes for the individual offshore worker: 
 
1. Safety of helicopter travel is perceived as acceptable, and the 
work decision is based on other factors of employment. 
2. Safety is perceived as unacceptable for the given rate of 
compensation (pay), and the terms of employment need to be 
renegotiated to incorporate higher factors for the risks of 
helicopter travel. 
3. Safety is perceived as unacceptable, and alternative 
employment that does not require helicopter travel needs to 
be sought. 
 
Taking as a framework for analysis Savage’s (1998) customers’ 
utility function under conditions of imperfect information, which 
includes the parameter for ‘customers’ perceptions of the preventive 
efforts undertaken’ (p.105); it is possible to examine the likely 
consequences of any perceived shift in helicopter safety from the 
data supplied in the survey.   
 
In the first instance, respondents were asked to state how 
important the issue of helicopter safety is as a factor in their own 
work decision (Fig.32).  As it can be seen, 88% of the survey 
sample state that helicopter safety is either already an important 
factor or it would become an important factor, should it be 
perceived that standards have dropped. Although this is an 
important result, as it demonstrates that the principle of Savage’s 
theory is probably valid, in itself it does not provide enough 
information to develop the ‘parameter of safety perception’ into a 
meaningful or useable function. 
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Figure 32: Perceived Safety & the Work Decision
There are More 
Important 
Factors to Think 
About When 
Choosing to 
Work Offshore
12%
Should 
Helicopter 
Safety Change 
for the Worse it 
Would Become 
an Important 
Factor
41%
Helicopter 
Safety  is 
Already an 
Important 
Factor
47%
 
As outlined in Chapter 3 and Appendix C, the questions were 
constructed to determine the range of opinions on a broad range of 
aspects concerned with the perceptions of helicopter safety.  Given 
any particular question, some responses are more precautionary or 
risk averse than others.  So, even though answers from one 
respondent will not necessarily be the same as those of another 
similar respondent on each and every subject, overall they may 
exhibit a similar cumulative risk response.  This is the basis of 
analysis for the ‘work decision scenario’. 
 
Wherever a question in the survey has elements that can be viewed 
as more or less precautionary, or risk averse, it was assigned points 
on an ordinal scale accordingly.  As expected, the permutations are 
considerable, and to ease the management of this data the tables of 
responses were organised according to two sub-categories.  The 
first, those respondents who had stated that some risks were 
generally unavoidable, and secondly, those who had stated that 
there were still too many dangers in life (Fig.5). Finally, totals for 
each set of responses were adjusted according to the response 
given for how important helicopter safety is in framing decisions 
n=302 
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about working offshore (Fig.32). Of the 309 returns in the sample, a 
slightly reduced number of 284 were complete enough to use in this 
analysis. As stated before, each of the responses to questions were 
assigned points as a rating of risk aversion; varying according to 
the directness of any relevance to overall perception of safety, and 
the clarity of any distinctions between alternative responses. These 
tables are attached in full at Appendix E, however the system of 
assigning a risk aversion rating to alternative responses is given 
below: 
 
QUESTION & ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES RATING 
Q2. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
I believe risk is unavoidable, but life is generally safe. 0 
 
I believe risk is avoidable, and there are still too many 
dangers in life. 
2 
Q4. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
Safety Regulators should never compromise on safety in 
their actions. 
2 
Safety Regulators have to make some allowance for cost in 
their actions. 
1 
Safety Regulators have an equal obligation to safeguard the 
financial viability of the industry. 
0 
Q6. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
Self-regulation in safety would be the most efficient system 
for helicopter operations. 
0 
A light regulatory touch from the state is the most efficient 
system for safe helicopter operations. 
1 
A strong system of state regulation is the most efficient 
system for safe helicopter operations. 2 
Q8. Serious accidents are very rare, but when they do occur there are a 
number of decisions to be made. With which of the following statements 
would you most agree? 
All aircraft of that type should be grounded as a matter of 
standard procedure, at least until more is known. 
2 
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QUESTION & ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES RATING 
The aircraft type doesn't need to be grounded 
automatically, but Investigation Authorities need to justify 
not grounding rather than vice-versa 
1 
The aircraft type does not need to be grounded 
automatically, and any decision to cease operations is rarely 
justified. 
0 
Q9.  With reference to individual aircraft operators, with which of the 
following statements would you most agree? 
The accident record of any company is very relevant to 
perceptions of safety, and it should be published. 2 
The helicopter industry operates to general standards, and 
so It is only the record of the industry as a whole that 
matters. 
1 
Published safety records are open to distortion and 
misinterpretation, so any publication would be detrimental 
to overall safety management. 
0 
Q10. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
I am only happy to continue flying as long as safety is 
tightly regulated. 
1 
Market forces and commercial interest is sufficient to keep 
flying safe. 
0 
The media is now more important than government in 
keeping aircraft operations safe. 
0 
Q12. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
The feeling of being safe when flying in helicopters is a 
major consideration for me deciding whether to work 
offshore. 
4 
There are much more important things to think about when 
choosing where and when to work. 
2 
Should helicopter safety change for the worse, it would 
easily become a factor in deciding whether to work offshore. 
0 
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QUESTION & ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES RATING 
Q15. How important is it to be able to express your own opinion about 
Helicopter Safety matters. 
Very Important. 2 
Important. 1 
Unimportant. 0 
Q17. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
The safety training is comprehensive and my chances of 
survival in an offshore accident are high. 
0 
The safety training is comprehensive, but that the chances 
of survival are low. 
2 
The safety training is not comprehensive enough, and the 
chances of survival are low. 
4 
Q22. In the event of an accident, how much information are you 
interested in knowing? 
a. I want to know every detail, so as to make up my own 
mind about how safe it is to fly   again. 
2 
b. I just want to know the main points, so that I can be 
assured that the investigation is thorough.  
1 
c. I just want to know who is to blame 0 
d. I don’t really want to know any details, as it might stop 
me flying again. 3 
e. Don't know 0 
Q25. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
Every company needs to make a profit, but if a company 
cannot demonstrate that safety is put above all 
considerations at every time, it should not be permitted to 
operate. 
2 
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QUESTION & ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES RATING 
No company can be expected to take an absolute and 
uncompromising position on safety, and as long as it 
doesn’t have a worse position than anyone else, a company 
should be allowed to operate. 
1 
The market forces are sufficient to ensure that safety is 
maintained at acceptable levels, without any punitive safety 
enforcement penalties imposed by government. 
0 
  
 
 
Table 3:  The System of Assigning a Risk Aversion Rating to 
Alternative Responses 
 
What results from this system is a total rating for the likely risk 
aversion exhibited in an overall perception of safety for a given 
individual.  Although this total rating is represented by a number, it 
is important to realise that it does not represent any absolute value.  
It merely gives an indication that a given individual is likely to find a 
safety risk more or less acceptable than somebody else in the same 
population presented with the same information.  There is presently 
insufficient evidence to assign any absolute measure to the 
increments on the scale. Consequently, it is only possible to 
represent the pattern of respondents that will find an increasing 
amount of perceived safety risk acceptable or not acceptable, under 
similar conditions.   
 
It was found that the maximum total rating on this scale of relative 
risk aversion was 26, and the theoretical minimum is zero. Given 
that the scale is 26 down to Zero, and as a way to emphasize the 
relative nature of the scale, it is appropriate to convert the 
numerical scale (resulting from the sum of the ordinal scores for 
each response) into an equivalent alphabetic nomenclature (A=26, 
equivalent to the most risk averse set of responses possible). 
 
The results to the tables at Appendix E are summarised and 
presented here as the first two columns of Table 4, and illustrated in 
Fig. 33.  The second curve in Fig.33 corresponds to the numbers in 
the third column of Table 4, and result from a simple moving 
average calculation, to provide a smoother trend line.  
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Even though it is theoretically possible for a respondent to provide a 
set of answers which equal zero according to this formula, it would 
appear that in reality the limit of any ‘risk seeking’ (as opposed to 
‘risk averse’) characteristic is a total of 5 (or ‘V’).  If it is assumed 
that anything less than that total is an outlier and can be removed 
from the data, then the resulting curve appears to be a close 
approximation of the normal distribution.  Taking the significant 
range of values between  ‘C’ and ‘T’, the mode, median and mean 
all lie somewhere between 16 and 17 (‘J’ or ‘K’). This is important, 
because it means that confirmatory data analysis techniques that 
cannot be used on skewed data, such as confidence intervals, can 
be used to predict outcomes for the population as a whole. 
 
It is reasonably logical for this curve to be a normal distribution.  As 
discussed at length during earlier chapters, the survey forms part of 
a study that not only examines the validity of using an assumption 
that people are generally ‘objective and risk-neutral’, but also 
explores the alternative ‘behavioural’ approach.  If the behavioural 
approach is valid, a normal distribution is a logical result.  It merely 
suggests most peoples’ responses will tend towards an average, and 
(relative to this average) there will be about an equal number of 
people who are particularly nervous (risk averse), as there are who 
are relatively incautious (or risk seekers). 
 
From a safety management point of view, it is not necessarily the 
most important to know how many people are likely to demand 
changes at any one level of perceived safety risk, rather, the total 
number of people whose threshold of acceptability has been 
exceeded by that point.  For this reason, the final two columns in 
Table 4 are cumulative numbers, and these are illustrated in Fig.34.  
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Table 4: The Number of Respondents Likely to Demand Changes in 
Response to an Increasing Scale of Perceived Risk. 
 
Perceived 
Safety Risk 
No. of 
Respondents 
Moving 
Average 
Cumulative No.
of Respondents
Cumulative No. of 
Respondents 
(Moving Average) 
A 0 0.5 0 0 
B 1 0.7 1 1 
C 1 4.3 2 5 
D 11 5.7 13 11 
E 5 11.7 18 22 
F 19 12.3 37 35 
G 13 26.3 50 61 
H 47 30.7 97 92 
I 32 35.7 129 127 
J 28 33.0 157 160 
K 39 30.7 196 191 
L 25 26.3 221 217 
M 15 18.3 236 236 
N 15 16.0 251 252 
O 18 12.3 269 264 
P 4 8.3 273 272 
Q 3 3.7 276 276 
R 4 3.0 280 279 
S 2 2.3 282 281 
T 1 1.3 283 283 
U 1 0.7 284 283 
V 0 0.3 284 284 
W 0 0 284 284 
X 0 0 284 284 
Y 0 0 284 284 
Z 0 0 284 284 
Ø 0 0 284 284 
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Figure 33: Relative Levels of Acceptable Risk as Stated by 
Respondents in Survey Sample
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Figure 34: The Cumulative Numbers of Respondents 
Affected at Each Level of Perceived Safety Risk
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The hypothetical consequences of the information here presented 
(Fig.34) are that for any perceived increase in safety risk (point ‘A’ 
increasing toward ‘V’), there will result a corresponding further 
increment of the population that will adjust their individual demand 
functions to account for the perceived ‘unacceptability’ of that risk.  
Hypothetically, those to the left of this new point on the scale will 
alter their demand function so that it will require a stronger 
response (or, set of responses) in order to restore it into the 
‘acceptable risk’ band. In practical terms, this could translate into a 
shift from ‘demands for change’ into a ‘demand for strike action’ 
and/or ‘change of employment’.  
 
In order to forecast the likely numbers of the offshore workforce 
population that correspond with each increment on this scale of 
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Perceived Safety Risk, the results from the data in the sample were 
statistically resampled, using a resampling ratio of 150 (the 
population is approximately 42,000). Six key points were selected 
for illustration, and shown here in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5:  The Proportions of the Offshore Workforce that will Likely 
Demand Change at Six Key Points on the Perceived Safety Risk 
Scale.   
 
Proportion 
Perceived
Safety 
Risk 
Lower Point 
of 95% 
Confidence 
Range (%) 
Upper Point 
of 95% 
Confidence 
Range (%) 
Lower Point of 
95% 
Confidence 
Range (No. of 
Workers) 
Upper Point of 
95% 
Confidence 
Range (No. of 
Workers) 
0.50% B 0 1.1 0 462 
5% E 2.8 7.4 1,176 3,108 
10% F 6.7 13 2,814 5,460 
Lower Quartile H 10.2 30.3 4,284 12,726 
Median J 44.4 55.6 18,648 23,352 
Upper Quartile L 70.8 81.3 29,736 34,146 
      
  Resampling Software:  resample.xls (Wood, M., 2003) 
      
 
 
It is unlikely that any perceived change from acceptable to 
unacceptable safety risk can only result in the ultimate outcome of 
ceasing to travel (strike or change of employment).  It is more likely 
that there is a progressive scale of demands, from a ‘demand for 
technical improvement in the operation’, through ‘demand for 
improved pay and conditions (hazard pay)’, and then culminating in 
‘strike action’ or ‘leave the offshore workforce’. If this model is 
valid, what expected outcomes do these numbers equate to? 
 
On the basis that during the period of the survey there was no 
significant or evident demand for change, it is possible to assume 
that the Perceived Safety Risk was ‘A’, or less. 
 
According to the model, should the perceived risk rise to ‘B’, then 
anything between zero and 462 workers could be expected to seek 
some evident sign of change.  Although it is possible that a 
particularly risk averse individual might seek alternative 
employment at this stage it seems unlikely, and it would be more 
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probable that the required response will be a change in some 
operational or technical matter.   
 
Should the increase in Perceived Safety Risk rise to ‘E’ on the scale, 
then these numbers could quickly rise to over 3,000.  It is also 
probable that individuals corresponding to lower trigger points on 
the scale will demand higher levels of response in order to restore 
their particular demand function to the ‘acceptable safety’ band. 
 
For the same shift on the Perceived Safety Risk scale (3 points from 
‘B’ to ‘E’), ‘E’ to ‘H’ now affects up to 30% of the workforce (or just 
under 13,000 workers). Then just two more points (‘H’ to ‘J’) results 
in a further 10,000 workers becoming disaffected (45-55% of the 
workforce in total). 
 
Realistically, if this situation were left unmodified, continued 
helicopter operations would probably be unsustainable by this point. 
5.2 Other Sources of Evidence 
 
So far, it has been possible to conclude that all of the factors 
reviewed in the survey are linked to mechanisms that frame the 
overall perceptions of helicopter safety in some way.  It is also 
possible to conclude that it is likely that these mechanisms differ to 
some extent from individual to individual, and that collectively this 
produces a significant effect. 
 
If the model proposed in this ‘work decision scenario’ has any 
validity, there should be other sources of evidence available to 
support these conclusions. 
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5.2.1 The Media and Past Accidents 
 
Taking into account the last twenty years, there have been 6 fatal 
accidents in the UK offshore oil-support helicopter operations 
sector: 
 
1. 06/11/1986, a Chinook helicopter (G-BWFC) operated by 
British International Helicopters suffered catastrophic failure 
of a spiral bevel gearwheel, killing 45. 
2. 25/07/1990, a Sikorsky S61 helicopter (G-BWEL) operated by 
British International Helicopters collided with a crane above 
the heli-deck, killing 6.  
3. 14/03/1992, an AS332L Super Puma helicopter (G-TIGH) 
operated by Bristow Helicopters ditched after take-off in bad 
weather, killing 11. 
4. 18/04/1992, a member of the heli-deck crew was struck and 
fatally injured by the rotor blades of a Sikorsky S76 helicopter 
(G- BOND), operated by Bond Helicopters 
5. 22/09/1995, in an unrelated incident, another member of a 
heli-deck crew was also killed by being struck by the rotor 
blades of an SA365N Dauphin helicopter (G-BLEZ), operated 
by Bond Helicopters. 
6. 22/07/2002, a catastrophic failure of one main rotor blade 
resulted in the loss of a Sikorsky S76 helicopter (G-BJVX), 
killing 11. 
 
If the conclusions of this section are valid, it would be reasonable to 
discover historical evidence that some of the proposed expected 
outcomes actually occur as a consequence of these accidents, and 
are reported in the media of the time (mainly, printed-press). 
5.2.1.1 G-BWFC, Boeing Chinook Helicopter 
 
As is evident from the comments given in the responses to the 
survey, the impact of this event on many workers’ perceptions of 
safety was so significant that it is specifically referenced some 
twenty years later. 
 
A keyword-search of the FACTIVA database (accessed 09/05/2006), 
revealed some 28 items of printed-press coverage about the 
aftermath of this accident. Some of which refer to consequences 
that are entirely consistent with what would be expected for an 
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event that significantly increases the Perceived Safety Risk (scale 
‘H’ or higher): 
 
• “The victims were typical North Sea oilmen: hard-working 
maintenance men and skilled technicians, many in their 
thirties, and many with young children; some had wives with 
babies on the way. Their families were used to their absences 
and some had ceased to worry about the dangers of life on 
the rigs and hazardous helicopter flights out and back; for 
others the worry had always been present.” (Foster, H. & 
McCarthy, M. The Times, 8th November 1986) 
 
• “Boeing and BIH (British International Helicopters) are to 
carry out a trial flight of a Chinook at the weekend as a means 
of restoring confidence in the craft.  However, Shell is still 
considering whether to resume Chinook flights for workers in 
the Brent oilfield.. ..Meanwhile, BIH has pointed out that the 
Chinook’s long-range fuel reserves mean that it offers a safety 
margin not available to other helicopters.” (The Observer, 30th 
November 1986) 
 
• “Shell has told its workforce that none of them would be 
required to fly in Chinooks for at least six months to allow a 
period of reflection.  Shell oil workers wrote to their union 
officials, calling for a permanent ban on the British 
International Helicopters Boeing Chinook for offshore use.. 
Since the crash, oil workers have been flown by Shell in 
chartered fixed wing planes from Aberdeen to the Shetlands 
and then to the rigs in Puma helicopters.” (The Guardian, 27th 
December 1986) 
 
• “Shell rig workers continue to boycott the company’s fleet of 
Chinooks.” (The Observer, 10th May 1987) 
• “British International Helicopters will not fly Chinooks identical 
to the one which crashed because the Shell Oil Company is 
not willing to charter them again until further reports into the 
accident are known.” (Textline Multiple Source Collection, 3rd 
February 1987) 
 
• “Although the fault which caused the accident has been 
identified, Shell, which charters Chinooks from British 
International Helicopters, is no longer using the Chinook for 
North Sea flights.  The ASTMS (The Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staffs) continues to look for further 
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safety measures and would like the CAA to change the 
internal layout of the helicopters, introduce more stringent 
training for passengers and to look at the suitability of these 
helicopters for making long flights.” (Lloyd’s List International, 
2nd February 1987) 
 
• “British International Helicopters is to make 100 people 
redundant at its Aberdeen base.. ..The company, chaired by 
Mr Robert Maxwell, attributed these latest redundancies to 
both a decline in the North Sea oilfields industry and the 
aftermath of the Boeing Chinook helicopter crash in 
November.” (Financial Times, 28th March 1987) 
 
• “White collar union ASTMS will outline details today of safety 
improvements it wants to see in the use of commercial 
helicopters, following the completion of the inquiry into the 
Chinook helicopter disaster” (Freeman, M. The Engineer, 9th 
July 1987) 
 
• “Privatisation of British Airways could be clouded by a multi-
million pound lawsuit arising from the Chinook helicopter 
disaster earlier this month in which 45 people died.  BA’s legal 
department is understood to be on alert for action from 
millionaire publisher Robert Maxwell, who bought the 
helicopter from BA three months ago.” ( Williams, I. The 
Sunday Times, 23rd November 1986) 
 
• “North Sea workers have said they are prepared to face 
dismissal rather than fly again in the Chinook helicopter.” 
(The Times, 18th November 1986) 
 
5.2.1.2 G-BWEL, Sikorsky S61N Helicopter 
 
The FACTIVA database (accessed 09/05/2006) gave 16 items of 
printed-press coverage that related to this accident, which occurred 
on the Brent Spar platform, 25th July 1990.  Again, many of the 
expected outcomes of the ‘work decision scenario’ are also evident 
in the material: 
 
• “About 60 North Sea oil workers refused to fly out to the 
oilfields on Sikorsky helicopters until the cause of the crash 
has been determined.  A Shell spokesman said half the men 
staying in hotels on the Shetland Islands at company expense 
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and the rest had returned to Aberdeen, Scotland, by plane.” 
(The Associated Press, 25th July 1990) 
 
• “North Sea safety has been one of the key factors in 
reopening the issue of union recognition offshore. These are 
the union demands and major incidents that have fuelled the 
debate.. ..July 25, 1990: Six men die when a helicopter 
crashes close to the Brent Spar.”(Lloyd’s List International, 
13th November 1990) 
 
• “The threat of a boycott of helicopter flights in the North Sea 
offshore sector emerged yesterday when British unions raised 
the issue of compensation for oil workers travelling to and 
from installations by helicopter.. The unions are demanding 
guarantees from all North Sea operators, the oil companies 
and the Department of Energy that the Warsaw Convention 
will not be used to limit legitimate compensation claims.  The 
TGWU’s (Transport and General Workers’ Union) national 
secretary for the oil industry, Fred Higgs, said: “If we don’t 
get an undertaking, there could be an averse reaction in 
terms of the willingness of our members to travel by 
helicopter.”” (Lloyd’s List International, 12th October 1990) 
 
• “Mr Higgs said: “It is absolutely certain that none of our 
members travelling by helicopter in the hostile environment 
offshore.. have any idea that any claims for damages resulting 
from an accident in a helicopter would be limited to 
£75,000.”..Shell said that the issue was a matter for the 
helicopter operator and its insurers.” (Clement, B. The 
Independent, 12th October 1990) 
 
• “Meanwhile, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, an ad 
hoc group of oil workers, confirmed a decision to hold a series 
of strikes later this summer as part of a campaign to secure 
industrial relations and safety charter.  Among the 
committee’s demands are the right to elect a shop steward, 
and negotiate pay and conditions, as few companies recognise 
trade unions offshore.  Ronnie McDonald, its chairman, said: 
“The men are required to make between 350 and 370 
helicopter trips a year, but we accept it is a fact of life out 
there.  What we are demanding is some sort of input into the 
way things are administered.”” (Reeves, P. The Independent, 
27th July 1990) 
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5.2.1.3 G-TIGH, AS332L Super Puma Helicopter 
 
The following excerpts from printed-press coverage at the time are 
also taken from the FACTIVA database (accessed 09/05/2006). 
However, there are some particular points of interest in this case; 
this accident occurred to a fully functioning and serviceable aircraft, 
and it brought a number of issues concerning the management of 
helicopter operations to the attention of the offshore workforce: 
 
 
• “Oil Company Shell Expro has imposed new safety limits on its 
North Sea helicopter operations, just weeks before an inquiry 
into the Cormorant Alpha helicopter disaster in March in which 
11 men died… The oil company, which operates the 
Cormorant Alpha production platform, refused to say whether 
the accident inquiry scheduled for November 30 had prompted 
their new policy.”  (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 14th November 
1992) 
 
• “London – Union leaders are claiming a helicopter which 
crashed into the North Sea, killing eleven workers, was forced 
to fly in bad weather because the Cormorant Alpha oil 
platform was overcrowded… Pending any findings, Shell 
declined all detailed comment into the cause and 
circumstances of the crash.  But it has moved to fend off 
pressure over the safety and extent of North Sea flying.  Shell 
Expro managing director Chris Fay said the Super Puma was 
operating within operational limits, which prohibit flights in 
winds over 60 knots.  It went down in recorded winds of 52 
knots.  But Shell said 37 oil workers on board Cormorant 
Alpha – union sources claimed it was more – demanded to be 
flown ashore amid union criticism of the number of North Sea 
flights.” (Platt’s Oilgram News, 18th March 1992) 
 
• “Cormorant Alpha Helicopter Inquiry Ends With Defence of 
Aircrew… ,the inquiry heard a spirited defence of the aircrew 
from solicitor James Roxborough, representing First Officer 
Hooker’s widow.  He asserted the flight should never have 
been allowed to take place.  He dismissed repeated assertions 
North Sea pilots are never put under pressure to fly and 
claimed that often they were… Campbell, however, criticised 
Cormorant Alpha OIM (Offshore Installation Manager) John 
Grant for not cancelling helicopter operations despite the fact 
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that fast rescue craft could not have been launched in the 
fierce seas.  It was “a remarkable example of the opposite of 
a safety-first mentality…”” (The Financial Times, 27th January 
1993) 
 
• “Evidence of probable job cuts at BP Exploration and worries 
about Shell Expro’s approach to offshore safety has been 
leaked to the Press and Journal… The document looks at 
changing contracts of employment, longer trips offshore 
resulting in fewer helicopter flights, early retirement, job 
security and changing the ratio of BP and agency personnel… 
Meanwhile, Shell’s alleged problems lie in two areas – 
helicopter safety briefings and a wave height measuring 
system operated by the company’s Metocean unit. Unit head 
Ian Leggett, 15 months ago, proposed Metocean’s service be 
extended offshore to help refine Shell’s adverse weather 
policy, which grew out of the Cormorant Alpha helicopter 
tragedy... The MSF union says measures designed to improve 
monitoring of weather and sea conditions should be 
introduced regardless of cost” (Cresswell, J. Aberdeen Press & 
Journal, 12th February 1993) 
 
• “Proceedings during the past week in the continuing 
Cormorant Alpha helicopter inquiry have been marked with 
contentious clashes between QC’s… During questioning of 
Cormorant Alpha HLO (Helicopter Landing Officer) Alexander 
King last Wednesday, Campbell revealed he had in his 
possession a written warning issued to victim Thomas Roe, of 
Rosyth.  Dated December 6, 1990, the warning was signed by 
two senior employees of contractor Press Offshore and said 
Roe had failed to accept instructions from the Press Offshore 
HLO prior to boarding a helicopter.  King, in earlier evidence, 
had denied men who raised complaints would be disciplined.  
But, cross-examined by Campbell, he admitted he had learned 
of the Roe case – “but not directly”.  The HLO agreed oilmen 
used the term “the dead man’s seat” for the middle seat in 
the back row of a helicopter – so-called because there is no 
adjacent escape window.  He also agreed it was the practice 
to get small men to sit in seats next to the smaller windows in 
the aircraft.  Campbell said Roe had been a small man and 
had eventually objected to repeatedly being made to sit in a 
seat which he felt was unsafe… The OIM also told the inquiry 
he had not known that, prior to that fatal flight, the 
passengers had been apprehensive.  But he knew some 
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people feared being disciplined it they refused to board.” (The 
Financial Times, 16th December 1992) 
 
• “A North Sea oil company was at the centre of a new row over 
helicopter safety last night as the final submissions were 
made at the fatal accident inquiry into the Cormorant Alpha 
disaster. Contract companies working for Elf Enterprise, the 
operators of the Piper Bravo platform, were accused of 
docking the wages of 30 oilmen who refused to board a 
helicopter flight because of adverse weather conditions. The 
men refused to fly to the Piper platform from the flotel 
Polyconcorde because the standby vessel could not launch its 
fast rescue craft in high seas.  It was also claimed last night 
that five elected representatives on the platform’s safety 
committee had resigned after the incident.” (Urquhart, F. The 
Scotsman, 22nd January 1993) 
 
• “The Civil Aviation Authority will take steps to improve North 
Sea helicopter safety only after an accident or a near miss, it 
was revealed yesterday at a fatal accident inquiry… It was 
suggested … at one point yesterday that the CAA was in the 
“guard’s van” of aircraft safety, rather than in the forefront..” 
(The Scotsman, 14th January 1993) 
 
• “Curbs urged on oil rig flights following Shell crash…. “Men out 
there are frightened and they’re saying they’re not going 
back,..” (Hetherington, P. The Guardian, 16th March 1992) 
 
 
Most of the effects so far highlighted have been the result of a 
specific accident that highlights some safety issue, either previously 
unrealised or underestimated (ref. para 2.1.2.2.9,  ‘Sufficiency 
Paradox’).  However, it is interesting to note a ‘Perception of Safety 
Risk’ type reaction is possible in other circumstances as well. 
5.2.1.4 Side-Floating Project 
 
Whilst not a direct consequence of any specific accident, the CAA 
has been overseeing a combined research project to investigate 
ways that survival from ditching at sea can be improved by 
preventing the helicopter inverting.  The total investment as of 
January 2006 had been in the order of £250,000 (source CAA, 
Helicopter Safety Research Committee).  At this point it was decided 
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that there were insufficient funds available to take the research any 
further, and the project was duly suspended.  
 
As the survey was heading towards conclusion, there was a short 
period of both national and regional press coverage concerning the 
announcement of this decision to cancel any further development 
work on the ‘side-floating project’.  It is interesting to note how this 
news resulted in outcomes consistent with a small increase in the 
Perceived Safety Risk.  
 
Although a CAA co-ordinated project, oil companies largely funded 
it, and yet one of the very last respondents to the survey 
volunteered the following comment: 
 
“Because of the stinginess of oil companies & government apathy, 
the flotation devices are still fitted in the wrong place, allowing 
aircraft to turn turtle in the slightest seas.  These devices should be 
fitted where the weight is, i.e., engines & gearbox.” 
 
Amongst the printed-press coverage, there have been the following 
comments: 
 
• “Oil companies have refused to fund research into a helicopter 
safety device which could save lives in a crash offshore, the 
Press and Journal can reveal… Last night Aberdeen North 
Labour MP Frank Doran protested bitterly over the decision, 
saying the North Sea remains one of the most dangerous 
areas in which to work… “There is no question in my mind 
that the oil industry can afford to pay for this research and 
their failure to do so raises serious questions about the oil 
industry’s commitment to safety.”” (Perry, D. Aberdeen Press 
& Journal, 6th February 2006) 
 
As indicated by this material from past printed-press, the final key 
differentiator of an accident occurring in the offshore helicopter 
environment to any other sector of commercial aviation is that 
externalities will be concentrated into losses borne by just one or 
two institutions (the oil companies). 
 
Consistent with these conditions, it would be logical to observe 
patterns of decision-making in the aftermath of an accident in the 
offshore helicopter environment that reflects the altered priorities 
and pressures of the parties involved. 
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5.3 The Costs of Accidents under Conditions of a Work 
Decision Scenario 
 
It has been demonstrated, by the sophistication of responses to the 
perceptions of safety survey in this study, that the average offshore 
worker has access to higher levels of knowledge about safety 
matters than other passengers do. 
 
It has also been established that the demand function for the 
average offshore worker is differentiated from other types of 
passenger in that there is no intermodal competition, and it 
manifestly forms a part of the individual’s wider work decision. 
 
As stated in the foreword to this study, the tragic loss of a Bristow 
Helicopters S-76 helicopter and all onboard on the evening of 16th 
July 2002 appeared to result in many consequences affected by 
these conditions. 
 
5.3.1 G-BJVX, Sikorsky S-76 A+ Helicopter, 16th July 
2002, Leman Field, Southern North Sea 
 
“The crash, on Tuesday, has alarmed workers in the North Sea oil 
industry who rely on helicopters to lift them from shore to drilling 
rigs.  Last night the accident was being blamed on mechanical 
failure.  Shell UK, which chartered the helicopter, asked for 
Sikorsky-76s to be suspended from servicing its oil platforms.” 
(Morris, S. & Bowcott, O. The Guardian, 18th July 2002) 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is not the causes of the accident 
itself that are most pertinent, but rather the actions of all the 
parties involved during its aftermath, and the associated motivators 
and drivers of those actions. 
 
As a matter of record, the accident was the result of catastrophic 
failure of a main rotor blade, initiated in the area of undetected 
damage caused by a lightning strike in a previous incident, and the 
unanticipated consequences of such lightning damage (Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch, Aircraft Accident Report 1/2005).  
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5.3.1.1 The Costs of the Accident to G-BJVX 
 
It has only been possible to construct this analysis due to the 
extraordinary cooperation of both the UK Air Accident Investigation 
Branch, in particular Mr Jeremy Barnett (Investigator in Charge), 
and Shell Aircraft International, in particular Mr Mark Stevens and 
Mr Cliff Edwards.  
 
With the information provided, it is possible to identify costs 
according to the Calabresi (1970) framework of accident costs 
classification: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary. These items can 
then be diagrammatically represented to provide an overview of the 
aftermath of this accident (Fig. 35). 
 
The total known costs of this accident were over £33M, and it is 
probable that this could rise to over £35M if some of the unknown 
items were added.  This represents a multiplying factor of 17 on the 
hull value of the aircraft concerned. 
 
The distinction between ‘Accident Costs’ and ‘Accident Reduction 
Costs’ was taken as being a matter of whether a particular cost item 
was an unavoidable consequence of the accident, or a consequence 
of decisions made to avoid further costs.  
 
Some of the specific details of how the costs occurred are subject to 
commercial confidentialities, but all costs represent real outlays and 
do not include economic losses (except that the estimate of how 
much the change to operational procedures costs is based on a five 
year projection at a discount rate of 6% (HSE, 2001)). 
 
The value of trained aircrew personnel is based on the known costs 
of training, plus the cost of 10 years experience for a Captain and 3 
years experience for a First Officer.  
 
The value of skilled offshore worker is based on a similar estimation 
of training costs, and 3 years work experience. 
 
Neither of these estimates is designed to put a value on life, but it 
does reflect the real costs of having to replace highly educated and 
skilled employees in a workforce that does not have access to large 
surpluses, or can adjust quickly to changes in demand.
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Figure 35: 
G-BJVX, S-76A+ 
Accident Costs 
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The question here is how does this pattern of events and actions 
differ from that which could be expected in the aftermath of any 
other aircraft accident? 
 
The most significant decision (from a cost implication) made by 
Shell was to ground their fleet of S76’s far longer than any 
regulatory requirement.  There was a regulatory decision to ground 
all S76 in the immediate aftermath of this accident, but other oil 
companies resumed operations within 48hrs or so, once the cause 
was known to be the failure of a main rotor blade.  Shell took the 
decision to ground their fleet worldwide for 12 days, and the fleet in 
Norwich for 42 days.  This was so the remaining aircraft operating 
from the Norwich base could be refurbished, to ensure that when 
operations were resumed the aircraft not only were improved but 
that they also looked improved.  It also gave time for 
representatives of Shell management to ensure that the aircraft 
were only re-introduced once the workforce were consulted and 
convinced it was appropriate. 
 
To cover essential helicopter requirements in the interim, Shell 
chartered aircraft from other fleets (AS365N2 and AS332L) at ad-
hoc rates, whilst still paying the standing charges on the S76 fleet. 
 
This whole programme of actions, designed to maintain the goodwill 
and co-operation of the Shell workforce, represented discretionary 
costs of £4 Million. 
 
Shell management, as well as providing the assets to recover the 
wreckage (£3.2 Million), ran a parallel investigation to the Air 
Accident Investigation, which represented costs of a further 
£400,000 + (or nearly twice the cost of the AAIB investigation). 
 
The counselling services for the workforce did not eventually 
represent a significant cost (£21,000), but that was only because 
take-up from the workforce was relatively low.  If more of the 
workforce had required it, then it was available. 
 
It is probable that many other cost items, although normal 
consequences of the accident and subsequent investigation, were 
significantly enhanced by the special circumstances of the situation. 
 
In all, the discretionary costs borne by the Shell oil company 
totalled at least £5 Million. 
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It is not a far fetched assumption that should any worker have 
decided to leave work as a result of the increase in perceived risk 
following this accident, even temporarily, then there would be costs 
incurred in replacing them.  If it is assumed that although an 
experienced replacement could be found and transferred from 
elsewhere, somewhere in the total system that represents the 
offshore oil industry a new replacement needs to be recruited. 
Based on this assumption that there are no readily available 
surpluses of skilled workers, any replacements represent the full 
cost of training, pay and supervision whilst gaining sufficient 
experience in the workplace.  For the purposes of analysing the 
accident costs it was estimated that the cost of replacing any 
trained and skilled offshore worker can be conservatively averaged 
to be between £150,000 - £200,000.  
 
Although the decision making by Shell management in this situation 
was the result of the experience and judgement of managers in the 
field, and the specialist advisors from Shell Aircraft International, it 
is possible to estimate the likely cost-benefit of this discretionary 
spend.  
 
If it is assumed that the ‘work decision’ model (and the Perceived 
Safety Risk index) is valid, then the discretionary spend of £5M is 
equivalent to the cost of between 25 to 33 workers leaving the 
industry. As it happens, anecdotally (in this case, conversations 
between one of the pilots who flew the replacement AS365N2 
helicopter in the aftermath and workers in the Leman Field) it was 
rumoured that a small number of workers were actively considering 
early-retirement or finding alternative employment.   There is no 
documentary evidence that any workers did actually leave the 
industry as a result of the accident, and so it can be assumed that 
this discretionary spend to alleviate such consequences (expected 
outcomes) of the accident were effective. 
 
There were 6 specific references made to this accident by 
respondents in the survey sample, which represents 2% of the 
sample. 
 
Given that the accident was probably at an equivalent level of ‘E’ or 
above on the Perceived Safety Risk scale, then at least 5% of the 
workforce might have been adversely affected in some way. 
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It is unrealistic to assume that the whole offshore workforce would 
have perceived the increase in risk in the same way, particularly as 
the S76 is no longer used in the northern North Sea. 
 
For the sake of argument, if it is assumed that just the workers in 
this part of the southern North Sea were significantly affected, then 
5% still represents at least 500 workers. 
 
On this basis, a discretionary spend equivalent to 25 to 33 workers 
leaving the industry would appear well justified, not just on the 
basis of well-founded subjective judgement but also on the basis of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Although the amount of information in the public domain about UK 
regulatory guidelines makes any comparison of costs difficult to 
make, the situation in the USA is different.  In the absence of any 
information to the contrary, and for the purposes of comparison, it 
is assumed that the FAA guidelines would result in similar costs. 
 
5.3.1.2 The Costs of the Accident According to FAA  
Guidelines 
 
It is interesting to note that the FAA estimate for the cost of an Air 
Carrier accident investigation is approximately £250,000 – or, the 
actual cost of the AAIB investigation.  However, this FAA guideline is 
a total cost, and the total investigation cost in this accident exceeds 
£3.8 million. 
 
The benefit of avoiding 11 fatalities, according to the guide, would 
be approximately £18 million.  This figure is likely to be close to the 
eventual compensation figure for families and relatives. 
 
However, it remains the case that a cost estimate of this accident 
on the basis of the FAA guide would still probably only achieve a 
figure 60 – 65% of the actual costs.  
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6 Discussion 
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6.1 Discussion 
 
“To be successful, however, any form of transport must achieve a safety record 
which is good enough to remove from its passengers and potential passengers 
the burden of fear.  This is, of course, a factor which varies widely from individual 
to individual, but with all of us it is essentially a calculation of risk probabilities.” 
(Wheatcroft, 1964, p.49) 
 
The safety of helicopters remains a significant business threat to 
both existing operations and for any future growth in the industry, 
far more so than the maturing fixed wing sectors; this is generally 
accepted (ref. Chapter 1). But, what is the nature of that threat, 
and why does it seem so important when, statistically speaking, the 
reportable accident rate in UK public transport helicopter operations 
are no more frequent than for UK public transport turboprop 
aeroplanes (approximately 24 per million flight hours, source CAA)? 
 
The study commenced with the idea that the answers lay in 
developing the notion that the economics of safety can be resolved 
into the effects safety issues have on the financial performance of 
companies, as a consequence of costs of regulatory compliance, or 
as losses resulting from an unusually high incidence of unscheduled 
maintenance.  If this approach to the study had been successful, it 
would have suggested that the efficiency of safety management is 
purely a matter of the technical delivery of engineering standards. 
 
It quickly became apparent during the literature review phase that 
this approach was unlikely to deliver a better explanation of the 
economics of safety.  Firstly, so many past studies had encountered 
significant difficulties in establishing reliable evidence of these 
seemingly intuitive relationships.  Secondly, a lengthy phase of 
secondary research conducted as part of this study, eliminating 
many of the variables present in previous research (multiple areas 
of operation, differing types of power plant, different sizes of 
operation, etc.) and utilising the more numerous data source of 
Mandatory Occurrence Reports (see Appendix A), still failed to 
provide anything conclusive. 
 
The question then becomes, is this because the research was 
looking at the wrong sets of data, or the more fundamental problem 
of not asking the right questions?  What if the accepted problems of 
integrating cost-benefit analysis into safety management, the 
identification of efficient regulatory measures, and some of the 
uncertainties of tort action all originate from an incomplete 
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understanding of the very fundamentals of safety, and thus safety 
as an economic force?  That is to say, there appeared to be a 
considerable quantity of quality, research based evidence that 
safety is a complex interaction of human perception and behaviour, 
but little agreement in the literature as to any exact definition of the 
word ‘safety’.  It is difficult to envisage that consistently efficient 
choices can result from such a situation.   
 
The emphasis of the study then focused on issues of safety 
management, safety management systems and policy. 
 
As recognised by ICAO, many of the current safety management 
systems (as adopted by ICAO, the FAA and CAA) need to be 
modified and adapted if they are to remain relevant to present and 
future requirements.  
 
Existing guidelines concentrate on avoiding the recurrence of a past 
accident.  Consequently, safety recommendations resulting from 
accident investigations (or any other sources of safety research) will 
tend to be assessed on statistical standards (probability), and 
evaluated in terms of ‘injuries avoided’ and ‘lives saved’.  With 
reference to Calabresi’s (1970) comprehensive system of accident 
costs analysis, such traditional systems help greatly with primary 
costs, but generally contribute little to assessing safety inputs 
designed to address secondary and tertiary costs.   The evidence 
gathered during this study supports a view that continuing this 
policy will not necessarily result in optimal solutions, or efficient 
economic choices arising from safety problems in the future. 
 
The basis of this finding is that the traditional analysis does not 
have a reliable, transparent or adaptable method of factoring for the 
following conditions: 
 
a) The possible variations in definition of safety. 
 
b) The complexity of utility functions, and the possible 
consequences of a markedly risk-averse population. 
 
c) The extent and nature of any asymmetric information in the 
market. 
 
d) The nature of agency relationships between government, 
regulatory authorities and individual members of society. 
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It is probable that the lack of any real descriptive definition to the 
word ‘safety’, at least in the context of aviation, results in an 
inexact framing of a given safety choice.  As Needham (1983) 
commented, the framing of a regulatory question greatly 
determines the chosen solution. Therefore, the inexactitudes of 
definition probably contribute to an incomplete understanding of 
how perceptions of safety translate into decisions or choices. This 
likely influences the adoption of the traditional approach to analysis, 
imposing limitations on the analysis by setting narrow boundaries. 
This impacts the overall efficiency of safety management systems.  
 
In addition to the problem of definition, the issue of sheer 
complexity contributes to the difficulty of creating a reliable and 
valid system of analysis that incorporates such a wide range of 
variable behavioural characteristics.  Empirical studies have 
developed WTP values for marginal risk avoidance, providing some 
allowance for risk preference and perception.  However, these 
values are heavily dependent on social and economic conditions, the 
levels of knowledge about and familiarity with risks, and the state of 
technology. 
 
Even if the WTP based values and costs are accurate, outcomes to 
expected utility amongst various segments of the market may still 
vary.  This could result from the tendency of individuals to 
overestimate low probabilities of loss. As accidents become rarer, to 
the extent of 10-6 (one in a million flights), it is possible to speculate 
how even relatively minor overestimates could produce significant 
misalignment of policy and market reaction, based on the principle 
of expected utility. 
 
The final issue is the one of agency.  If the regulatory authorities 
make decisions based on aggregate data (i.e. the expected disutility 
arising from a loss to society as a whole), it will likely be very 
different to one made on the basis of the aggregate response of a 
population of individuals faced with a similar loss (i.e. the expected 
disutility arising from the sum of individuals in society). 
 
It becomes theoretically possible to simplify the problem by looking 
at the outcomes of such analysis, rather than the nature of the 
utility functions themselves. Then in turn using these empirical 
results to develop some proxy measure for the ‘acceptability of 
risk’.  
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The research question then resolved into whether the evidence for 
such reasoning would emerge through studying a specialised 
environment, one characterised by the UK Offshore Helicopter 
Industry.  
 
The data produced by the stakeholder survey (passengers and 
aircrew) revealed evidence that all the factors supposed to affect 
the perception of safety are indeed in some form present. 
 
The data also established that individuals exhibit sufficient traits of 
risk aversion to prejudice the efficiency of ‘traditional’ safety 
management. It also became clear that the necessary ‘objectivity’ 
is, to all intents and purposes, absent (only 6 respondents 
exhibiting any idea of the real statistical chances of a fatal 
accident). 
 
Establishing that  ‘traditional’ safety analysis is likely to fail to 
produce efficient outcomes, because many behavioural aspects are 
demonstrably evident, does not fully answer the research question.  
The real problem remains, proposing an alternative decision-making 
model that incorporates these behavioural aspects.   
 
The first clue is in the relative importance of the ‘safety record’ of 
an aircraft to the offshore passengers.  When asked the same set of 
questions (Questions 11, 11a , & 11b; Appendix C) a small set of Air 
Transport Management MSc students (41 students) gave a 
markedly different range of responses.  37% of these students 
considered ‘comfort’ the most important attribute, and only 27% 
considered ‘safety record’ the most important. In addition, 49% 
considered the accident record of a particular type of aircraft of ‘no 
interest’. These students represent a group of knowledgeable 
aviation professionals, but not necessarily with flight operations 
responsibilities.  This indicates that the opinions of the offshore 
passengers are much more likely to reflect those of the experts in 
safety matters.  
 
Although the offshore workforce does not represent a strictly 
objective population (in an economic, or statistical sense), this 
result establishes that this group is differentiated from other 
populations (or groups of passengers) by being more knowledgeable 
about safety, or safety-aware. 
 
The second clue is the way this more knowledgeable population 
reacts to perceived increases in safety risk.  This population has the 
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ability to interpret new information and the ability to subsequently 
demand change, demands which can significantly influence 
decision-making.  This was demonstrated by generating the 
hypothetical ‘work decision scenario’ and comparing the expected 
outcomes with evidence from past press-coverage, and the 
behaviour of responsible authorities in the face of an accident 
investigation.  
 
So, it has been established that the study represents a well-
informed but risk-averse population, that will interpret new 
information through the filters of well established behavioural 
factors, and that may subsequently perceive an increase in the 
safety risk.  Should such a situation arise, the scale of the perceived 
increase in safety risk results in demands for changes, in order to 
re-establish the risk within an individually determined range of 
acceptability. 
 
This suggests that rather than economic forces being driven by a 
fixed ‘definition of safety’ to any given circumstance, it is more akin 
to a ‘mechanism of safety’.  The evidence points toward a stable 
economic system in which safety is not a significant force until a 
perceived failure (or new safety information) acts as a disturbance 
to the system.  Safety inputs then have to be made to restore 
stability to the system.  
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6.2 The Mechanism of Safety 
 
In order to develop this concept, it is useful to reclassify some 
‘definitions of safety’ (as defined in the literature, e.g., Cobb & 
Primo, 2003) as ‘safety states’.  This is because they describe some 
measures of safety, independent of any individual’s perception. 
These are: 
 
• Absolute Safety 
• Relative Safety 
• Statistical Safety 
 
Additionally, an alternative safety state not specifically mentioned in 
the literature, but consistently alluded to throughout the material on 
role of paternalism in complex systems, is Paternal Safety.  The 
evidence in the survey supports this description of a distinct safety 
state, and it represents a state whereby safety does not need to be 
measured, because a trusted institution is managing it.  
 
These ‘safety states’ will form the base of this proposed model for 
the ‘mechanism of safety’ (Fig. 36). 
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Figure 36: The Mechanism of Safety 
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It is already known that the ICAO believes that the economics of 
safety may well be predicated on the perception of safety, rather 
than any measure of safety.  For example, it is written in the Safety 
Management Manual, 2006: “The air transportation industry’s future 
viability may well be predicated on its ability to sustain the public’s 
perceived comfort regarding their safety while travelling.  The 
management of safety is therefore a prerequisite for a sustainable 
aviation business”(ICAO, Safety Management Manual, 2006, p.1-4). 
 
This is consistent with Savage’s theories about the demand function 
operating within boundaries of ‘acceptable safety’, and safety only 
becoming a factor when the perceived risk falls into the 
unacceptable. The main tenet of the theory, as described by Savage 
(1998), is that the demand function is controlled by a factor 
representing the perceived level of safety in any transport operation 
or activity. The evidence in this study has substantiated the theory, 
but also points toward a slight variation on the theory. Savage 
considered the perception of safety as a variable parameter, 
integral to the demand function.  It is more likely that the 
parameter is a step function, or binary character, that is not 
necessarily an integral part of the demand function under normal 
conditions. In order for that demand function to operate, it is a pre-
condition that safety is within the bounds of acceptability.  Should 
safety be perceived to drop below the acceptable, according to this 
version of the theory, the normal operation of the demand function 
is not modified, it ceases.  In order to restore the normal demand 
function (where competition is decided on the basis of price, 
comfort, convenience and service) safety inputs need to be seen to 
be made, sufficient to restore the boundaries of acceptability. 
 
These findings are also entirely consistent with the findings of other 
researchers investigating the relationships between financial 
performance and accidents (Barnett, et al., 1979; Dionne, et al., 
1997; Golbe, 1986; Mitchell & Maloney, 1989; Oster et al., 
1992;Rose, 1990 & 1992; Talley & Bossert, 1990). 
 
Either the pre-condition of acceptable safety is there, and the 
demand function operates, or it is not, and demand ceases.  
Stability can then restored by making safety inputs.  However, the 
system is still subject to variability, because of the nature of 
individuals’ characteristics, and risk aversion.  The variability of the 
perceived safety parameter is introduced by the cumulative effect of 
these differing personal characteristics, rather than via the action of 
a variable parameter of perceived safety within the demand 
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function, as proposed by Savage (1998).  As illustrated through the 
‘work decision scenario’ (Fig.34), a localised accident (provided the 
primary causes are known quickly) will affect a few individuals 
significantly, but this is unlikely to represent a sufficient force to 
shift the market.  This is especially the case if the market has a 
general surplus of demand (most true of airline services).  However, 
with only a slight change in circumstances (e.g., the population 
becoming aware of a situation previously under a sufficiency 
paradox, like airport security prior to 9/11) an accident or incident 
has enough contributing factors to concern a dramatically higher 
proportion of passengers, and the outcome can tip the market into 
crisis.  In this case study, this finding is supported by the evidence 
concerning the Boeing Chinook crash in 1986.  
 
Savage also suggested that should the levels of safety exceed the 
required levels (surplus), as perceived by passengers, then it would 
be conceivable to create a premium market for those passengers 
most risk averse, and wanting the extra assurances which such a 
product might bring.  The evidence in this study does not prove that 
case, but the shape of the Perceived Safety Risk curve (Fig. 34) 
certainly supports the notion that such a scenario is possible. 
 
The mechanism of safety, as proposed and illustrated in Fig. 36, can 
be demonstrated as far as the manner in which the Perceived Safety 
Risk acts as a pre-condition for the system to operate, and as far as 
the importance of knowledge in becoming aware of a safety risk.  
However, to complete the model it is first necessary to apply some 
theory from other disciplines. 
 
The data that emerged from the survey, without too much 
secondary analysis, established a convincing evidential case that 
many of the behavioural factors considered by other researchers 
(Adams, 1995; Cvetkovich, et al. 1999; Douglas, 1985; O’Hara, 
2004; Perrow, 1999; Slovic, 2000; Starr, 1969; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986) are of critical importance to the functioning of 
this mechanism.  However, the exact process of how a particular 
individual translates an awareness of a safety risk, based on a given 
description of the ‘safety state’, into a perception of that safety risk, 
is not immediately available from the data. 
 
To resolve this part of the model, it is useful to borrow the theories 
of Sen (1999), who has proposed that most pre-conditions of 
economic well-being and growth can be described in terms of 
‘freedoms’.  It is then a matter of identifying which of these 
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behavioural factors can be described as an internalised ‘freedom’, 
and which are more characterised by interaction with the external 
environment. 
 
To aid this analysis, the following assumption is made: a 
behavioural factor that can be characterised as an internalised 
sense of freedom is going to be an output of a situation, whereas 
one that is characterised by the external environment is going to 
provide context to that situation. 
 
From the data gathered during this case study, and making 
particular use of the comments provided by respondents, it is 
evident that any perception of the safety risk is formulated by: 
 
1. Is there any sense of being in peril? (Freedom from Peril) 
2. If there is a sense of being in peril, does the hazard represent 
something to be feared (does it generate a sense of dread)? 
(Freedom from Dread) 
3. If there is a sense of peril, and the hazard represents 
something to be dreaded, how certain is the risk? (Freedom 
from Uncertainty) 
 
The remaining factors of power (control), expectation, trust and 
confidence will influence the strength of feeling concerning these 
freedoms, but, in the absence of a situation threatening these 
freedoms, they cannot generate a perception of safety risk in 
themselves. 
 
Having completed the structure of the mechanism of safety (Fig. 
36), what are the implications for the handling of accident 
investigations, or safety management in general? 
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6.3 Reducing Accident Costs  
 
The most convincing framework for accident costs analysis is 
Calabresi’s (1970) structure, categorising costs into three types.  
Applying that structure to the mechanism of safety proposed here 
(Fig.36), it becomes possible to identify the points in the process 
where each type of cost would influence the system.  Further to 
that, it becomes possible to speculate how cost reduction measures 
would operate to strengthen the system (or re-establish the normal 
demand function). 
 
Any primary accident costs are principally centred on the ‘safety 
state’.  The outcomes of the Perceived Safety Risk are generally 
secondary costs.  The management of the central process is largely 
attached to tertiary costs. 
 
6.3.1 Safety Inputs, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The fundamental change proposed in this study is that in addition to 
cost- benefit analysis being based on the number of lives saved 
(and injuries avoided), it should incorporate a value for the 
expected changes in demand.  For example, in the ‘work decision 
scenario’ illustrated here, a change in the Perceived Safety Risk that 
results in a demand for a pay increment of 1% would in turn result 
in a cost to the oil companies in the first year of £21M, and a 
present value adjusted cost over 5 years (at 6%) of £89M. 
 
When the model proposed in this study is used in conjunction with 
Calabresi’s costs classification, it makes it possible to be very clear 
and focused about the specific objectives for any proposed safety 
input to the system.  Once these objectives become clear and 
precise, it is a much more objective proposition to evaluate the 
expected costs and benefits of the safety inputs. 
 
If the objective is to change the safety state, then this becomes a 
matter of evaluating the costs of improving reliability (Primary 
Accident Cost Reduction) and comparing these against the expected 
outcomes of such a change throughout the process. 
 
Similarly, if the objective is to alleviate passengers concerns about 
compensation for losses; it is a matter of evaluating the expected 
numbers of passengers who are likely to change their demand, as a 
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result of finding the Perceived Safety Risk acceptable, for each 
increment of compensation. 
 
Possibly the most challenging cost-benefit analysis concerns 
evaluating proposed safety inputs classified as Tertiary measures.  
Under this system, it should be possible to make these assessments 
quantifiable as well.  If, for example, it is proposed to extend the 
use of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) equipment to aid the task of 
accident investigation, it becomes a matter of evaluating the 
consequences of not providing the expected levels of certainty 
following an accident against those for having such certainty, based 
on shifts in the Perceived Safety Risk. 
 
In summary, the proposed changes to the process of analysis are to 
have a precise understanding of why it has become unstable (or 
might become unstable), and then to have clearly matched and 
targeted strategies to restore an efficient balance to the system.  
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7.1 Conclusions 
 
1. The population exhibits significant tendency towards risk-averse 
preference, and lacks any realistic understanding concerning 
probability of accidents.  This casts doubt on the efficacy of some 
of the current safety related regulatory and legislative analytical 
processes, which have stated guidelines unsuited to these 
findings. 
 
2. The perception of safety may be based on the measures of safety 
presented by industry and government, but is defined according 
to individual tolerances.   It is this perception of safety 
information, interpreted through the filter of knowledge and 
amplified by cultural factors, that forms the basis of economic 
stability in the system, and not the measures of the safety state. 
 
3. The perception of safety (or more precisely, the perception of the 
safety risk) affects the stability of the UK offshore helicopter 
industry, in the form of an economic pre-condition that the risks 
are acceptable.  Should a sufficient number of individuals in the 
offshore workforce decide that the risk has become unacceptable 
(either as a result of new information, or as previously unrealised 
information becomes available), a number of safety inputs in 
proportion to the scale of perceived increase in safety risk will be 
required before a normal, stable demand function is re-
established.  
 
4. Cost-benefit analysis based purely on ‘lives saved’ cannot explain 
the rational choices of decision makers in the face of a situation 
where potential economic losses are critical (in this case, the lack 
of surplus in the offshore workforce and the expected losses from 
disruptions to production).  Cost-benefit analysis augmented by 
the Perceived Increase in Safety Risk, illustrated in this study, is 
likely to deliver more socially efficient accident prevention.  This 
is consistent with the evidence of actions and outcomes in the 
aftermath of an accident under such conditions examined in 
detail as part of this study. 
 
5. The study has demonstrated that any move by government 
agencies to modify the system of regulation would necessitate 
careful evaluation, as a high degree of paternalism, in the form 
of stringent regulations, remains an important factor in 
maintaining a stable mechanism of safety.  
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6. There is much evidence arising out of this study to support the 
notion that high levels of trust and confidence act as strong 
stabilising influences on the mechanism of safety (as described 
here).  There is also evidence to suggest that, in the case of UK 
offshore helicopter operations, the most readily recognised 
representation of trust in the system is through the conduct of 
the aircrew.  This has many significant consequences for 
helicopter operators, and the decision-making of operational 
managers. 
 
7. Safety recommendations are generally made because a 
shortcoming, or potential shortcoming, has been identified by an 
expert (Accident Investigator or other industry professional). 
Decisions about accepting such recommendations would be more 
efficient if adequate considerations were incorporated for the 
reaction from passengers, should any subsequent failure actually 
occur, based on shifts in knowledge and hence the perceived 
safety risk (i.e. anticipating the potential breakdown of a 
‘sufficiency paradox’). 
 
7.2 Future Research Questions 
 
• This study has established that an acceptable level of Perceived 
Safety Risk is a pre-condition for the normal operation of the 
demand function in offshore helicopter operations.  It has also 
been established that it is the cumulative rate at which that pre-
condition fails, according to each individual’s criteria, that will 
determine the strength of any subsequent force for change.  
However, because the number of accidents in the UK offshore 
helicopter industry is relatively low, it is only possible to guess at 
the correlation between causal factors and any corresponding 
level on the Perceived Safety Risk scale (Fig. 34).  It would be 
useful to develop this concept, apply the theory to a wider area 
of operations, and investigate whether any reliable correlation 
can be developed. 
 
• This study has studied the particular case of UK offshore 
helicopter operations and established a mechanism of safety, 
whereby information about a safety state is interpreted and 
translated into a perception of safety, and thereby into a 
decision.  It would be useful to explore the validity of this theory 
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as a set of general principles, first to air travel and then to 
transport as a whole. 
 
• A consequence of this theory is that it is conceivable that a 
situation can arise whereby a ‘free rider’ strategy could deliver 
short-term gains.  Suppose the levels of acceptable safety have 
been established as a result of the years flag carriers were able 
to make (and be seen to make) safety inputs in excess of those 
required by regulation.  It is possible that an operator could 
decide to reduce the level of safety inputs and receives cost 
benefits for doing so, without having to compensate passengers 
for such a reduction (i.e., it still competes on price with other 
carriers maintaining higher levels of safety inputs), for as long as 
the situation goes unnoticed by the population at large.  
However, if this mechanism of safety is generally valid, it is also 
conceivable that such a strategy introduces a latent failure to the 
market as a whole.  Should a situation arise whereby these cost 
reductions are exposed as contributory factors to an accident,  
the aftermath could tip from a relatively localised or short term 
market impact (for example, the aftermath of the ValuJet 
accident) to a full market crisis, dependent on maybe just a few 
additional factors. It would be a useful exercise to generate some 
scenarios around experts’ opinions (e.g. Delphi technique) of 
potential shortcomings in the aviation system (e.g., known areas 
of where present safety management is subject to a sufficiency 
paradox) and, using the model proposed here, forecast the likely 
market impacts. 
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1. Methodology 
 
Although there have been concerns that an apparently intuitive 
relationship between financial performance and expenditure on 
safety exists (or could exist in a future, less regulated 
environment), and that this could result in an increase incidence of 
fatal accidents; there is as yet little conclusive evidence either way. 
The Congress of the United States, in its report “Safe Skies for 
Tomorrow: Aviation Safety in a Competitive Environment” (1988) 
concedes that the complexity of overseeing the deregulated market 
exceeded initial expectations, and that programs and systems for 
tracking and analysing safety data were required.  It further 
recommended that ‘new emphasis could be placed on systematic 
and regular monitoring of financial conditions and management 
changes at airlines,..’(p.6). 
 
When considering this issue, there are two possible states, aside 
from the null case that there is an absence of any relationship.  The 
first is that financial performance can affect the safety record of an 
individual operator or airline (Rose, 1990), the second is that the 
safety record can affect the financial performance (Mitchell & 
Maloney, 1989). 
 
Whichever approach is taken, or possible combinations of these, it 
has to be acknowledged that there are a number of inherent 
complexities that make causal relationships particularly difficult to 
detect, let alone describe in any meaningful context. These include: 
 
1. Accidents, although significant events, are both statistically 
rare and random. 
2. When considering airline operations, there are many other 
operational circumstances that need to be factored, for 
example: 
a. Type and size of organisation 
b. Long haul vs. short haul 
c. Type of aircraft 
d. Geographic location and scope of operation 
e. Regulatory, cultural and economic environment 
3. The time line of any serious accident and subsequent 
investigation tends to be lengthy, making discrete observation 
and correlation of ‘cause and effect’ particularly problematic. 
4. Historically there has been, and to some extent continues to 
be, a marked lack of symmetry in information, with the 
market being generally at a distinct disadvantage. 
  
  
  182                     
              
  
 
It is often considered that the most significant obstacle to 
meaningful analysis is the, thankfully, rare and random nature of 
accident data.  To overcome this, some researchers have considered 
utilising the data collected on the more numerous non-fatal incident 
events.  However, as Barnett & Higgins (1989) point out, and as 
Dionne et al. (1997) discovered, although more numerous, the data 
is prone to incompleteness and of ‘unsatisfactory’ quality. 
 
In an effort to factor some, if not all, of these limitations the study 
focused attention on the helicopter industry, and in particular the 
offshore oil sector as a case study. The advantages of this are that: 
 
1. The operators all utilise similar aircraft, fitted to relatively 
uniform standards. 
2. All operations are conducted to Public Transport standards. 
3. The nature of operations is common. 
4. The standard of regulation is common. 
5. The general political and prevailing socio-economic conditions 
are common. 
6. The asymmetry of information is less skewed, with the major 
oil operators (de facto customers) assuming a very active role 
in overseeing and monitoring the contracts they place. 
 
The most logical starting point is the relatively low level safety 
events reported via the various occurrence reporting schemes, 
which are designed to capture information on all events that have 
had or may have an impact on the safe operation of aircraft. In the 
UK this scheme is known as the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting 
scheme (MOR), and managed by the Civil Aviation Authority.  The 
monthly reports contain summary information on any event that 
can be classed as either an incident or an accident, where the 
differentiation is made by severity of consequence rather than 
circumstance. 
 
Is the present Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme actually a 
richer source of information than presently realised? The existing 
MORS has been designed to capture information on all events that 
have had or may have an impact on the safe operation of aircraft. 
 
MORS published monthly reports formed the main source of data for 
the study, in which summary information on any event classed as 
either an incident or an accident is listed on a case by case basis 
(where any differentiation is made by severity of consequence 
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rather than circumstance), along with details of aircraft type and 
the reporting organisation. 
 
At the time analysis of the data was being undertaken, the latest 
report gave the Feb 2004 incidents. 
 
In order to establish industry groupings, the CAA and BHAB (British 
Helicopter Advisory Board) records were researched to identify the 
number of aircraft being operated, and the nature of activity 
undertaken by individual organisations. 
 
2. Rotary Wing Occurrences Submitted by Each Offshore 
Helicopter Operator Organisation 
 
As stated in the ICAO Safety Management Manual (2006), there are 
many business situations that are recognized as having an impact 
on general safety risks. “6.6.2 Some situations should alert State 
aviation administrations to the possible need for applying risk 
management methods, for example:.. a) start-up or rapidly 
expanding companies; b) corporate mergers;..d) companies facing 
serious labour-management difficulties;..”(p.6-11, 6-12) 
 
The reporting behaviour exhibited by the offshore sector of the 
helicopter industry has produced a sizeable quantity of data.  To 
examine whether a time-series analysis of MOR data could deliver 
evidence of periods of organisational instability, the UK offshore 
helicopter operators were examined in detail.  To de-identify the 
organizations concerned, single letter abbreviations are used in the 
reporting of data. 
 
Over the period 1995 – 2004, there have been 5 companies 
operating in the offshore role, in the UK sector.  However, one 
operator’s entry to the UK sector was short lived (consequently not 
shown in Fig.1), and on a relatively small scale (4 to 7 airframes 
compared to 45+ for the incumbents).  In addition, Operator ‘C’ is 
the result of a merger between ‘A’ and ‘B’ in September 1999.  So, 
in reality, it is necessary to compare the consolidated data for ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ prior to the merger, with that for ‘C’ post merger. 
 
The resulting data are illustrated in Fig.1. The difference in the 
underlying frequency of reports between the two major operator 
groups (the groups later known as ‘C’ and ‘D’) may indicate a slight 
difference in reporting procedures. It could also be a reflection of 
the fact that one fleet is more heavily dependent on medium weight 
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helicopter operations, which have a significantly higher frequency of 
departures and arrivals. 
 
Since there is this uncertainty, it is the purpose of this study to 
detect any significant shift in the relative reporting levels for one 
group year on year, rather than merely comparing the absolute 
level between the groups at any particular time.  
 
The two clear points of interest around 1997 and 2002 remain for 
the individual parts (A & B), and for the combined organisation that 
became Operator ‘C’.  
0
50
100
150
200
250
D-95 D-96 D-97 D-98 D-99 D-00 D-01 D-02 D-03
Date
N
o.
 o
f R
ep
or
ts
Operator 'A'
Operator 'B'
Operaor 'C'
Combined Occurrence Data Pre & Post Merged Operator 'C'
Operator 'D'
 
Fig.1  UK Offshore Helicopter Operator Occurrence Reports by Year, 
1995 – 2003 
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These two dates happen to coincide with periods of major change, 
in these cases, merger and acquisition activity. In 1997 operator ‘B’ 
merged with (in reality, was acquired by) another European 
operator, and in 2002 there followed a further acquisition of this 
new group by the North American parent company of operator ‘A’, 
to form the operator ‘C’. 
 
Anecdotal experience suggests a number of potential factors should 
be considered, for example: 
 
1. Reporting attitudes could change amongst employees as a 
way to apply pressure on management. 
2. The disruption of the workplace during such activity may 
genuinely affect motivation and has some detrimental effect. 
3. Management becomes less cohesive and certain about their 
goals and responsibilities, arising out of a certain amount of 
political positioning and confused ‘line management’. 
 
What is fairly certain is that something occurs under these 
circumstances that is reflected in the occurrence reporting data.   
 
Although there is nothing to suggest that absolute levels of safety 
were compromised by these organisational changes, it is possible to 
speculate about how a mechanism for elevating the operational risk 
may occur.  In the case of Reason’s (1997) model of organisational 
risk (sometimes referred to as the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model), it would 
appear consistent; as the ‘holes’ become more numerous, longer 
lasting and possibly larger as well. In the case of Perrow’s (1999) 
description of ‘Normal Accidents’, it is also consistent; the 
complexity of the organisation increases with the number of new 
factors; and the coupling of the organisation becomes tighter, as 
resources get stretched or less cohesive, diminishing the potential 
means to divert the course of any developing situation harmlessly. 
 
Whether or not absolute safety standards are compromised, it is 
apparent that occurrence reporting is affected by such re-
structuring and major organisational change.   
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3. Comparison with Financial Data 
 
These events are of interest because it is generally accepted that 
most mergers and acquisitions are potentially disruptive, and 
actually fail to realise the financial benefits intended, often falling 
below the value of the separate parts. ‘..acquisitions and mergers 
are painful and anxiety producing experiences.  They involve job 
loss, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, diminished 
power, and much else that is stressful.  No wonder most managers 
think about how to get them over with – not how to do them better 
the next time… ..acquisitions that appear to be both financially and 
strategically sound on paper often turn out to be disappointing for 
many companies:.’ (Ashkenas, DeMonaco, and Francis, 1998) 
 
There are some difficulties in trying to compare publicly reported 
financial data.  Namely: 
 
i. Financial Accounting Standards are not absolutely objective, 
and can be subject to interpretation. 
ii. Reporting schedules are not perfectly matched. 
iii. Some critical information, namely operating hours, remains 
confidential. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates two or three points of interest, and in an attempt 
to analyse these more thoroughly it was important to try and 
reverse some of the reported Financial Accounts into more readily 
meaningful Management Accounting type data. For all the financial 
data, a basic assumption had to be made, but it is problematic and 
may not be totally valid.  In order to get any meaningful 
comparison on a time line, it is assumed that within any reporting 
period the financial data can be divided into a monthly proportion, 
and re-organised into a calendar year without any gross distortion 
of the information. As Profit, and Operating Profit have been largely 
discredited as meaningful information, in light of much recent 
evidence concerning the ‘scope’ of interpretation available to the 
accounting profession, it was not the preferred measure for this 
analysis. 
 
Ideally, it would be useful to get the ‘Cost of Sales’ figures and then 
eliminate some of the variables without any direct relationship to 
safety management.  These are principally the cost of fuel and 
labour costs. It would have been preferable to take the ‘cost of 
sales’ less ‘employee pay’, but as both of these numbers were 
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inconsistently reported, the next best had to be selected, namely 
‘total expenses’ less ‘remuneration’.  This is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig.2: 
Comparative Costs less Remuneration
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To make any meaningful sense of the data it is necessary to try and 
get the costs per flying hour or sector.  It is evident that the levels 
of activity will greatly influence both the costs and the likelihood of 
a ‘Reportable Occurrence’. 
 
In an attempt to get an approximation of flying hours, CAA data 
from the ‘UK Offshore Helicopter Operations Statistical Report’ for 
years 1995 - 2002 were taken in conjunction with British Helicopter 
Advisory Board  (BHAB) data on the number of aircraft operated by 
member organisations.  Several attempts to find a credible 
approximation for company specific data were tested, but, to date, 
no such output has been sufficiently robust to warrant analysis.  
Problems include: 
 
i. Operator ‘D’ has a more significant proportion of its 
operations in overseas areas, which do not necessarily feature 
in the occurrence reports. 
ii. Operator ‘A’ retained a number of aircraft in the latter parts of 
the 1990’s with a proportionally low rate of utilisation. 
iii. The number of aircraft is too inconsistent amongst the various 
sources of data to be totally reliable. 
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Taking the information illustrated in Fig 3, it may be possible to 
consider some correlation between the significant peaks on the 
number of occurrences occurring for ‘B’ in 1997, and ‘C’ (post 
merger ‘A’ & ‘B’) in 2002, with the reporting ‘Operating Profit’ for 
the organisation(s).  In both cases, the peak in incidents was 
preceded with a drop in operating profit. 
 
Fig 3: Operating Profits 
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Care needs to be taken, in that the timing of the two events may 
well be more closely aligned than that, as the assumptions made in 
order to smooth out the differences in reporting schedules may 
have skewed the time line slightly.  Also, it is difficult to say with 
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any degree of certainty whether there is likely to have been any 
lead, lag, or any other relationship between these things, or in fact 
whether it is just similar effects of a completely different cause. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
“9.1.1  After collecting and recording voluminous safety data 
through safety investigations and various hazard identification 
programmes, meaningful conclusions can only be reached through 
safety analysis.  Data reduction to simple statistics serves little 
useful purpose without evaluation of the practical significance of the 
statistics in order to defines a problem that can be resolved.” (ICAO 
SMM, 2006, p.9-1)  
 
The evidence presented, analysing the period 1995 – 2003, makes 
a strong case for the idea that the levels of operational risk vary 
quite considerably without necessarily resulting in an accident, and 
can be significantly influenced by periods of organisational change 
and upheaval, as already suggested by ICAO.  This is consistent 
with other findings on organisational change (Ashkenas et al., 1998; 
Spekman et al., 2000).  
 
With so many other organisational changes occurring at the same 
time, there is little conclusive evidence that shifts in any key 
financial performance indicators are directly linked to the rate of 
occurrence reports.   
 
This may be the result of the fact that this statistical type measure 
of safety is not in fact the key determinant of safety as an economic 
driver.  Or, it may be that the theory of a relationship between 
statistical measures of safety and financial performance is sound, 
but the methodology lacks sufficient precision to reveal the 
evidence. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
• There was a possibility that this method would contribute 
something to earlier attempts to link the financial 
performance of an operator and its statistical safety 
performance.  However, this remains inconclusive. 
 
• There is also the possibility that the very inconclusiveness of 
the data is the result, and that the true economic relationship 
between safety and economic performance of the air transport 
industry is founded on different measures (or factors) of 
safety. 
 
• The research should examine further alternative approaches 
of study rather than seek to develop this one. 
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Glossary 
 
AOC  Air Operators Certificate 
 
CAA  UK Civil Aviation Authority 
 
BHAB  British Helicopter Advisory Board 
 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
 
FDM  Flight Data Monitoring 
 
HOMP Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme 
 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
 
MORS Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme 
 
MOR  Mandatory Occurrence Report 
 
OIG  Office of Inspector General 
 
SMM  Safety Management Manual 
 
SRG  Safety Regulation Group (CAA) 
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Preliminary Investigation 
- Passenger Interviews 
 
Purpose 
 
To aid questionnaire design, by conducting informal discussions with 
a sample of typical offshore passengers, as individuals and in 
groups, in their offshore working environment. 
 
Date 
 
11 – 14th May 2004 
 
Location 
 
Forties Bravo, Fixed Oil Platform, 110nm ENE Aberdeen. 
 
Profile 
 
Session 1: 2 x Engineers (male) with many years experience of 
offshore work and helicopter travel, including: Sikorsky, Bell, and 
Eurocopter Types. 
 
Session 2: 1 x Heli-Admin (female), whose duties encompass the 
administration of passenger and freight manifests, and the 
supervision of pre-flight safety briefs.  
 
Session 3: 2 x Operation Room Controllers (male), 1 with in excess 
of 10 years offshore experience, the other with 2.5 years. 
 
Session 4: 1x Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) (male), with 
ultimate responsibility for all aspects of work and safety on the 
platform. 
 
Session 5: 1x NUI OIM + 2x Engineers (male) NUI1 Team, 
experienced maintenance personnel who fly in helicopters the most 
regularly, generally at least twice per day, in all weathers. 
                                   
1 NUI : Normally Unmanned Installation 
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Key Points 
Session 1: 
Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
1.1 Priorities 
Both participants expressed the opinion that their main 
priority when choosing a seat was the size and location 
of exit. 
Peril, Size and Location of 
Exits 
1.2 Hazards 
Both participants are familiar with Health and Safety 
legislation, and expressed the opinion that many of the 
ergonomic factors of embarking and disembarking 
helicopters, in particular regard to step heights, would 
not meet normal work standards. 
 
Paternalism, Slips, Trips 
and Falls 
1.3 Environment 
Both participants stated that they became very aware in 
flight of any draughts or rattles associated with doors or 
windows. 
Peril, Design and Build 
Quality 
1.4 Equipment 
Both participants stated that they believed that 4 point 
harnesses were better than just a lap strap, given the 
main consideration of body restraint.  However, one 
participant did moderate the preference with a concern 
for how liable such systems are to impeding an 
underwater escape. 
Crashworthiness and 
survivability 
1.5 Behaviour 
Both participants considered that the no.1 objective in 
the design of a passenger compartment was to make it 
as relaxing as possible, as both participants were 
confident in their own and other passengers’ abilities to 
Peril, Comfort, Dread, 
Survivability, Human 
Factors 
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Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
conduct drills effectively provided no panic ensued.  One 
participant cited a belief that “In that Sikorsky crash the 
one guy who survived had been asleep, and so was 
perfectly relaxed”. (Believed to be a reference to S-61 
accident on Brent Spar, 1990) 
1.6 Drills 
Both participants stated that they try to note how 
jettison handles operate for their exit, but also believe 
that too much is asked of passengers in an emergency 
situation, especially in regard to operating life raft 
systems. If a quiz were to be held after watching the 
emergency brief, both doubted that the necessary points 
would be correctly answered. 
Survivability, Peril, 
Design and Operation of 
Emergency Equipment 
1.7 Flight Conditions 
The first factor noticed in flight is any change in noise, 
followed by changes in vibration.  Other more minor 
points include a dislike of flying in and out of cloud, 
much prefer either in or out. 
Environmental Factors 
1.8 
Pilot 
Announcements 
Both participants felt that the more modern aircraft with 
tannoy announcements were a retrograde step on the 
previous headset system, as they are difficult to listen 
to.  Also, they felt it important that Pilots should make 
efforts to pre-warn passengers about significant changes 
in conditions, but most importantly keep them informed 
about the time of travel.  
Trust & Confidence, In 
flight information 
1.9 In Flight 
Entertainment 
Both participants could recall a time when some form of 
entertainment was available to passengers via their 
headsets, and felt that this was a very positive measure 
Comfort, Anxiety, Human 
Factors 
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Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
toward making travel more relaxed, and therefore a 
contributor to safety by dampening any predisposition to 
panic. 
1.10 Procedure 
Rotors running or rotors stopped disembarkation does 
not convey any safety consideration whatsoever.  Rotors 
running is by far preferred, as it is perceived as quicker. 
Passenger Management 
1.11 Performance 
Some annoyance was expressed at how baggage weight 
is managed, with some apocryphal retelling of instances 
where as little as 5kg has been removed for the 
purposes of Max Weight.  Some doubt was expressed 
about the accuracy of body weights, and how this makes 
the situation with baggage contradictory.  (Author’s 
note:  Some sectors of the North Sea still use standard 
weights others actual) 
Regulation, Paternalism, 
Trust & Confidence, 
Passenger management 
1.12 Maintenance 
Both participants stated that they generally formed their 
view of maintenance based on the visible state of the 
interior.  As engineers, they particularly noticed any fluid 
leaks.  The stated view was, if the trim is “bust” is 
anything else?  They both stated a view that Offshore 
Helicopters come someway down the list of regulatory 
requirements, in comparison to other public transport 
aircraft and even other helicopters. 
Regulatory Oversight and 
Brand Management 
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Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
1.13 
Safety 
Programmes 
Neither participant was aware of the major offshore 
safety initiatives, in particular the role and significance 
of IHUMS2. 
Communication, Brand 
Management 
1.14 Training  
The whole working environment of offshore operations is 
predicated on safety management and training, and so 
the extensive pre-flight briefing used in the helicopter 
operations, allied with the provision of survival 
equipment, is taken as normal.  The only perceptible 
impact of such training is not on their attitude towards 
helicopter travel, but rather on that toward general 
airline travel.  Both subjects felt they take more care to 
note where they sit, and find the general lack of concern 
and attention exhibited by other passengers toward 
safety briefing a source of annoyance. 
Passenger Information, 
survival equipment and 
unintended consequence 
1.15 Questionnaire 
Both participants expressed doubts as to how effective 
any web-based questionnaire would be, as only senior 
personnel tend to have access to terminals whilst 
offshore.  Both believed that any survey would need to 
be conducted at the heliport. 
Survey Methodology 
 
 
 
 
                                   
2 IHUMS: Integrated Health and Usage Monitoring System 
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Session 2: 
Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
2.1 Statistics No awareness shown about the state or role of accident statistics. Perception 
2.2 Training 
The participant expressed her opinion that because of training, she 
felt far more confident of her chances of escaping an accident in a 
helicopter than other aircraft. In fact, she generally felt safer in a 
helicopter “as our windows come out”.  However, she did express 
the opinion that the safety videos have been too long in the past, 
although better now, and contained too much information to 
absorb at once. 
Passenger 
information and 
perception. 
2.3 Behaviour 
The participant observed that passengers tend to get ready for 
flight very early and have their favourite seats, and will endeavour 
to sit in those chosen locations each and every time – herself 
included.  She generally felt that her priorities in this regard were 
space followed by location of exit (Author’s note: The participant is 
of small stature, which may make this comment somewhat 
surprising at first glance). 
Anxiety, Peril, 
Comfort, Human 
Factors 
2.4 Drills The participant felt that although the drills require some passenger 
participation, these were not too complicated.  
Emergency 
procedures and 
survivability 
2.5 Performance 
 
The participant considered that the general awareness and 
understanding of the significance of baggage weight was poor.  
 
 
Passenger 
information and 
management. 
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No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
2.6 Maintenance 
The participant expressed the opinion that she wouldn’t tend to 
notice much about the exterior presentation of an aircraft, but may 
well note the state of interior, inferring that if the general upkeep 
were poor than something may well not be right elsewhere. 
Maintenance, 
Brand Management 
2.7 
Flight 
Conditions 
The participant stated that she most noticed changes in noise, with 
some sense of unease and discomfort during take-off, especially 
offshore, as it involves a “bit of up and down in the hover first”. 
Peril, Dread, 
Human Factors 
2.8 Safety 
Initiatives 
The participant was aware of many of the programmes, including 
IHUMS, but only by dint of her role as a Helicopter Administrator. 
Brand Management 
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Session 3: 
Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
3.1 Statistics 
Both participants were generally unconcerned about statistics, 
but expressed the opinion that “it is safer in the helo 
(helicopter) than in a car”.  The general assumption being that 
it’s a regulated industry, and that if the aircraft has been 
released for service, it is therefore safe. 
Safety Management 
and statistics 
3.2 Training 
Both participants felt more confident about their chances of 
escape from a helicopter accident than other modes of air 
travel. 
Passenger information 
and survivability 
3.3 Culture 
Both participants considered helicopter travel safer, on the 
assumption that helicopters are more “controllable, as they 
can come to a stop” and that an emergency landing is better 
on water “because it’s softer”. 
Passenger information 
and perception 
3.4 Environment 
One participant expressed a preference for sitting next to a 
window, the other (a relatively tall person) stated that his first 
priority when choosing a seat was space. 
Peril, Comfort, Human 
factors 
3.5 Maintenance 
Both participants considered the state of interior relevant to 
their overall impression of maintenance and airworthiness.  
They tend to associate poor trim and any leaks with age, and 
age with reliability of the aircraft. 
Brand management 
3.6 Pilot  
Both expressed a high level of confidence in the competence of 
helicopter crews, and considered the sight of aircrew 
conducting “walk-rounds” on deck a reassuring measure. 
Trust & Confidence, 
Brand management 
3.7 
In flight 
conditions 
Although neither participant considered the tannoy 
announcements a problem both would prefer a headset 
system that incorporated some form of entertainment system, 
Comfort, Peril, Dread 
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Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
similar to that used in the past.  It was considered that such a 
system would make a significant contribution to making the 
business of helicopter travel more pleasant and relaxing. 
3.8 
In flight 
conditions 
Changes in noise tend to “grab attention” most during 
helicopter flight, but, in general, if there is any concern it is 
during take off and landing offshore, because both participants 
are conscious of the lack of space and turbulence.  It was 
considered a good flight management practice to pre-warn 
passengers of likely changes in conditions that may give rise 
to turbulence and the like. 
Human factors and 
passenger 
management 
3.9 
Safety 
Equipment 
4 point harnesses give a greater sense of security. 
Crashworthiness and 
survivability 
3.10 Environment 
When asked as to which aspects of interior design would they 
wish to improve, both agreed upon bigger windows first, 
followed by creating “more room”. 
Cabin design, human 
factors and 
survivability 
3.11 Training 
Both participants felt that they pay much more attention to 
airline safety briefs as a result of their offshore helicopter 
training. 
Passenger information 
and unintended 
consequence 
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Session 4: 
Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
4.1 Reliability 
Reliability is taken for granted, on the assumption that it is a 
function of licensing and regulation. 
Safety management 
and trust 
4.2 Priorities 
The participant (a tall man) stated that on boarding the aircraft 
his priority was “how to get out”, and he takes into consideration 
location of exit and the size and type of passengers in adjacent 
seats.  He has a favourite seat, and tends to become more aware 
of things when he is not able to sit in that location. 
Survivability and 
human factors 
4.3 Environment 
The participant is conscious of space, and is uncomfortable with 
the any sense of confinement, but this is a secondary 
consideration to the priority of a perceived ease of exit. 
Cabin design, Dread, 
Peril, Human factors 
4.4 Maintenance 
No particular note is made of aspects of aircraft presentation, 
although it was supposed that some note is made of the overall 
impression given by the interior, whether it’s tatty or old. 
Brand management 
4.5 Training 
As a result of the training and information provided to offshore 
passengers, the participant firmly believed that his attitude 
toward general air travel had been altered. He makes some 
conscious effort to note the name of airline operator, and takes a 
dimmer view of airline operations. He has even gone as far as 
considering taking a smoke hood with him. 
Passenger 
information, Brand 
management and 
trust 
4.6 Management 
The participant could not recall a single incident, in his capacity 
as OIM, when somebody brought a report or complaint 
concerning the safety of helicopter operations, any concerns 
raised tend to be restricted to logistical problems (time, weather, 
capacity and so-on). 
 
Safety management 
and performance 
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Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
4.7 Risk 
The participant considered the risks associated with helicopter 
operations, though not insignificant nor small, well catered for 
within given operational procedures and the Safety Case, and in 
relation to other potential risks associated with the whole 
operation of an oil platform, well down in the 3rd quartile of 
management concern.  Any management issues tend to be 
restricted to day-to-day concerns over logistical matters. 
Regulation, trust and 
safety management 
4.8 Development 
Given the perception that safety management is in place, the 
participant would most welcome improvements concentrated on 
broadening the “operational window” of offshore helicopter 
operations. 
Market development 
and customer focus 
4.9 Management 
Having an offshore based aircraft is considered a very mixed 
asset, and on balance a “net negative” from his perspective 
(Author’s note: the nature of the contract does tend to create 
most benefit for other oil company assets within this field) 
Strategic vs. 
operational 
management 
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Session 5: 
Ref. 
No. 
Subject Summary of Discussion Issues 
5.1 Management 
The group considered the main priority during a shuttle 
operation as minimising the speed of turnaround.  
Performance measures 
5.2 
Safety 
Management 
As the operation is regulated, it is taken for granted that 
safety is a given.  
Passenger information, 
trust, brand and safety 
management 
5.3 
Design for 
Safety 
The group considered the enclosed fan, or fenestron, a 
feature of helicopter design that made a considerable 
contribution to safety in the offshore environment.  
Design, safety 
management and 
performance 
5.4 Cabin 
Environment 
The subject group are very familiar with two types of 
helicopter, the AS332 (Puma) and AS365 (Dauphin), and 
have past experience of others.  The design features that 
they assessed as good were the: 
• All-round visibility of the Dauphin 
• The spaciousness of the older designs as opposed to 
the perceived confinement in a Puma 
• Build quality, as the gaps and rattles around the doors 
in a Dauphin tend to unsettle passengers, tending to 
make them concerned about the security of the 
locking mechanism. 
Engineering quality, 
design policy, and 
human factors 
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Summary Points 
 
Although the participants had a variety of jobs and a wide range of 
experience in the industry, and some fly more than others, there 
were some recurring themes during the preliminary survey. 
 
These include: 
1. Statistics seem to have little or no impact in framing offshore 
helicopter passengers’ perception of safety.  
2. Training has a significant impact on perception, but not in 
regard to helicopters but rather in changing attitudes toward 
aviation travel as whole. 
3. Many features of flight conditions attract attention, but almost 
universally it is noise, or precisely changes in noise, that 
becomes consciously noticed. 
4. The state of interior trim and maintenance influences opinion 
about the state and presentation of the whole airframe. 
5. Nearly all the participants of this small survey were confident 
in their own ability to conduct emergency drills, and in the 
level of safety afforded by the operation as a whole, but were 
almost universally concerned about possible panic.  The more 
experienced workers could recall a period when headsets were 
provided, through which some simple in-flight entertainment 
could be played, and when the airframes in use provided more 
sense of space.  Both of these measures were suggested as 
positive contributors toward making the journey more 
relaxing, and thereby providing a safety benefit to 
passengers.  
6. Despite the many significant improvements in helicopter 
safety management sponsored by the oil industry, in 
particular the IHUMS program, there seemed to be little or no 
awareness of these benefits amongst the participants 
surveyed. 
7. The safety standards provided by the helicopter operators was 
generally taken as a given, with a high degree of confidence 
being expressed in the capability of aircrew. 
8. The four point harnesses presently being introduced were 
universally accepted as a safety improvement, and welcomed 
as such. 
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Preliminary Survey - Pilot Interview 
 
Occurrence 
 
A chance discussion with two highly experienced pilots (both over 
10,000 hours experience) delved into the concept of trust and 
regulation. 
 
Date 
17 Aug 2004 
 
Location 
Humberside Airport. 
 
Profile 
Seasoned offshore qualified pilots, with current experience on the 
S76 type. 
 
Summary Points 
 
1. The July 2002 crash was of greater concern to operator crews 
than appreciated. 
2. A body of pilots that felt that the system of safety regulation 
had failed crews, by putting unfair pressure on them.  By not 
having made any official moves to ground the aircraft, it 
resulted in individual crews having to make up their own 
minds about the safety of continued operations, and in a 
commercial employer-employee relationship that is a heavy 
burden. 
3. The passengers were only convinced to continue flying 
because they believed that the crews would not put 
themselves at any undue risk, but this failed to appreciate the 
commercial pressure in the relationship. 
4. The drip-feed nature of subsequent faults in blades reinforced 
a general feeling of unease, compounded by the certainty of 
catastrophic consequences (given the type of component 
failure). 
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5. One of these seasoned pilots described the situation as being 
the first time in his aviation career where he felt an 
expendable resource of the company, not just economically 
expendable (with regard to job security) but “physically and 
morally” as well.  The operator companies had placed 
commercial risks above “a safety first” principle. 
6. The same pilot considered partly let down by the company, 
but mostly by the regulatory bodies.  He could not understand 
why the AAIB and CAA had not taken a more precautionary 
approach in the immediate aftermath of the accident, given 
the nature of the in-flight break-up.  His trust in such 
organisations had been completely destroyed as a result. 
 
Interesting Points 
1. The system of trust is more complicated than just passengers 
and the aviation industry. There is a more intricate interplay 
of interest groups, including flight crews and operating 
companies. 
2. The system of regulation has a part to play in ensuring a 
“duty of care” within the industry. 
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February 2005                         Air Transport Group 
Cranfield University 
Building 115 
Cranfield 
Bedfordshire 
MK43 0AL 
 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
We need to know what you think. 
 
 
Research into “The Economics of Safety”: 
Phase 3, Stakeholder Survey 
 
 
The above research project forms an integral part of a wider study being conducted 
at the Safety and Accident Investigation Centre, a sub-group within the Air Transport 
Group, Cranfield University. 
 
The overall objective of the study is to better understand how and why safety matters 
to the aviation industry, from an economic viewpoint. 
 
The Offshore Helicopter sector of the industry has been selected for detailed study, 
because it represents a particular set of circumstances where the issue of safety and 
safety management has a much more obvious part in customer relations. 
 
As in any complex industry, it is not just the structure and framework of organisations 
and institutions that is important; it is also the perception of that framework and the 
efficiency of those relationships that has real consequence in the longer-term. 
 
Each company and organisation has a part in the bigger picture, driven by your 
individual interest.  It is your opinion, as a member of those institutions, which is 
being sought. 
 
This survey is a “tick-box” type format, and should take no more than 10-15 mins to 
complete. 
 
There really isn’t a right or wrong answer to any of these issues, it is how people feel 
about them that matters. 
 
Although you are encouraged to consider the question carefully, please try to avoid 
spending too long thinking about the answer, as we are really trying to get your first 
reaction, or “gut-instinct”.  
 
Thank you, 
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Offshore Helicopter Operations: 
Stakeholder Survey 
 
 
 
 
Sex:     Male                Female                        
 
 
 
Age:     <30      
     30-45    
     >45    
 
Organisation:   Exploration & Production    
     Support Services     
     Government Institutions     
     Helicopter Operator    
      
     Other…………………………….. 
 
 
Do you have management responsibilities with regard to Helicopter 
Operations? (Excluding Flying)  
 
Yes*    
No    
 
*Please describe briefly what those are (e.g. Heliadmin, Logistics etc.) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
How often do you fly in a helicopter to or from offshore installations? 
 
More than once per week     
Weekly or fortnightly     
Between 6 and 12 times per year    
Less than 6 times per year     
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Q1.Rank the following statements in the order you feel appropriate: 
 
                  
   
The Government Institutions have the greatest responsibility for ensuring Helicopter Safety
  
The Oil Companies have the greatest responsibility for ensuring Helicopter Safety 
  
The Helicopter Operators have the greatest responsibility for ensuring Helicopter Safety  
 
The Unions have the greatest responsibility for ensuring Helicopter Safety  
   
 
Q2. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
   
I believe risk is unavoidable, but life is generally safe.            
  
I believe risk is avoidable, and there are still too many dangers in life.  
   
 
Q3. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
 
*Flying in helicopters is now safer than it has ever been 
  
 No less safe, but no more safe 
  
 Less safe  
   
 
*Q3a. If you believe helicopters are now more safe, has there ever been 
a time when you felt less safe?  
   
Yes  
 
No  
   
 
*Q3b. Please provide any particular reason for the answer given? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….….. 
 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 4 
Tick One 
Tick One 
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Q4. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
   
 
Safety Regulators should never compromise on safety in their actions. 
  
Safety Regulators have to make some allowance for cost in their actions. 
 
Safety Regulators have an equal obligation to safeguard the financial viability of the industry. 
 
  
   
Q5. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
   
The Helicopter Industry is best placed to recognise the most effective safety measures.  
 
Government Institutions are best placed to recognise the most effective safety measures. 
  
The Oil Companies are best placed to recognise the most effective safety measures. 
 
 
 
Q5a. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
 
 
The Helicopter Industry is best placed to oversee the implementation of safety measures.
  
Government Institutions are best placed to oversee the implementation of safety measures. 
 
The Oil Companies are best placed to oversee the implementation of safety measures. 
 
 
 
Q6. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
 
 
Self-regulation in safety would be the most efficient system for helicopter operations. 
 
A light regulatory touch from the state is the most efficient system for safe helicopter 
operations. 
 
A strong system of state regulation is the most efficient system for safe helicopter operations. 
 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Tick One 
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Q7. Aviation is like any other industry, as well as the need to be safe it is 
subject to everyday commercial pressures, and needs to make a profit 
in order to survive. With which of the following statements would you 
most agree? 
   
All details of any safety related matters concerning individual companies should be published, 
so that nothing is hidden. 
 
Some information is of a technical nature and no public interest is served by publishing, 
provided nominated third party organisations are fully informed. 
  
Aircraft operators are responsible organisations and should not be forced to divulge 
unnecessary detail about their safety management.  
   
 
Q8. Serious accidents are very rare, but when they do occur there are a 
number of decisions to be made. With which of the following statements 
would you most agree? 
   
All aircraft of that type should be grounded as a matter of standard procedure, at least until 
more is known. 
  
The aircraft type doesn't need to be grounded automatically, but Investigation Authorities 
need to justify not grounding rather than vice-versa 
  
The aircraft type does not need to be grounded automatically, and any decision to cease 
operations is rarely justified.  
   
 
Q9.  With reference to individual aircraft operators, with which of the 
following statements would you most agree? 
   
The accident record of any company is very relevant to perceptions of safety, and it should be 
published.  
 
The helicopter industry operates to general standards, and so it is only the record of the 
industry as a whole that matters. 
   
Published safety records are open to distortion and misinterpretation, so any publication 
would be detrimental to overall safety management.  
   
 
 
 
Q10. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
 
I am only happy to continue flying as long as safety is tightly regulated. 
  
Market forces and commercial interest is sufficient to keep flying safe. 
  
The media is now more important than government in keeping aircraft operations safe.  
   
 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Tick One 
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Q11. Do you take notice of what type of aircraft you fly in? (Airline or 
Offshore Helicopters) 
  
Yes  
 
No  
  
  
Q11a.  If you were able to choose between aircraft, how would you order 
the following factors for importance? 
 
 
a. Comfort  
b. Noise 
 
c. Spacious cabin 
 
d. Safety record  
 
e. Location of exits 
f. Size of exits 
 
g. Speed 
 
h. Standard of interior fittings (maintenance) 
 
i. In-flight information/entertainment  
   
   
 
Q11b. With reference to individual aircraft types, with which of the 
following statements would you most agree? 
   
The accident record of any particular aircraft type is very important information, and should be 
generally available to the public at large.  
 
Modern aircraft are all designed and built to a similar standard, and I take no interest in the 
safety record of the type of aircraft I am travelling in, even if it were generally available. 
 
   
 
Q12. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
   
  
The feeling of being safe when flying in helicopters is a major consideration for me deciding 
whether to work offshore. 
  
There are much more important things to think about when choosing where and when to 
work. 
 
Should helicopter safety change for the worse, it would easily become a factor in deciding 
whether to work offshore. 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 9 
Tick One 
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Q13. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
   
*Some of the survival equipment makes the flight unnecessarily uncomfortable. 
 
It is so much more important to have survival equipment that I can easily tolerate any slight 
discomfort. 
  
*Please Comment 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
   
 
Q14. Offshore helicopter operations are necessarily conducted largely 
over water; with which of the following statements would you most 
agree? 
  
  
It makes no difference to safety 
 
It is more safe than flying over land 
  
It is less safe than flying over land  
   
(Please take a moment to say why you answered as you have) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q15. How important is it to be able to express your own opinion about 
Helicopter Safety matters. 
 
   
Very Important. 
  
Important. 
  
Unimportant. 
 
 
Tick One 
Tick One 
Tick One 
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Q15a. In relation to Q15, who is it most important to be able to express 
your opinion to? 
 
a. The Government, through its institutions (HSE/CAA/AAIB etc)  
b. The Oil Companies  
c. The Unions  
d. The Operating Companies (CHC/Bristow/Bond etc)  
   
 
 
 
Q16. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
   
 
The standards of safety in offshore helicopter operations are better than in airline travel. 
 
The standards are neither any worse nor any better. 
 
The safety standards in offshore helicopter operations are not as high as airline travel.  
 
   
 
Q17. With which of the following statements would you most agree? 
  
  
The safety training is comprehensive and my chances of survival in an offshore accident are 
high.  
 
The safety training is comprehensive, but that the chances of survival are low. 
  
The safety training is not comprehensive enough, and the chances of survival are low.  
   
   
Q18. In any ten year period, how many fatal accidents do you think 
occur in offshore helicopter operations worldwide? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………….…….
  
Q18a. Of those accidents, what percentage do you think are in the North 
Sea?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
   
 
Note: CAA – Civil Aviation Authority 
         AAIB – Air Accident Investigation Board 
         HSE – Health and Safety Executive 
 
Tick One 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 4 
Tick One 
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Q19. If you were asked to guess, how would you order the following 
areas around the World as to the relative toughness in safety 
regulations for offshore helicopters?  
 
   
a. USA  
 
b. Canada  
 
c. Norway  
  
d. UK  
 
e. Australia  
 
   
 
 
Q20. How relevant do you believe the standards of safety regulation are 
to your everyday travel? 
 
   
a. Very relevant  
b. Some relevance  
c. Little practical effect  
d. Solely a paperwork exercise  
   
 
Q21. Whom do you credit most for driving safety innovation and 
improvement in offshore helicopter operations?   
  
  
a. The Government, through its institutions (HSE/CAA/AAIB etc)  
b. The Oil Companies  
c. The Unions  
d. The Operating Companies (CHC/Bristow/Bond etc)  
   
 
 
Note: CAA – Civil Aviation Authority 
         AAIB – Air Accident Investigation Board 
         HSE – Health and Safety Executive 
 
 
 
 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 5 
Tick One 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 4 
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Q22. In the event of an accident, how much information are you 
interested in knowing? 
   
 
a. I want to know every detail, so as to make up my own mind about how safe it is to fly   
again. 
  
b. I just want to know the main points, so that I can be assured that the investigation is 
thorough.  
  
c. I just want to know who is to blame 
  
d. I don’t really want to know any details, as it might stop me flying again. 
 
e. Don't know  
 
   
 
 
Q23. Accidents are very rare, but should one happen, whom would you 
most trust for accurate information concerning the circumstances of the 
accident?  
   
 
a. The Government Accident Investigators  
b. The Oil Companies  
c. The Helicopter Operators  
d. The Media  
  
 
Q24. Accidents are very rare, but should one happen, whom would you 
most trust for accurate information concerning whether it is safe to fly 
again? 
 
  
a. The Government Accident Investigators  
b. The Oil Companies  
c. The Helicopter Operators  
d. The Media  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Tick One 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 4 
Rank 1 
(High) 
to 4 
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Q25. With which of the following statements would you most agree?  
 
   
Every company needs to make a profit, but if a company cannot demonstrate that safety is 
put above all considerations at every time, it should not be permitted to operate. 
  
No company can be expected to take an absolute and uncompromising position on safety, 
and as long as it doesn’t have a worse position than anyone else, a company should be 
allowed to operate. 
  
The market forces are sufficient to ensure that safety is maintained at acceptable levels, 
without any punitive safety enforcement penalties imposed by government.  
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and participation, your 
opinion matters and will be heard. 
 
 
How to Return: 
 
A. If you have completed this form in the passenger terminal, please 
place it in one of the boxes provided. 
 
B. If you have you have been given this form via a nominated company 
representative, please return it to that individual. 
 
C. Any return may be sent directly to: 
 
 
Simon Mitchell 
Air Transport Group 
Cranfield University 
Building 115 
Cranfield 
Bedfordshire 
MK43 0AL 
 
 
 
Please feel free to find out more about the University and the 
Department by visiting: 
 
http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/soe/airtransport/csaic.htm 
Tick One 
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Questionnaire Analysis 
 
 
The questionnaire resulted in 32 elements, from which data could 
be collected and organised to provide evidence for conclusions 
regarding the stated research objectives. 
 
As a way to check that all potential factors were adequately covered 
by the final draft of the questionnaire, the potential output for each 
question was analysed for elements and sub-elements of theory 
covered in the literature review.  The resulting information is 
presented in Tables 1a & 1b.
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Q 1 2 3 3a 3b 4 5 5a 6 7 8 9 10 11 11a 11b 
Absolute Safety      1           
Relative Safety  1 1         1     
Statistical Safety                 
Paternalism 1     1 1 1 1  1 1 1    
Uncertainty          1 1 1   1  
Peril    1 1     1 1   1 1  
Dread    1 1            
                
Availability   1 1 1          1  
Knowledge          1    1 1 1 
Power / Control                 
Expectation 1     1          1 
Trust 1        1      1  
Confidence 1      1 1     1  1  
Aversion  1    1     1      
Totals 4 1 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 6 2 
 
 
Table 1a (Appendix C) : Question Plan 
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12 13 14 15 15a 16 17 18 18a 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Totals Q 
               1 2 Absolute Safety 
  1   1    1       6 Relative Safety 
       1 1        2 Statistical Safety 
    1 1    1 1 1  1 1  15 Paternalism 
            1 1 1  7 Uncertainty 
1 1 1   1 1          11 Peril 
 1 1              4 Dread 
                 
                4 Availability 
  1   1 1   1       8 Knowledge 
1   1       1      3 Power / Control 
     1    1      1 6 Expectation 
         1 1 1  1 1  8 Trust 
          1   1 1  8 Confidence 
1               1 5 Aversion 
3 2 4 1 1 5 2 1 1 5 4 2 1 4 4 3 89 Totals 
 
 
Table 1b (Appendix C) : Question Plan 
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Ref No Q3b Q13 Q14
1 Risk of capsize, esp in bad weather, remoteness of rescue
2 Most helicopters can land I believe survival would be easier on land
4
Everything nowadays is aimed at safety so they should be safer now than 
they have ever been realistically
Weather conditions in water aren't very good, sometimes in N Sea 
at best of times you can mostly land all right on dry land if there is 
a problem
6 Irregularly fitting seals (neck & wrist) Capsize risk, ability to escape
7
Since 1988 the survival and safety training has improved 
greatly
A high speed impact is same on land as water
8
The few accidents with helicopters have proven the use of 
survival equipment
I assume crashing on land is as bad as ditching in the sea
9
Over the years improvements made ie. 2 pilots, improved flying suits, 
improved lifejackets
Flying suits in very hot weather
10 I have full faith in pilots
11
In the 1980s, I was aware of a number of crashes involving offshore 
travel, now they are almost unheard of in the North Sea
Chances of survival in a water crash virtually zero, but not much 
better over land. In a ditch better over land
12
Flying offshore/onshore during the late 1980s & early 1990s pressure on 
companies to fly in very poor weather was present. I flew from NE 
Shetlands in some awful weather & once refused a flight.
The companies must continue to develop new and 
innovative ideas for this market
Landing in an emergency on land is much easier than ditching to 
water at freezing temp.
13 We still operate old technology equipment
Money should be invested in new aircraft not more safety 
equipment
No terrain clearance issues and generally less traffic
14
Have always been glad to fly in choppers with two engines. Regulation has 
ensured that risks have reduced.
How many times in the last 30yrs have survival suits been 
used in earnest & saved lives
No or fewer vertical hazards
15
Following Shell's S76 crash off Leman in 2002.  The industry continues to 
learn from accidents and investigations which continuously improves 
safety.
16 I once flew in the Gulf of Mexico in a Huey. That was less safe.
17 After crashes etc. If the helicopter has a problem it could be over land or sea
18
I was onboard the Santefe Monarch in 2002 when the S76 went down so 
for a while I thought about safety much more.
19 A drop from the air is a drop from the air
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22
Whilst water may make for a more soft landing, operations are not 
affected
26 Flying to NUI from a platform when the wind is calm.
In these waters I feel some of the equipment are 
unnecessary
Crashing on water is as equal to land
27 Feel that re-breathers are a waste of time
28 Short flights so safety is more important Impact of incident over either has major consequences
31 Due to the structure of the helicopter
34 You don't need to swim on land (dumb question)
35 If you are going to crash you will
38 Helicopter crash, S76, no real reason found why
Shoulder harnesses and high back seats are a positive 
improvement in safety, although slightly more onerous to 
wear.
A helicopter does not know where it is flying in relation to land or 
water.  Chances of survival in either case are probably equal.
39
The same measures should be taken to ensure safety, whether 
over land or water (the highest measures)
40
Generally feel that as time progresses & accidents happen, the findings 
contribute to increasing safety
Whilst recognising its importance, ergonomics must be 
considered to promote its use
If you survive the impact, survival on land is easier
42 Some items are OTT (re-breathers) Water or land helicopters should not crash
43 Less incidents now due to awareness
45 Cost cutting pressure from oil companies (contracts awarded on price)
Passengers wear too much clothing/survival suits in 
summer
survival less likely after emergency landing
47
When flying single-engined helicopters over water or when single pilot IFR 
at night in twin-engined helicopters
In flight emergencies can happen at the same rate over water as 
over land.  Properly equipped, a heli can land anywhere on the 
water, not always possible over land.
48 More regulation and standardisation
Survival equipment designers should be very mindful of 
sortie length
Safety and survival equipment is provided to suit the operational 
environment
52 Beginning of the 1980s - safety management/design not what it is now Qualified answer - depends on duration of flight
In the event of a problem requiring immediate landing you will be 
better placed on land than water
53 Better diagnostics, engine management diagnostics
Crashes are generally non-survivable whether over land or sea.  
Controlled ditching in the sea is less safe due to likely sea states
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Ref No Q3b Q13 Q14
54 In the 80s pre - HUMS/HOMP etc.
56 Better FDM systems now & diagnostics
Injured passengers may not escape from a/c before drowning.  
Although impact may be greater on land, injured should survive
58 Wont make much of a difference in case of an emergency
66
Cannot identify anything which has improved safety.  Helicopters are 20+ 
years old!
Neck seals are tight, liners are hot Helicopters can land anywhere, but are top heavy so flip in water
68 New technology makes it safer now than previously
With engine situated above pax, upon impact (either land or water) 
it will drop on top of them regardless
69
After landing onshore, aircraft jammed one undercarriage wheel in drain 
cover on apron.  Pilot attempted to use lift from rotor to free the jammed 
wheel without disembarking passengers first.  Aircraft tilted heavily to one 
willing to use any item which increases survivability
70 Ex military.  No doors on Pumas in them days
Hitting water at speed just the same as hitting land.  Prefer land if 
controlled landing as you can walk away from the aircraft - easier 
than swimming
72
You don't have the same opportunity to walk/crawl away from a 
crash over water as on land!
73
Unplanned landings can be controlled or uncontrolled.  
Uncontrolled landings are unlikely to be survivable either way.  
Controlled landings are likely to be safer on land.
74
Comfort in helicopters makes you feel safer and all safety improvements 
ie. Three point harness make you more uncomfortable.
For a man over six ft two wearing all the equipment I don't 
be;ieve he could escape, and no way could he assume the 
crash position.  (all helicopters need 3" more leg room)
I believe if I crash I would be very lucky to escape, but, if I 
survived, to then have to escape in water and wait on rescue - I 
don't think I have a chance.  The chances of the aircraft floating 
upright, I also believe to be slim.
75 Water temp, ease of rescue, disorientation & panic
76 Search & Rescue, and weather limitations for rescue
78 The important part is keeping the aircraft in the air!!
79
You can have so much "safety eqp" round your neck it is 
impossible to move. So puts down your chances of getting 
out of a crashed helicopter.
Does not matter what you are flying over - it is normally the drop 
that kills you.
81
A lifejacket with integrated air pocket may be more 
comfortable.
Less likely to endanger lives below.
82 Shuttling from platform to platfoem during adverse weather conditions
Can't say whether flying over land or water makes a difference to 
safety, apart from the obvious.
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83 safety should be standard
85
It may seem less hazardous to ditch in water but it presents its 
own hazards
87
In the 4 years I have been going offshore little changes have occurred & 
general culture is to continually improve standards.
both situations have risks & equally important in safety terms
88 autorotation over land is safer, helicopters overturn on water
89 increased recovery time if ditching
90
I am concerned, however, that some survival equipment 
(airpocket) may hinder my exit in an emergency
Survivability of a forced landing is the same whether on land or 
water - what matters is your chances once you have escaped the 
wreckage.
91 It is safer to put down in water
93 Less force of impact if land in water
95
Equal risks/different hazards. Water: drowning/rapid escape req'd - 
Land:Impact buildings etc/fire
97 If you crash it's not good land or sea
99
Because of the dangers of survival at sea (assuming you survived 
the crash)
102
In an emergency - unless the pilots have control of the helicopter 
it does not matter.  If it falls from 1500ft, you are lucky to survive.
103
In the early days passengers were not weighed, freight offshore was 
guessed & put on the flight.
From the point of being rescued, it is less safe flying over water
104 Re-breathers getting in the way when putting seat belt on
105 Very little safety equipment. Personal, lap life jacket only
Safety equipment has much improved over the years - very 
basic 25 yrs ago
You can't land in heavy seas
107 Control on overly large/obese passengers
108 Flying in Gulf of Mexico, not as much preparation training Flights are not that long
Page 230
Ref No Q3b Q13 Q14
109
Whilst I believe that safety has increased, in terms of awareness of risks 
associated with helicopter flight & protection provided in the event of a 
crash; I always feel safe.  However, that may be due to placing my well 
being into the hands of others when I have confidence in their 
professional skills.
Any aid to survival should be taken
I would consider that the survival rate over water would be slightly 
higher than over land.
110
But felt safer just after 'downed' chopper about 2yrs ago, as I knew 
everyone would be more focused on maintenance/safety.
In my view the chances of survival are bad any way
116
Landing on a helideck with 60kt winds.  One passenger on & one off 
holding onto a rope on your knees.
Some companies insist on 3 layers of clothing plus TIG, re-
breather etc.
Safety should be the same over land or sea
117 Overseas If you emergency land on water you can not just walk away
118 Less control on flying in bad weather conditions in the past.
119
At no time have I ever felt unsafe. During a flight or whilst dealing with 
heli-ops.
The safety of the helicopter to me is far more important than the 
consideration of flying over land/water
122 Easier for emergency access
123 No difference to passengers in a crash on land or sea
125 If you crash at speed it makes no difference
126 Landing on water (if required) it's an issue regarding surviving
127
Re-breathers, can't see them being any use in helicopter 
ditch. It would be a panic situation.
132 Continuing to upgrade
134
Most people think when a chopper goes down no one will 
survive anyway!
136 Stricter regulations Safety equipment may one day save my life An accident can happen over land or water
137
When first offshore not compulsory to wear survival suits or even 
lifejackets.  Also nowadays re-breathers in use
Whether over water or land, if helicopter falls out of sky it is 
irrelevant what it hits
138
Trainings for escaping drowning helicopter provided, safety video is shown 
before flight, airpocket and swimsuit provided.
When helicopter crashes - it crashes
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141 Chopper had to turn back to airport as a technical fault developed (Radar)
Perhaps a built-in lifejacket (all in one) would be more 
comfortable.
Flying over land or sea in my opinion should make no difference to 
safety
143 Better technology Subconsciously safer (OVER LAND)
144
I would say it is a lot safer flying over land, if you can control the 
landing you have no chance of drowning.
145 I believe helicopters are inherently unsafe
Since a helicopter would drop like a stone, I think the difference is 
negligible
146 Helicopter Operators
148 The helicopter should be safe whether travelling over water or land
149
A forced landing on land gives the opportunity to select a field, 
airfield, road etc. Over the sea conditions are more severe, sea 
temperature for example
150 Because of 76 accident
151
Greater condition monitoring, better technology, tighter constraints on 
flying, operating conditions etc.
Safety of aircraft is same over land or water but risks increase over 
water in event of aircraft ditching
153
Not personally, but with equipment, systems and regulations that are in 
place, helicopters (and aviation) is now more safe.
However, I regard flights to offshore installations generally safer 
than other roles involving helicopters.
154
The vibration monitoring equipment is a major factor in preventing critical 
failures along with the constant improvement in material specifications.
155 While in the forces seen things I did not find safe. If you go down you go down
156 An irrelevant question as all crash sites are different
158
I am a pilot so as long as lifejacket is unrestrictive and I 
can still fly.
Survival times in water compare to land, liferafts increase time, 
slight discomfort.
159 Providing the aircraft can land location does not matter
163
I have previously flown in helicopters because of military service and 
offshore work but have never felt particularly unsafe in helicopters.
Slight discomfort is not a concern
If a helicopter can be landed under controlled conditions it is safer 
over land
164 Do not fly if sea state prevents rescue by standby boats.
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165 Survival time very minimal
166
It should not matter if flying over land/water - safety will still be 
same
168 Regardless where you fly, safety still matters
169
Advances in technology and the airworthiness of aircraft has improved 
dramatically
Dress to survive
Many years of flying over water, help isn't easily at hand should 
the event occur!
172 You very rarely hear of helicopter crashes or disasters
Special suits have to be worn when flying over water and you can't 
emergency land on water obviously.
173
Early days, ops pressure, management pressure dictating how engineers 
assess problems.  Lack of investment in engineering depts.
Land and sea crashes have different factors which may affect 
survival of passengers/crew, both are equally important.
174
In the late 70's and early 80's the performance and equipment was 
sometimes marginal
Take offs and landings are the times when most incidents happen
175
Flying in industry for 5 yrs and safety has always been paramount and is 
constantly improving as focus is always on a safe and efficient operation.
Some items on life jackets do make flights uncomfortable 
over a long period of time. Eg. Personal beacons, flares
Hostile terrain or not should not have any bearing on operational 
safety
177 Low possibility of terrain collision
178 Less safe before HUMS systems were fitted Water is not as flat as the land (in this country)
180 Earlier times and differing commercial pressures Experience as a pilot. Walking away is easier than swimming away
181
Difficulty of rescue; possible rough sea state for ditching; cold 
temperatures; no protection from elements
182
We now have shallower cros-cockpit gradients; decision making by flight 
crew has become more conservative
Difficult to answer; onshore implies high density traffic and 
increased risk of CFIT; offshore accidents produce a consequential 
survival issue, but this has been mitigated by many initiatives in 
terms of safety equip/tng., HUMS, SAR, etc.
183
Recovery time can be lower and recovery made more difficult in 
water
184 Much less chance of CFIT
185 HUMS
Even a safe (ie. successful) landing on water exposes passengers 
and crew to the dangers of hypothermia and drowning
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186 Because you can drown more easily
190
It's not necessarily a feeling, more a realisation that risks are better 
managed now and the industry is more highly regulated (at least in the N 
Sea area)
Survival/rescue time in the event of an emergency 
landing/ditching. "Cold shock"
191
Previous operation (still ongoing) was single-engine/single pilot/no AFCS 
over water, at night (overseas)
More regulated, better equipment & training, fewer obstructions, 
crews more experienced & qualified
193 Safety ongoing, therefore always feel as safe
194
Improvements in technology allow improvements to safety programs, e.g. 
FDM/HUMS etc.
Life jackets could be made far more comfortable. Wide 
variety used on the Nsea - no standard
A ditching at sea is more hazardous than a forced landing onshore, 
but the helicopter doesn't know whether it's over sea or land
195
Air conditioning should be available in order to prevent 
heat exhaustion in summer which would be made worse if 
a full ditching occurred.
There is no ground to hit when low-level over water and 
obstructions are well-mapped.
196
Being in a helicopter with a large person next to you taking up half of your 
seat and blocking the exit that they will not fit through.
There is some good survival equipment out there (suits) 
the oil companies should spend some money and buy it.
If you make the crash landing on water you only have 3min 
without good suits.
197 In the event of a problem, there are obviously fewer places to land.
199
Prior to lightening strike on blade incident which was a factor in the 
incident at Norwich.
200 Mainly because of the continuing safety researches Whether flying over land or not safety should not be compromised.
201 Services are far more professional than 70's & helicopters newer.
The only reservation with British equipment is the 
comparative effectiveness between ours and Norwegian 
survival suits, Norwegial vastly superior.
Survivability in water after high impact landing marginally better 
than land.
202 I'd rather land in the water than hit the ground
204
Additions of HUMS to aircraft, advances in condition monitoring & lessons 
learned from many years of operation.
205 At the first sign of a problem pilots return to base and sort it out. Re-breather and PLB is uncomfortable but is important tool. Softer landing (I Hope)
206 Everyone in the business is older now. You can't drown on land.
207 Older aircraft, foreign locations with less stringent operating procedures.
209 General improvement over time - new a/c,ROSS, HUMS, HOMP
Survival risks balanced by survival equipment, most critical failures 
do not respect environment.
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211
Better survival suits, but cramped cabins, i.e., 18 people would be hard to 
exit in a crash.
No granite clouds. Therefore less flight into terrain incidents. Only 
recovery after an incident is more awkward.
212 Too cumbersome
If you can auto glide - better to land on something solid - not tip 
over in water.
213
Due to poor ergonomics and expanding waist sizes in the event of 
submersion I feel in some seats there is little chance of escape or use of 
equipment due to lack of space/movement.
As mentioned before due to lack of space and small exits in 
some cases do not believe it could be used!!
Do not believe in the controlled landing said to occur in briefs.
214 Advances in survival suits, self inflating gear (PPE)
216 Safety equipment has to be accessible.
Flying over land or water is equally hazardous, wlthough the 
nature of the hazards are different.
217
One would expect safety elements to improve with technological advances 
and the increasingly more vigilant safety culture generally.
It would make a difference to the survival equipment carried but 
survival would depend upon the location and circumstances of the 
crash (& pilot skill).
218
There's too much safety equipment now; survival suit, 
lifejacket and location beacon. Don't like the idea re-
breather.
Same risk applies over water (drowning hypothermia), land impact 
related injuries.
219 It is more important to stay airborne.
221
After any incident, but mainly after the Chinook incident off Shetland, 
which I was close to at the time and knew a number persons involved.
If you have a heavy landing water is still hard.
225 The new survival suits hurt the back of your neck
If your helicopter is safe, it does not matter where you fly land or 
sea.
226
Acceleration due to gravity is the same regardless of the surface 
flown over.
227 Introduction of new safety procedures and equipment. Safety takes priority
9 times out of 10 helicopter will be able to land - added hazard of 
drowning & cold temps.
228
How would I know as a passenger if helicopters are more or less safe than 
before?
No difference for crash, but a landing (ditching) on water involves 
other hazards like hypothermia.
230 Only been offshore for 7 months but had no problems in regard to safety.
L.A.P Jacket is a bit sore on the back of the neck when it is 
a long flight.
The water is as hard when hitting at speed.
231 New lifejacket with built-in re-breather is very heavy
233
Chances of survival in incident more or less the same, and down to 
individual's instincts.
236
Survivability in a crash is low on sea or land.  Similarly a controlled 
landing is survivable.
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237 No incidents in 15 years (personal?) I don't believe the survival equipment brings much.
239
High reliability of the aircraft has a greater importnace than 
survival equipment
As Q13 reliability & the prevention of incidents is paramount.
244 Flying in very bad weather, near miss in fog. Helicopters can turn over on sea.
245 Advances in technology and reliability. Rescue & recovery
246 If helicopter goes down it's going to break up wherever
248 Safety should be paramount whether over land or sea.
250 The time they flew Chinooks. Very uncomfortable round the kneck, mind bending There are advantages/disadvantages to both.
252 Purely because of difficulty of effecting a rescue.
254 Modern design & construction of a/c
255
As long as all relevant precautions are taken and appropriate 
training provided, I feel safe.
256 Increased awareness in helicopter safety. I don't see any real difference.
257
Helicopters are making several stops on different installations, resulting in 
more take-offs & landings, known to be the highest risk during flight.
Survival rate is low during any accident over water or land
258
Flying is now safer.  There are still helicopter incidents, near misses, 
technical faults, and fatal crashes still occur. But, in the past, helicopters 
have been used which were uncomfortable, noisy & generally hated by the 
work force.  I refer to Chinooks, and although numerous complaints were 
made, it took a fatal crash to take them out of service.  Generally 
concerns are now acted on.
A helicopter flight should be safe no matter whether it is over land 
or water.  Operators should be 100% sure that their aircraft are 
safe to fly anywhere.
259
Bulky & stiff lifejackets make for an uncomfortable journey 
which can last up to 2 hrs.
Height/speed/impact are the critical elements to survival in an 
aircraft failure.
260
More control and guidelines now as pre 1980's, ie. Pilots' flying hours, 
wind and sea states, weight restrictions, better maintenance, more 
emphasis on safety.
Over land and sea the safety remains paramount
261 Older aircraft, less reliable systems.
Relative impact of water/land obviously less, but drowning danger 
exists.
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262
Mechanical faults cause stress. Bad weather conditions makes you worry a 
bit.
Easy access is more important than slight discomfort. Once in the air, it makes no difference (land or sea).
264 Only been offshore for 1 year & therefore have not known different
falling from height into water or land doesn't matter, you're still 
going to die
265
Standards around helideck operations for boarding and dis-embarking are 
now tighter.
Survival equipment should be standardised across the 
industry
Falling from height have the same risks no matter what you are 
over.
266
3 layer policy + TIG suit + survival suit make travel very 
uncomfortable in crampt Tiger/Puma
Falling from circa 2000ft will result in same outcome.
268 Less known incidents or reported incidents in recent years. It is the aircraft integrity that is key, no matter where it is flying
269 I did not feel safe flying in the Chinooks
270
If the helicopter crashes mid flight I'm likely to be killed on 
impact, I'd rather be comfortable
Less places to land if minor problem occurs.
272
Even in a controlled ditching you may have to cope with bad sea 
states. Added risk once landed which does not occur over land.
273
The new lifejacket pull down neck, keep head from going 
back
If you crash, you crash
274 When flying in Chinook helicopters
Either way the chances of survival are minimum on both land or 
sea
275
I feel that if a helicopter crashes that it would not make much ods 
about was below.
276
There is a secondary accident hazard in drowning if you were to 
survive the crash.
277
Used to fly Chinooks, was on Cormorant Alpha crew when chopper went 
down.
Provided rotor are intact, it really makes no difference hitting 
water. From a great height, uncontrolled will be the same as land 
with *** difficulties
278 Flying in higher sea states years ago
279 Does not seem to be so much incidents Better chance of survival in accidents (water)
280 They can land at any time on land
281
In event of failure larger 'safe' area to land at short notice (over 
water)
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282 less of an impact (water)
283 Life jacket too large, should be lighter and more compact No matter where you're flying, safety is no.1 priority.
284 Up-to-date survival suits, communication, training Three layer policy If you have to ditch at sea you are not trying to avoid anything
285 Possible design changes would improve comfort Falling from a great height hurts
286
Standards of offshore heli-crew competency & standard of operating 
company's maintenance & operations
My perception is less safe: although in reality I suspect there's 
probably no difference after surviving the impact whether you 
drown or survive the fire
288
Due to ditching/aircraft remaining upright/ rotor blade impacting 
water
289 Water provides its own hazards. Rescue access
290
I've never felt unsafe flying, but recognise that there has been continual 
improvement with training, safety equipment & procedues which has 
increased safety.
I do agree that it's more important to have survival 
equipment, but only if it is proven that it can help save 
your life in more than an obscure way.
Only rescue service may be very remote.
294
Before three months ago I had not been in a helicopter, so therefore I 
don't know how they used to be. But, I would think it is down to all 
personnel to ensure safety.  There is occasional mechanical malfunction, 
but if no one cared for safety then indeed flying would be unsafe.
I would rather be slightly uncomfortable for a short while 
with a better chance of survival, than be comfortable with 
less chance of survival.
I would think it would be slightly safer than flying over land; would 
not crash on civilian buildings or streets, & with lifejackets & rafts 
hopefully our chance of survival would be better than hitting 
concrete.
295
Flying adverse weather, multiple take-off and landing on 'milk-run' flights. 
(less)
Lifejackets now incorporate air-pocket, very bulky. Would 
be awkward to get out of helicopter window in case of 
emergency.
If it hits water or land, it's still going to hurt
297 I would like to think helicopter travel is gettung safer every year. If helicopter fails over land you can land quite easily.
298 I can't recall any occasion on a helicopter flight whereby I felt at risk
You'd want every available means of survival about you if 
an accident were to happen
If the helicopter was to crash I feel that it would be equipped to 
cope with either scenario
299
I am happy with the safety from 3 years ago until now.  I have only been 
offshore for 3 years.
The safety equipment is required. Fact. Nothing can be 
done about it.
Risk of Fire reduced
300 If you crash from a height water is just as hard as land.
302
You seem to have to wear more and more clothing & 
equipment every year, making escape from helicopter more 
difficult
Survival percentage over water should be higher, but how long 
would you last in sea?
303
We as a helideck crew and as helicopter passengers feel confident in the 
helicopter operators, as this is the safest way to get from offshore to 
onshore each trip.
new lifejackets are uncomfortable
If flying over land and the engine gives way, the helicopter can 
auto gyrate and have a reasonable safe landing
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304
Flying offshore on the morning of Tuesday 26th Feb 2006, the aircraft 
lifted from Bristows Aberdeen in white-out conditions. When other 
operators were not flying at that particular time.
The equipment/ re-breather is a bit bulky
If anything happened and a controlled landing was necessary, the 
pilots have the training to land the aircraft on land or water.  But 
on water the sea state has a large influence on the safety of 
305 There are greater safety aspects than whether over land or sea
306 I do feel they always err on the side of safety
It is just acceptable at present, but I wouldn't like to wear 
anything else!
Only if there was a low speed impact (safer)
308
Flying Chinook helicopters, 44 passengers with only 4 emergency exits, if 
the Chinook landed on the sea & turned over, there was 'no' chance of 
escape.
If a helicopter has to ditch, there is the possibility of it turning 
over, thus forcing people to try & escape - wouldn't happen on 
land.
309 Please make escape exits bigger
Both uncontrolled land & sea ditches are likely to end in death, 
controlled land ditches are slightly more safe.
310 Technology has improved over the last 25 years
Because of the stinginess of oil companies & government apathy, 
the flotation devices are still fitted in the wrong place, allowing 
aircraft to turn turtle in the slightest seas.  These devices should 
be fitted where the weight is, I.e., engines & gearbox
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Appendix E 
 
 
Table for Work Decision Scenario with Individuals Who Believe Risk is Avoidable
Demonstrating Safety * Work Decision * Compromise * Regulatory System * Grounding * Accident Record * Regulatory Oversight * Express an Opinion * Safety Training * Accident Information Crosstabulation
Count 
Accident Information Safety Training Express an Opinion Regulatory Oversight Accident Record Grounding Regulatory System Compromise Demonstrating Safety Work Decision Total
Helicopter Safety Important S More Important Factors S Should Safety Change for the Worse S R
Every Detail 2 Comprehensive 0 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 5 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 5
2 0 2 1 2 2 0 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
2 0 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
2 0 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 6 4 21 F 0 17 3 2 19 H 9
2 0 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 2
2 0 2 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 4 20 G 0 16 1 2 18 I 5
2 0 2 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
2 0 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
2 0 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
2 0 2 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
2 0 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
2 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Market Forces 0 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
2 0 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Market Forces 0 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
2 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 22 0 18 1 2 20 G 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 10 4 23 D 1 0 19 H 3 2 21 F 14
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 21 F 0 17 2 19 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 22 E 0 18 2 20 1
2 2 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 0 16 2 18 1
2 2 2 1 2 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 21 F 0 17 2 19 1
2 2 2 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 22 E 0 18 2 20 1
2 2 2 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 21 0 17 2 2 19 H 2
2 2 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 22 0 18 1 2 20 G 1
2 2 2 0 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Market Forces 0 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
2 2 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 1 2 17 J 1
2 2 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 21 0 17 2 2 19 H 2
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 1 0 16 K 2 18 1
2 2 1 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
2 2 1 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
2 Not Comprehensive 4 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 25 B 0 21 2 23 1
Main Points 1 Comprehensive 0 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
1 0 2 1 2 2 2 Equal Obligation 0 Relative Parity 1 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 0 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 3 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 3
1 0 2 1 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 0 2 1 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 0 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 0 2 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 0 2 1 1 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
1 0 1 1 2 2 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 1 0 13 N 2 15 1
1 0 1 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
1 0 1 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
1 0 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Relative Parity 1 4 16 1 0 12 O 2 14 1
1 0 1 0 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 14 M 0 10 2 12 1
1 0 1 0 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 13 1 0 9 R 2 11 1
1 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 0 16 2 18 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 3 4 22 E 0 18 1 2 20 G 4
1 2 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 21 0 17 2 2 19 H 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 1 2 17 J 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
1 2 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 2 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Market Forces 0 4 17 1 0 13 N 2 15 1
1 2 2 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 2 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 1 0 12 O 2 14 1
1 2 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 21 F 0 17 1 2 19 H 3
1 2 1 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 Relative Parity 1 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 3 2 18 I 3
1 2 1 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
1 2 1 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 1 2 17 J 1
1 2 1 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
1 2 Unimportant 0 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 2 0 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
No Details 3 Comprehensive 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
3 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Market Forces 0 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
3 2 Important 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Relative Parity 1 4 18 1 0 14 M 2 16 1
3 Not Comprehensive 4 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 26 0 22 1 2 24 C 1
109
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Table for Work Decision Scenario with Individuals Who Believe that Risk is Unavoidable
Demonstrating Safety * Work Decision * Compromise * Regulatory System * Grounding * Accident Record * Regulatory Oversight * Express an Opinion * Safety Training * Accident Information Crosstabulation
Count 
Accident Information Safety Training Express an Opinion Regulatory Oversight Accident Record Grounding Regulatory System Compromise Demonstrating Safety Work Decision Total
Helicopter Safety Important S More Important Factors S Should Safety Change for the Worse S R
Every Detail 2 Comprehensive 0 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 17 J 1 0 13 N 1 2 15 L 4
2 0 2 1 2 2 0 2 Relative Parity 1 1 4 16 K 0 0 12 0 2 14 1
2 0 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
2 0 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 7 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 7
2 0 2 1 2 2 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
2 0 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
2 0 2 1 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
2 0 2 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 18 I 0 14 1 2 16 K 3
2 0 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
2 0 2 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
2 0 2 1 1 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 16 K 0 12 1 2 14 M 3
2 0 2 1 1 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 3 2 15 L 3
2 0 2 1 1 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
2 0 2 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 1 0 12 O 1 2 14 M 2
2 0 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 1 0 12 O 2 14 1
2 0 2 0 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
2 0 2 0 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
2 0 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
2 0 2 0 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Market Forces 0 1 4 12 O 0 8 2 10 1
2 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
2 0 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
2 0 Unimportant 0 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 14 M 0 10 2 12 1
2 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 2 2 17 J 2
2 2 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 0 16 2 18 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 4 21 F 0 17 4 2 19 H 8
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 Relative Parity 1 0 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
2 2 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 1 2 17 J 2
2 2 2 1 2 2 0 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 1 0 16 K 2 18 2
2 2 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 21 F 0 17 6 2 19 H 8
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 0 0 16 2 18 1
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 Relative Parity 1 0 4 19 2 0 15 L 2 17 2
2 2 2 1 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Self Regulation 0 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 1 0 12 O 2 14 1
2 2 2 1 2 0 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
2 2 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
2 2 2 0 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 2 0 14 M 2 16 2
2 2 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
2 2 2 0 2 1 1 Equal Obligation 0 Market Forces 0 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
2 2 2 0 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
2 2 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 1 2 17 J 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 20 G 0 16 2 2 18 I 3
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
2 2 1 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
2 2 1 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 1 0 15 L 1 2 17 J 3
2 2 1 1 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Self Regulation 0 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 14 1 0 10 Q 2 12 1
2 2 Unimportant 0 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 1 0 14 M 2 16 1
2 2 0 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 12 1 0 8 S 2 10 1
2 2 0 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
2 Not Comprehensive 4 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 23 D 0 19 2 21 1
2 4 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
2 4 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
Main Points 1 Comprehensive 0 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 15 1 0 11 P 2 13 1
1 0 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 0 2 1 2 2 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 0 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Relative Parity 1 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 0 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
1 0 2 1 2 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 16 K 1 0 12 O 0 2 14 3
1 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 Market Forces 0 0 4 14 0 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 0 2 1 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
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Table for Work Decision Scenario with Individuals Who Believe that Risk is Unavoidable
Accident Information Safety Training Express an Opinion Regulatory Oversight Accident Record Grounding Regulatory System Compromise Demonstrating Safety Work Decision Total
Helicopter Safety Important S More Important Factors S Should Safety Change for the Worse S R
1 0 2 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Relative Parity 1 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
1 0 2 1 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Market Forces 0 4 11 0 7 1 2 9 R 1
1 0 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 0 2 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 0 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 2 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 2
1 0 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Publication Detrimental 0 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Equal Obligation 0 Market Forces 0 1 4 11 P 0 7 2 9 1
1 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 0 1 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Relative Parity 1 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 0 1 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 0 1 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 0 1 1 2 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 13 1 0 9 R 2 11 1
1 0 1 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 0 1 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 12 1 0 8 S 2 10 1
1 0 1 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 1 4 12 O 0 8 2 10 1
1 0 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 13 0 9 1 2 11 P 1
1 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Very Important 2 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 14 2 16 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 20 0 16 1 2 18 I 1
1 2 2 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 1 Equal Obligation 0 Relative Parity 1 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 4 19 H 0 15 1 2 17 J 5
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 Relative Parity 1 1 4 18 I 0 14 0 2 16 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 18 I 0 0 14 2 16 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 Relative Parity 1 0 4 17 1 0 13 N 2 15 1
1 2 2 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 0 4 19 0 15 1 2 17 J 1
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 Relative Parity 1 1 4 18 I 0 14 0 2 16 1
1 2 2 1 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 1 0 14 M 1 2 16 K 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 2 2 1 Publication Detrimental 0 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 1 0 12 O 2 14 1
1 2 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 2 0 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 15 L 0 11 2 13 1
1 2 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 1 2 15 L 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 19 0 15 2 2 17 J 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 Relative Parity 1 4 18 0 14 1 2 16 K 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 Equal Obligation 0 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 17 J 0 13 2 15 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 1 1 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 2 0 13 N 2 15 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 16 K 0 0 12 2 14 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 Relative Parity 1 0 4 15 1 0 11 P 2 13 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 18 0 14 2 2 16 K 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 Relative Parity 1 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 Equal Obligation 0 Relative Parity 1 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 17 0 13 1 2 15 L 1
1 2 1 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 2 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 14 1 0 10 Q 2 12 1
1 2 1 0 2 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
1 2 1 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 2 1 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
1 2 Unimportant 0 Tight Regulation Required 1 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Never 2 Absolute Priority 2 4 16 0 12 1 2 14 M 1
1 2 0 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Automatic Aircraft Grounding 2 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 15 0 11 1 2 13 N 1
1 2 0 0 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Market Forces 0 4 11 1 0 7 T 2 9 1
1 2 0 0 2 1 1 Some 1 Market Forces 0 1 4 12 O 0 8 2 10 1
1 Not Comprehensive 4 Very Important 2 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Some 1 Absolute Priority 2 1 4 19 H 0 15 2 17 1
1 4 2 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Equal Obligation 0 Relative Parity 1 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 4 Important 1 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 1 4 16 K 0 12 2 14 1
1 4 Unimportant 0 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 14 0 10 1 2 12 O 1
Who is to Blame 0 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Important 1 Market Forces Sufficient 0 Publication Detrimental 0 Grounding rarely warranted 0 Light Regulation 1 Some 1 Relative Parity 1 4 10 1 0 6 U 2 8 1
No Details 3 Comprehensive 0 Important 1 Tight Regulation Required 1 Industry Record relevant 1 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Self Regulation 0 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 13 1 0 9 R 2 11 1
Don't Know 0 Comprehensive but Chances Low 2 Important 1 Media Exposure more Important 0 Should be Published 2 Not-grounding to be justified 1 Tight Regulation 2 Never 2 Market Forces 0 4 14 1 0 10 Q 2 12 1
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